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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction: India's Droit Politique 
and the Politics of Judging
Abstract   A single question suffices to structure this thesis — why 
has the Indian Supreme Court become so powerful? Embedded 
within this question lie three contextual dimensions which 
consequently come to frame our analysis of judicial power: 
relational, temporal, and institutional contexts. Firstly,  Chapter One 
introduces judicial power as relational; most forms of power are 
and especially for a court — with ‘no influence over either the 
sword or the purse’ (Hamilton, Federalist, No. 78) — our search for 
answers thus must begin with a search for those powerful actors 
who can make the Supreme Court do something it does not want to 
do; vice versa, to what extent can the Indian Supreme Court impose 
its will on those other actors, especially through persuasion and 
influence as key indicators of judicialisation? Secondly, Chapter 
One maps the temporal contexts of this thesis, illustrating that 
judicial power — like all good dependent variables — varies over 
time. Thirdly, the Supreme Court is not just an idea, but also an 
institution: a building, with a budget, and surrounded by a fence, 
where judges, clerks and lawyers struggle with enormous 
workloads together. Chapter One argues that their power is 
embedded in political reality, calculation and strategy, and to 
understand the nature and origins of the power of the Court we 
must, above all, study the diffusion of power through elections. 
Last but not least, as the English legal language does not 
distinguish easily between droit and loi, between Recht and Gesetz, 
Chapter One also brings in that great paradox of constitutional 
theory, the relationship between pouvoir constitué and pouvoir 
constituant, to analyse the fall of parliamentary supremacy and 
India’s new basic structure constitutionalism.
1
CHAPTER 1   ·   Introduction
[1.1] From Parliamentary to Judicial Supremacy 
Is the Indian Supreme Court the most powerful court in the world? This was not always 
a question posed by those who study Indian politics. When Indian Independence was 
young, the Westminster model was at the forefront of constitutional thought and the 
supremacy of parliament quickly became the central paradigm for understanding Indian 
politics, polity and policies. With Nehru at its head, the Congress party was not content 
with gaining office and majorities, but aimed for nothing less than boundless legislative 
freedom to rebuild Indian society from above. What is more, with the inauguration of a 
republican constitution in 1950, the ascendancy of universal suffrage, and the 
consolidation of a unitary legislative power, any type of reform politics and any agenda 
for social change not only implied changes in the contents of laws but above all a 
revolution of law’s institutional premise in terms of popular sovereignty. For the first 
time, modern institutions of mass democracy would claim a pivotal role in the 
administration of justice and as India held her first general election in 1951, the idea of 
law itself inevitably became captive to the ultimate primacy of the legislature and the 
mobilising power of democratic competition. Speaking in Parliament on March 14, 
1955, on the fourth constitutional amendment, Nehru elaborated:  
You may say, you must accept the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution. They are wiser than we are in interpreting things. But, I say, then if that 
is correct, there is an inherent contradiction in the Constitution between the 
2
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fundamental rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy. Therefore, again, it 
is up to this Parliament to remove that contradiction and make the fundamental 
rights subserve the Directive Principles of state policy.  
[…] 
The Ultimate authority to lay down what political or social or economic law we 
should have is Parliament and Parliament alone; it is not the function of the judiciary 
to do that. […] We accept the interpretation by the judiciary of the Constitution. 
Having accepted that, we feel it is not in consonance with the social or economic 
policy that we think the country should pursue. Therefore, we do not by-pass the 
Supreme Court; we come for a change in the Constitution, accepting their 
interpretation of it. (LSD, March 14, 1955; columns 1949, 1957) 
In a nutshell, at the beginning of the 1950s Nehru and India’s political elites had no 
doubt that ‘if the Constitution itself comes in our way, then surely it is time to change 
that Constitution’ (Nehru 1989 [1951], 325).  1
Enter Chief Justice Sikri and the famous judicial opinions in the Kesavananda 
case,  known throughout the world as an epoch making affirmation of the power of 2
judges, and asserting the ultimate supremacy of the Indian Supreme Court over the 
ballot box. This drumming vindication of judicial power, though partly a strategic 
retreat from the unsophisticated doctrines set out by the Golak Nath case,  has become 3
1 The following two paragraphs are from Fischer (2007). The mere project of an entrenched written 
constitution already had been a step out of Dicey’s shadow and parliamentary supremacy in its most 
radical sense — as India makes a clear legal distinction between constitutional and other laws and 
introduces ‘a  judicial or other authority having the right to nullify an Act of Parliament, or to treat it as 
void or unconstitutional’ (1939, 91); at the same time, the immediate introduction of the Ninth Schedule 
before the first election restores the idea of parliamentary omnipotence to some extent, especially when 
combined with the explicit claim to a right to legislate on any topic as Parliament pleases through 
constitutional amendments.
2 (1973) 4 SCC 225.                 
3
 Golak Nath vs. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643.
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the icon of India’s new constitutionalism, as unelected judges have effectively 
substituted the notion of the parliamentary sovereignty with an unambiguous 
declaration of formal judicial supremacy. The story of judicial power then continues 
with the emergence of public interest litigation, India’s rights revolution and an 
unparalleled transformation of judicial behaviour in terms of social activism. Today, 
there ‘is no area where the judgments of Supreme Court have not played a significant 
contribution in the governance — good governance — whether it be environment, 
human rights, gender justice, education, minorities, police reforms, elections and limits 
on constituent powers of Parliament to amend the Constitution.’   As well as this, the 4
Indian Supreme Court  has come to provide the single most important avenue for 5
political activists, organised groups of every stripe and opposition parties to challenge 
the government of the day. Above all, it is not only astonishing to note the exceptionally 
bold and copious rulings of the court after the emergency, but, what is more, since the 
end of the 1980s the judges have repeatedly claimed the power of ‘the last word’ and 
successfully imposed their will on the executive and legislative. For India’s judges, the 
supreme act of popular sovereignty was the ratification of the Constitution of 1950, not 
the electoral process, and it is the Court’s job to put elected politicians in their place. 
This was no easy victory for the Indian Supreme Court, and it is worthwhile 
remembering that the Court’s frontal assault on the supremacy of the Indian Parliament 
 Speech of the Chief Justice of India, Y. K. Sabharwal, Role of Judiciary in Good Governance (2006, 4
11); <http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in/new_links/Good%20Governance.pdf>, last accessed, 
September 12, 2015. 
  Throughout this thesis we speak of “the Court,” when of course there is no single Supreme Court, but 5
rather sets of many Indian justices. The question of how judges reach consensus and how individual 
judicial preferences are aggregated is a related but different topic, and chapters two and three address 
such theoretical problems in detail.
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was at first unsuccessful and politically costly because of retaliation by the other 
branches of government. 
It has been not today’s policy, but the old policy of the National Congress laid down 
years ago that the zamindari institution in India, that is the big estate system must be 
abolished. So far as we are concerned, we, who are connected with the Congress, 
shall give effect to that pledge naturally completely, one hundred per cent. And no 
legal subtlety and no change is going to come in our way. That is quite clear. […] 
Within limits no judge and no Supreme Court can make itself a third chamber. No 
Supreme Court and no judiciary can stand in judgment over the sovereign will of 
Parliament representing the will of the entire community. If we go wrong here and 
there it can point it out, but in the ultimate analysis, where the future of the 
community is concerned, no judiciary can come in the way. And if it comes in the 
way, ultimately the whole Constitution is a creature of Parliament. But we must 
respect the judiciary, the Supreme Court and the other High Courts in the land. As 
wise people, their duty it is to see that in a moment of passion, in a moment of 
excitement, even the representatives of the people do not go wrong; they might. In 
the detached atmosphere of the courts, they should see to it that nothing is done that 
may be against the Constitution, that may be against the good of the country, that 
may be against the community in the larger sense of the term. Therefore, if such a 
thing occurs, they should draw attention to that fact, but it is obvious that no court, 
no system of judiciary can function in the nature of a third House, as a kind of Third 
House of correction. So, it is important that with this limitation the judiciary should 
function.  6
This Nehruvian understanding of parliamentary supremacy — for Dicey parliament can 
make or unmake any law, for Nehru, Parliament can make or unmake any part of the 
constitution — may have been the constitutive principle of Indian politics after 
 Jawaharlal Nehru, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume IX, pp. 1195-96 [10th December 1949]. 6
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Independence, but it has lost first its vitality and then its relevance. After a nostalgic, 
courteous nod to Indira Gandhi’s institutional dance with the judges in the 1970s, we 
can declare parliament’s supremacy as dead as the electoral hegemony of the Congress 
system. At the end of almost three decades of grim institutional struggle between the 
governing Congress party, whose mandate was backed by the people, and the Court, 
whose mandate was backed by a piece of paper, there was nothing to stop the judges 
after the breakdown of the Congress system. Today, the working of Indian governance is 
structured by an ever-expanding web of constitutional and legal constraints. In a word, 
Indian politics has been judicialised as the Supreme Court routinely intervenes in 
legislative processes, establishes limits on law-making behaviour, reconfigures policy-
making environments, sets new policy agendas and even drafts the precise terms of 
legislation.  
[1.2] The Political Origins of Supreme Court Power
Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation that ‘scarcely any political question arises in the 
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question’  holds true for 7
India too, particularly since the early 1980s, as India’s Supreme Court judges began to 
reinvent themselves in the course of the emergence of public interest litigation as 
judicial activists of the “most active” sort. Today, authors like Upendra Baxi and S.P. 
 Quoted in Langer (2002, 1).7
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Sathe simply as well as unequivocally refer to India’s Supreme Court as the most 
powerful court in the world: ‘The Court’s specific political role lies in its functioning as 
a parallel legislature and quite often as a parallel constituent body’ (Baxi 1980, xii).  
Such extraordinary powers of the Supreme Court of India derive from a history of 
contestation. Broadly speaking, plans for fresh federal constitutional designs and all the 
other big constitutional questions before partition reinforced the idea of judicial review 
and strong non-representative institutions to govern federal structures, to guarantee 
minorities’ rights and to institutionalise veto-players powerful enough to oppose “crude” 
majoritarianism. As the constitutional debate then was shaped by conditions of political 
deadlock and diffused parties, we can expect to find elements of strong, accessible 
judicial review. These consociational functions of courts have echoed until today: 
whenever religious or ethnic cleavages threaten the polity, unelected judges reinforce 
constitutional commitments to minority rights facilitating productive discussion rather 
than debilitating conflict. By putting some subjects beyond the boundaries of 
democratic intervention, Indian courts and constitutionalism thus divert ‘resources from 
unresolvable problems to soluble ones’ (Sunstein 1988, 399). However, by 1950 we are 
also coming face-to-face with a dominant political party setting itself up to control 
India’s political system, and thus we should also expect a weak, low-access form of 
judicial review. It is thus not a surprise to find a Congress party that strips the Indian 
Supreme Court of parts of its jurisdiction already before the first general elections, 
continuing year by year, eventually culminating in a constitutional emergency crisis 
during which the complete abolition of judicial review becomes likely. Hence, both 
7
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predictions have come true at different points of time and such contradictions and 
histories of contestation will be examined in more depth in the case studies that follow.  
Many narratives describing the Supreme Court before the 1980s provide us with 
examples of a court that overreaches, loses in separation-of-power-games, and exposes 
itself to retaliation by the other branches. The origins of judicial power after 1980 are 
thus political in the sense that new actors begin to dominate Indian politics and either 
want to benefit from the existence of powerful judges (e.g. as an “insurance” while 
being out of power, for blame avoidance or dispute resolution within complex coalition 
systems) or simply are politically so divided that they no longer can create the 
consensus necessary to defy or retaliate against court decisions they regard as 
undesirable (see Cooter and Ginsburg 1996; Ginsburg 2003). As long as the dominant 
Congress party is able to predict its continued success in elections it prefers strong 
majoritarian institutions. However, as political forces deadlocked, or scattered across 
coalitions, no party can any longer confidently predict that it will be able to win the next 
elections; and since there are no clear prospective winners in Indian democracy 
anymore, all political parties prefer to have bounded majoritarian institutions and value 
non-representative institutions such as judicial review (insurance model). The key factor 
in explaining variation in the extent of judicialisation in India’s constitutional systems is 
therefore the structure of the party system and the diffusion of political forces. As the 
probability of electoral loss increases the benefits provided by access to judicial review 
for politicians out of power seem all the more attractive: namely the entrenchment of 
their policy-decisions, the protection of individual interests and the ability to oppose and 
re-direct government policy via constitutional litigation. As a general hypothesis, 
8



Unconstitutionality Cases Won by 
the Government of India  
Unconstitutionality Cases Lost by 
the Government of India  
FIGURE 1.4 Unconstitutionality Cases: Claims and Declarations of Unconstitutionality against the
Government of India, 1950-2009
Source: Compiled by author from SCC; n = 40, 618 (total number of all reported cases in SCC database);
n = 1,617 (total number of reported unconstitutionality cases in SCC database).
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FIGURE 1.4 Unconstitutionality Cases: Claims and Declarations of Unconstitutionality 
against the Government of India, 1950-2009
Source: Compiled by author from SCC; n = 40, 618 (total  number of all  reported cases in SCC 
database); n = 1,617 (total number of reported unconstitutionality cases in SCC database).
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the Supreme Court builds up its ability to assert itself through anti-government 
decisions. Figure 1.4 thus adds an important dimension to our study judicial power, the 
distinction between assertion, i.e. judicial decisions not in line with the preferences of 
the government, and deference, i.e. decisions that support the government.  9
The relationship between assertion and deference can be observed in Figure 1.5 
again, where the black line shows how the Indian Supreme Court outgrows any regime 
support roles and emerges as an assertive, powerful court that decides against the 
government in more than half of increasing numbers of cases. In addition, from the bar 
chart elements of Figure 1.5 it is apparent that more and more important cases are 
brought in front of the Indian Supreme Court, framed as unconstitutionality challenges 
or even as basic structure questions;  Figure 1.5 also points towards a steady and 10
growing flow of public interest litigation cases, a special form of litigation and Supreme 
Court activism with particularly strong governance implications. All elements of Figure 
1.5 therefore point towards our dependent variable: judicial power expansion.  
Simultaneously, across time, judicial power is also question of path dependency, 
positive feedback loops and self-reinforcement. The strategies that the Supreme Court 
utilise — such as the judicial innovations of public interest litigation or the basic 
structure — have a significant effect on the judges ability to exercise power in future 
encounters with the other branches. It may be apparent from this discussion that we 
confront an endogeneity problem (King et al. 1994) in trying to explain the 
development   of   judicial   power:   Constitutional   courts   are   constrained   by   the 
 For Dahl (1957) the key function of judicial review, especially in new democracies, actually is regime 9
support.
 Chapter Four will explain basic structure review as a special type constitutional litigation, based on the 10
idea of the unconstitutional constitutional amendment. 
13
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constitutional order, but they are themselves central actors in the articulation of rules 
that constitute constitutional order. Perhaps, more than other political institutions, 
constitutional courts can shape their own institutional operating environment. Either 
way, our arguments are always based on a law and politics approach, taking for granted 
that central forces constraining the judges of the Indian Supreme Court are not legal but 
political, and primarily the countervailing power of other institutions. Nevertheless, our 
study of judicial power has to be careful in attributing outcomes to the institutional 
framework, since that framework is in part a result of judicial power. While we treat the 
power of the Supreme Court of India as dependent variable, we cannot neglect the fact 
that Court itself simultaneously shapes the independent variables that constrain or 
empower the judges. In other words, it is difficult to balance the study of our dependent 
variable — judicial power — with the path dependency of judicial power , while at the 
same time taking into account that the exercise of judicial power has the potential 
reinvent the Supreme Court itself and thus disrupt path dependent flows (Chapter Four, 
for instance, argues that a heresthetic manoeuvre broke the trend of judicial power 
contraction after Independence). 
Simultaneously, this view of India’s constitutional order as dynamic helps to 
explain why judicial power has grown as democracy deepened. The Supreme Court 
became an important site of political contestation, and frequently called upon to resolve 
disputes. Losers in the political arenas are likely to take their disputes to the Court, 
which means that political questions themselves are increasingly framed within the 
context of a constitutional-legal discourse. Judicial review  thus  enhances  participation  
15
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and empowerment, but also judicialises political discourse.  Such processes contribute 11
to the search for empirical linkages between increasing political competition and 
fractionalisation (Figure 1.6 and Figure 1.7) and rising litigation rates (Figure 1.5) due 
to the politicisation of the judicial process and the judicialisation of politics. 
The politicisation of constitutional review processes, by litigants, comprises the 
essential first step, the trigger mechanism, that enables judicialisation; and 
judicialisation  processes  serve to  legitimise  constitutional review,  by  establishing 
and continuously reinforcing the centrality of constitutional case law within 
legislative and judicial processes. Underlying this argument, indeed underlying the 
account of constitutional politics in this book, is a theory of action. This theory of 
action integrates strategic behaviour and normative reasoning. (Stone Sweet 2000, 
139)  
As there was a single, dominant party in 1950 that had rightly believed that it was likely 
to hold onto political power, Congress had little incentive to set up a strong, neutral 
umpire to resolve disputes about constitutional meaning. It would rather retain the 
flexibility to dictate outcomes without constitutional constraint. The flexibility of 
constitutional change and the power of Nehruvian supermajorities allowed for easy 
policy changes and maximum exercise of parliamentary power by overruling the 
Supreme Court frequently. The absence of a successful and assertive judicial review 
institution under Nehru reflects the desire of strong politicians to maintain their 
exclusive role of constitutional interpretation — in a nutshell, if the Constitution is what 
somebody says it is, then who has the last word? By contrast, if we move down the time 
 Critical legal studies scholars argue that a juridified or judicialised political discourse constrains politics 11
and is structurally conservative, embedding the status quo, and encouraging a type of politics that is 
unambitious, almost blindfolded by legal categories.
17


CHAPTER 1   ·   Introduction
underlie manifestations of judicial power, in particular the tectonic shifts in India’s party 
system at Union and State levels. Throughout this thesis we will use the simple idea — 
that elections diffuse power at increasing rates, thus opening up new spaces for judicial 
power expansion — to analyse and contextualise judicial activism of India’s post-
emergency democracy and the various judicial coups d’état during the period of 
governmental instability of the 1990s. There are two features of these contexts which 
contrast sharply with Nehru’s democratic regimes. First, future political outcomes are 
more uncertain. The presence of increased electoral competition means that even the 
most dominant and popular parties face a relatively high chance of losing power. 
Information on future outcomes is more difficult to assess — in this new context, a 
powerful Supreme Court creates more “winners” by looking after the increasing 
numbers of losers. Support for the power of the Court is therefore nothing more, and 
nothing less, than a question of political interest. We can call this the insurance model of 
judicial review (Ginsburg 2003). By serving as an alternative forum in which to 
challenge government action, judicial review provides a form of insurance to 
prospective electoral losers. Judicialisation thus helps to ensure a level of institutional 
stability of India’s political system that may otherwise not be, by accommodating those 
who lose. It is therefore worthwhile to remember that many of the defining features of 
judicialisation go beyond the judges’ activist and ‘imperialist’ impulses, as the 
expansion of judicial power has been taking place in the context of weak, decentralised, 
or a chronically deadlocked coalition governments. It seems plausible to speculate that 
changes in the party system are the key independent variable, opening up those new  
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political spaces for judicial power expansion. Political deference to the judiciary is not 
only tacit approval of judicialisation but also an effective way of overcoming systemic 
‘ungovernability.’ It seems clear that hung parliaments, minority governments and weak 
coalitions provided courts with a structural window of opportunity to change the 
balance of power in their favour. As the decline of the Congress-system corroded the 
authority of the legislative and executive branches of government, the Supreme Court 
emerged as a dominant, seemingly apolitical decision maker.  
The Figures of Chapter One and Table 5.2 illustrate how the transformation of the 
Indian party system has taken vulnerability elements of political competition — an 
incumbents’ safety of tenure — to new levels.  Any professional politician has to live 12
with the almost certainty that he will be out of power during some time during his 
career. What will he do when not in power? Litigation is a shield, and a tool for access. 
Moreover, Ginsburg’s idea of diffusion of power is not just limited to the party system. 
Global debates about a differentiated polity or disaggregated state hint at the ways in 
which power flows across India’s complex webs of commissions and watchdog bodies, 
media, civil society. Structural changes, such as panchayati raj reform or differentiation 
through increasing specialisation of governance (e.g. the SC/ST commissioner becomes 
a permanent commission, then two different permanent commissions) further 
decentralise and diffuse power across new institutions and actors with competing, 
 What matters for judicialization is not just the fragmentation as measured today, but also the political 12
uncertainty that politicians can expect tomorrow. Table 5.2 provides further variables of power diffusion: 
Anti-incumbency trends, more candidates contesting, more deposits lost, new technologies of 
campaigning with massive impact and swing elections, narrower margins of victory, comparatively low 
numbers of re-elected and simultaneously first-time Members of Parliament. In India, we first see a 
fragmented opposition in 1950, and then fragmentation all around.
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conflicting preferences for governance. Even if we imagine the re-emergence of a 
dominant political party, the polity itself has diffused and fragmented, as the meaning of 
separation of powers has changed, bringing in new actors that create new spaces for 
political competition; for our model of judicialisation, this means that the court has 
many layers of allies and a multitude of support constituencies (Chapter Six, for 
instance, shows how an Election Commission and Supreme Court alliance rewrote 
electoral laws, against strong opposition from Parliament and the executive).  
Thus, as the risk of electoral loss increases, the incentives for politicians to 
support a powerful Indian Supreme Court increase as well. Similarly, an increase in 
perceived legitimacy benefits or greater possibilities of policy-making through litigation 
will expand judicialisation, holding electoral risks and agency costs constant. Given the 
institutional structuration of incentives within India’s political system, the 
judicialisation of politics is therefore systemic and the rise of the judges is unstoppable 
as long as elections continue to diffuse political power. Other things being equal, an 
increase in the diffusion of political power leads to an increase in uncertainty, followed 
by increased demand for the types of political insurance that judicial review provides. 
Under such conditions it is especially useful for Indian politicians to support the 
judicialisation of politics to entrench existing political bargains, and to protect them 
from the possibility of extreme reversal after the next election. Because rational Indian 
politicians have learnt that they will remain in power for five out of ten years, they 
choose to defer a certain amount of political power to independent judges to protect 
their bargains from repeal and to oppose and influence government when out of power.  
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Behind the Figures of Chapter One we find another pattern: Judges have increasingly 
asserted their own authority in the governance of the India whenever legislative politics, 
operating on the basis of majority rule, fails in finding efficient solutions. As soon as the 
executive or legislature become incapable of action, they will lose control of their 
political authority and the Court — as an agency capable of focused, autonomous action 
— will act where the government and legislative is too divided to react. This dimension 
of judicialisation is the key reason why Figure 1.5 goes beyond election results and 
expands our analysis into the realms of governmental types and instability; Chapters 
Five, Six and Eight in particular will discuss sequences of “raw” judicial power 
expansion — which scholars have come to call judicial coups d’état — that fall into the 
1990s and “rob” the prime minister of control over judicial appointments, the Central 
Bureau of Investigation, and more. Figure 1.5 thus describes the types of circumstances 
in which policymaking and lawmaking will tend to be judicialised and migrate towards 
the sphere of the Indian Supreme Court as the only body that is capable of decisive 
action. These are the conditions of a political system in which we see the development 
of a divided legislative, a “runaway” bureaucracy and the emergence of a powerful, 
activist court (Ferejohn 2002). The contributions of this thesis are such strategic 
accounts of judicial power, rooted in metaphors of positive political theories. It is 
neither judicial behaviour nor normative political philosophies that account for the 
stunning rise of judicial power in India: Above all, the continuous presence of elections, 
the sine qua non of Indian democracy, has continuously increased the complexity of and 
uncertainty within the polity — hence, the demand for judicial review, the political 
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origins of judicial power. The power of Indian the Indian Supreme Court thus reflects 
the political diffusion characteristic of Indian democracy and the process of the 
judicialisation of Indian politics has not only begun, it is systemic as well as irreversible 
as long as elections continue to open up new spaces for judicial power expansion. 
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CHAPTER TWO
Mapping the Supreme Court Across 
Time and Jurisdictional Spaces
Abstract   Chapter Two explores the deep historical and 
quintessentially colonial roots of the judicial review process. The 
Supreme Court is a modern, Indian, English-language court in a 
sub-continental, linguistically diverse and multinational state. 
Like few other bodies of the modern Indian polity, the Supreme 
Court is linked ideologically, institutionally and aesthetically — 
by history as well as imagination — with the pillars of the 
Empire and that most English of creations, the common law. In 
contrast, as with all legal transplants, indigenisation has driven 
the Court’s institutional development from the start as Indian 
judges had to come to terms with specific local social 
phenomena, such as widespread poverty and specific patterns of 
marginalisation, as well as India’s sheer size and its mega-
pluralism of groups and cultures. This chapter portrays the 
history of the Indian Supreme Court as a judicial struggle for 
jurisdictional spaces against an unsupportive and often hostile 
political environment; the chapter then draws attention to 
specific historical events and structural political changes that 
opened up new political spaces for jurisdiction expansion after 
the Emergency. At the same time, judicial power expansion 
emerges as a double-edged sword as each of the Court’s 
successes kept adding further to enormous workloads, and the 
resulting challenges of institutional organisation have important 
consequences in relation to the resources and judicial ‘time-
budgets’ that can flow into the policy-making roles of the Court. 
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[2.1] 	Judicial Review in Time: Legal Transplants and the Migration of Ideas 
It was not new. It was bound by tradition. August 1947, at the ‘stroke of the midnight 
hour,’ the age of the Federal Court of India did not end, and two-and-a-half years later 
its successor, the Supreme Court, would not ‘step out from the old to the new’ either. On 
the contrary, colonial laws stayed in place, the decisions of the colonial courts remained 
valid, judges stayed in office  and lawyers continued to be licensed to practice. India’s 1
Supreme Court did not move into a new building until 1958, and the law libraries of 
courts and lawyers remained prized possessions throughout the country, full of English 
law books and reported case law. Probably nothing symbolises continuity more than the 
Supreme Court’s insistence on English language proceedings, which stands in marked 
contrast to the increased use of Hindi in the Lok Sabha and the affective role of regional 
languages in parliamentary debates in general (Spary 2010). Even if we take full 
account of the nativisation of English (Annamalai 2004), it seems that the Supreme 
Court deliberately set itself apart from established governmental language practices by 
refusing to make any efforts to publish its judgments in Hindi. Similarly, Supreme Court 
reports and the court news are published in English only, and the Court maintains 
probably the only website of the central government that does not have a Hindi version.  
From a contemporary, comparative perspective, these observations reveal 
continuity across regime change as a distinctive, if not a unique, characteristic of the 
Indian Supreme Court. South Africa, for example, displaced Afrikaans from the legal 
 The First Amendment Act, 1950, even changed the Constitution to allow non-citizens to stay on as High 1
Court judges.
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system, created a new constitutional court, removed judges associated with the 
apartheid regime, appointed new judges, moved the entire court into a renovated prison 
and changed the colour of the robes to green. With respect to the latter, and given the 
role of cloth in South Asia as a symbol of ‘community and right conduct […] not 
merely in fixing and symbolising social and political statuses, but in transmitting 
holiness, purity, and pollution’ (Bayly 1986, 285), we would at least expect to find a 
debate about changing the design of judicial robes. Yet, in India in 1950, not even such 
dress codes changed, judges and lawyers continued to put on the same gowns as the 
judges who had applied colonial law. While homespun cloth had become a central 
symbol of the entire freedom struggle (Trivedi 2007), the judges still came to court in 
what was quintessentially foreign dress. 
Paraphrasing Morris-Jones (1971, 17-19), it is thus in more than one sense that the 
new India inherited a ‘Westminster-model’ constitution (Harding 2004), and it is not 
fanciful to see English constitutional sentiments underlying both the Supreme Court and 
the Congress Party — the former, viewing itself as the successor of an assertive Federal 
Court; the latter devoted to an omnipotent parliament at the time of independence. 
India’s judges and political leaders had not only received the tangible fabric of the 
British Raj’s machinery of government, but also inherited an ‘accumulated sum of 
psychological capital’ (Morris-Jones 1971, 19) that accustomed the Indian legal mind to 
an English outlook on constitutional issues. 
Wealthy Indian families, like the Gandhis, Jinnahs, and Nehrus, were eager to send 
their brightest young men to dine in London’s Inns of Court set amid lovely garden 
grounds north of the Thames Embankment. There they breathed the sweet air of 
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liberty, imbibing such revolutionary concepts of the Common Law as the 
presumption of innocence and the freedom to express one’s ideas and opinions in 
speech or writing, whatever one’s colour, creed, or caste might be. Those London 
Inns (the Inner Temple for Gandhi and Nehru; Lincoln’s Inn for Jinnah) proved 
inadvertent cradles to the nationalist leadership of India and Pakistan, educating 
those brilliant barristers to voice English demands for justice and teaching them 
most effectively to speak, petition, and act in rallying millions of their followers to 
demand freedom. (Wolpert 2001, 24) 
While there is no need to embrace Wolpert’s eulogy of and enthusiasm for the ‘sweet air 
of liberty’ of 19th century common law constitutionalism,  it is easy to see how English 2
legal education and legal practice shaped first the ‘empire’s governing classes’ (Rudolph 
and Rudolph 2006, 22) and later the independence movement. In point of fact, the first 
political formations of Indian nationalism were dominated by Indian lawyers. For 
instance, no less than 68 per cent of members of the Indian National Association, 
founded by Surendra Nath Bannerjea and Anand Mohan Bose in 1876, were lawyers 
(Seal 1971, 216). Likewise, it is difficult to overestimate the ascendancy of the legal 
profession within the Indian National Congress. Not only were half of the delegates at 
the first Congress session (1885) lawyers, but also the first President of the Indian 
National Congress, Womesh Chandra Bonnerjee, was a successful Middle Temple 
barrister and doyen of the Calcutta Bar (Bonnerjee 1944). Of a total of 2361 delegates 
who attended the first four Congress sessions between 1885 and 1888, 866 were 
 The relationship between race, common law and the colonial state is discussed further below. The 2
common law also never stood in the way of the enforcement of caste and untouchability. For instance, in 
Sankaralinga Nadan v. Raja Rajeswara Dorai ILR 1908 (31) Madras 236, the Privy Council in London 
ordered low-caste Nadars to pay damages as their entry into the temple had polluted the idol and the 
damages paid were calculated on the basis of the costs for purification rituals. 
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lawyers, and ‘for decades to come more than a third of the delegates at every Congress 
belonged to that profession’ (Ghosh 1960; Seal 1971, 278). Even after Gandhi had 
transformed the Congress ‘from a club of Anglicised lawyers into a mass political 
organisation’ (Markovits 2004, 93), lawyers remained at the helm of the Indian 
independence movement. For illustration purposes, we can look at a random list, in 
alphabetical order, of political leaders who had practised law: Ambedkar, Jyoti Basu, 
Sarat Chandra Bose, Gandhi, Syama Prasad Mookerjee, Motilal Nehru, his son, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad, Chakravarthi Rajagopalachari. 
Irrespective of region, caste, religion or ideological orientation, it is clear that the most 
important decision-makers had been intimately acquainted with British constitutional 
law and its strong aversion towards formal legal checks on the power of government. 
 It should not come as a surprise, then, that A.V. Dicey’s classic work, Introduction 
to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, first published in 1885, became one of the 
most often-quoted law books in the Indian Constituent Assembly debates and dominated 
the constitutional imagination of many Assembly members. At the same time, the 
freedom movement also learnt to use the courts and, more importantly, the discursive 
power of fundamental rights and equality discourses as tools for direct and ideological 
resistance against the colonial state. The interplay between law, ideologies, colonial 
domination and anti-colonial resistance is thus much more complex than Wolpert’s 
‘sweet air of liberty’ simplification. We can rather see Wolpert’s writing as a mere 
continuation of the colonial ideology of rule, that the ‘foundation of our empire in India 
rests on the principle of justice’ (Sunderland 1929, 105). Probably the most important 
judicial intervention in the formation and challenging of such ideological frameworks 
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was the impeachment trial of Warren Hastings. It was not only the first time, but also an 
exceptionally significant assemblage of important figures; the British public  engaged 
with the trial received the first major public discursive event of its kind in England, in 
which the ‘colonial ambitions and practices of European powers in the East stood 
exposed to a close and comprehensive critique, and the legal and moral legitimacy of 
colonialism itself as a phenomenon was thrown into question before the highest judicial 
body in Britain, the House of Lords. The fact that the prosecution was led by Edmund 
Burke only added to the trial’s enduring significance as a moment of critical reflection 
on colonial practices’ (Mukherjee 2005, 591). Side by side with the idea of justice as a 
governance discourse (Mukherjee 2010) — the promise of justice — such critical 
reflection quickly brings to light the day-to-day reality of the colonial administration of 
justice — the experience of injustice. Shifting from the law in the books to the law in 
action, a much more accurate description than Wolpert’s thus derives from Bal 
Gangadhar Tilak: ‘The goddess of British Justice, though blind, is able to distinguish 
unmistakably black from white’ (Kesari, November 12, 1907, quoted in Kolsky 2010, 
4). Kolsky’s work (2010) on colonial law is not just a specific reminder of how the 
weight of race ‘imbalanced the scales of colonial justice’, but also of how the inability 
of the colonial state to prosecute white violence resulted in constant de-legitimisation of 
the colonial state and reforms. 
If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimise 
nothing, contribute nothing to any class’s hegemony. The essential precondition for 
the effectiveness of law, in its function as ideology, is that it shall display an 
independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just. It cannot seem to 
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be so without upholding its own logic and criteria of equity; indeed, on occasion, by 
actually being just. (Thompson 1975, 264) 
Thompson and Kolsky embody the type of scholarship — in contrast to Wolpert — that 
enables us to move beyond the ‘increasingly sterile debate between “celebratory” and 
“accusatory” histories of the Empire’ (Wiener 2009, ii). Instead of abstract claims about  
‘the rule of law’ and modern courts, we find complexities, contradictions and changing 
meanings. As legal ideas migrate and legal institutions are transplanted, we simply 
observe processes by which more Indians come in touch with the rule of law — 
described by E.P. Thompson as a specific, peculiar type of legitimating ideology, both 
‘humbug’ as well as an ‘an unique alified human good’ (1975, 266). Many actors and 
groups managed to gain ground — from the bottom up — by making use of the new 
legal system, strategically using the colonial state and its courts; other actors and groups 
were crushed and their defeats embedded deeper by the new legal structure. Both types 
of stories stand side by side, and as for other places and other times, it is in this case 
best to think of law as Janus faced. What matters most for our understanding of judicial 
power are large-scale structural and discursive changes: the institutionalisation of 
colonial legal services is linked to educational institutions and professionalisation, 
driving the emergence of a powerful indigenous legal profession. As outlined above, 
Indian lawyers became exceptionally influential in shaping anti-colonial discourses, 
even if it was mostly in the language of modern constitutionalism and through rule-of-
law discourses. To better understand these complexities, hybrid developments and 
paradoxes, we can turn to James Tully’s work on the history of modern 
constitutionalism and distinguish three waves of constitutionalism: firstly, the imperial 
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dimension and the role of constitutional design in the construction of colonial rule; 
secondly, the anti-imperial dimension and the role of constitutions in state building after 
decolonisation; thirdly, the politics of cultural recognition and the reinvention of 
constitutionalism as a challenge to the inherited forms of modern constitutional 
uniformity in a ‘genuinely post-imperial age’ (Tully 1995, 17). Indian courts have 
played important role in all these phases, and despite its foreign origins, the Supreme 
Court has shed its foreignness a long time ago. Today the Court’s ‘Indianness’ derives 
not only from its geographic location and jurisdiction, but also from its personnel and 
undisputed position at the top of Indian legal system because it is run by Indians and run 
for Indians, which sets it apart from  other English language courts in the history of the 
subcontinent. The following section further explores how the deep embeddedness of the 
historical structures of judicial review in combination with a powerful legal profession 
and popular rights discourses continuously push in the direction of jurisdiction 
expansion, establishing a sense of path dependency from the rule of law to the rule of 
judges. 
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[2.2] 	Jurisdictional Spaces: Contraction, Expansion, and Hyper-Expansion 
Despite epochal and bold innovations of the Indian Constitution — such as the abolition 
of untouchability in Article 17 — continuity emerged as a key theme when it came to 
organising the judiciary. The Supreme Court was not at the centre of the Constituent 
Assembly Debates as too many other pressing issues had to be given priority,  and while 
we see little innovation in terms of institutional design by the constitution-making body, 
the Supreme Court evolved into an institution that could not be more different from the 
Federal Court. Throughout its existence, the Federal Court heard only 250 cases (Pylee 
1966, vii) and decided all of them as full bench (all judges sitting). Moreover, each case 
resulted in a written judgment. The Supreme Court of India heard close to 80,000 new 
cases in 2009. Even ignoring court and public holidays, roughly speaking more cases 
are filed per day than the Federal Court heard throughout its ten-year existence (Figure 
2.1). In addition the institutional structure is further burdened by a backlog (Figure 2.2) 
of well above 50,000 pending cases adding to the workload pressure. 
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The institutional design of the judicial review mechanism in India is no longer just a 
product of the written constitution itself. As such, it reflects more than the choices of the 
constitutional designers, and the expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction is often driven by 
the judges. This qualification is necessary both because a number of patterns of judicial 
review are not derived from India’s constitutional text (for instance, public interest 
litigation) but also because non-constitutional norms may be important in shaping the 
judicial review environment. Robinson (2013) has shown how judicial attitudes towards 
special leave petitions have remained unchanged since the 1980s, and thus actually 
encourage higher workloads. Even more surprising is his conclusion that the Supreme 
Court accepts an increasing number of appeals from the High Courts,  thus adding to its 3
ability to control lower courts, although at the cost of further increases in its own 
workload. In a nutshell, we follow two interrelated historical narratives, institutional 
design and jurisdiction control through legislative and executive interventions, as 
opposed to jurisdiction expansion through judge-made law. 
The demand for a supreme court of appeal was considered seriously by the colonial 
powers only during the round table conferences when the princely states agreed to form 
 Under Articles 132, 133 and 134, the Court can, but does not have to, review appeals from the High 3
Court if a certificate is issued by the concerned High Court in both civil and criminal cases. In this regard, 
the Supreme Court website states: ‘Appeals also lie to the Supreme Court in civil matters if the High 
Court concerned certifies: (a) that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance, 
and (b) that, in the opinion of the High Court, the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme 
Court. In criminal cases, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court if the High Court (a) has on appeal reversed 
an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to death or to imprisonment for life or for a 
period of not less than 10 years, or (b) has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any Court 
subordinate to its authority and has in such trial convicted the accused and sentenced him to death or to 
imprisonment for life or for a period of not less than 10 years, or (c) certified that the case is a fit one for 
appeal to the Supreme Court.’ (The Supreme Court of India website: http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/
jurisdiction.htm; last accessed 10 September 2015)
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a federal structure with the British provinces. Therefore, a Federal Court that would 
resolve the disputes within such a structure was considered a requirement. This hints at 
an important dimension of judicialisation — federalism and the resolution of disputes 
between federal units, both vertically as well as hierarchically — which is part of the 
key hypothesis of this thesis in terms of regional parties and their role in political 
diffusion. The origins of the debate for an all-India court of appeals (and not just 
provincial apex courts) thus reach back to a tumultuous period of pre-independence 
India, and the constantly evolving times meant that people kept changing sides on the 
debate. Those who had opposed the first demand, such as Motilal Nehru and Tej 
Bahadur Sapru, prominent leaders of the freedom movement, later became supporters of 
the cause and vice versa. The prime reason for the argument for a ‘local’ court of appeal 
(which would still be subject to Privy Council appeal) was the almost universal 
disapproval of the decisions meted out by a court that was physically very distant from 
the country and not well versed in the intricacies of personal laws in India. As M.A. 
Jinnah commented while arguing in support of such a court: ‘I have no hesitation saying 
that the Privy Council have on several occasions have absolutely murdered Hindu law, 
and slaughtered Muhammadan law’ (Legislative Assembly Debates, 17 February 1925, 
p. 1175). He was in the midst of a heated debate against the stand of Motilal Nehru and 
others and in support of Hari Kishan Gour who was proposing the establishment of such 
a court.  
 Even though the argument seems legitimate, the opposition to a local court of 
appeal was widespread, cutting across party and community lines. The main issue was 
the scepticism surrounding the ability to bring adequate skilled and talented judges to 
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India and the lack of a clear and unbiased atmosphere in which to function even if they 
were to make the journey. The issue of expense was also an issue, but for parties on 
both sides of the debate. Newspapers of the time record the astonishment of Gandhi to 
the opposition against a court of appeal. For Gandhi, the want of support for such a 
court was due to a lack of confidence ‘in ourselves’ (Gadbois 1964, 26) since he felt that 
the judges of the Privy Council were no more immune to prejudice or ignorance than 
local judges would be. 
Within these groups, even the supporters for a local Supreme Court of Appeal or a 
Federal Court wanted varying levels of relations with the Privy Council; not all of them 
wanted a complete severance of the chance to appeal to the Privy Council, even with a 
local court of appeal set up (e.g. Sapru or Sankaran Nair, a former Advocate General of 
the Madras presidency, was one of the supporters of a local court of appeal because the 
Privy Council usually did not hear appeals in cases involving criminal offences). The 
turning point in this debate came in the two round table conferences in 1930 and 1932, 
where the agreement of the states to enter into a federal structure with British provinces 
highlighted the requirement for a Federal Court. The new court was to have both 
appellate and original jurisdiction (Gadbois 1964, 31).  4
The Federal Court, designed to safeguard the federal structure and resolve disputes 
between federal units, ‘… tried to function as the bulwark of individual freedom against 
state interference’ (Pylee 1966, vi-vii). Yet it was constrained by the fact that it could 
 See also the Indian Round Table Conference (First Session) Proceedings-Cmd. 3778, 1931 XII, p. 417 4
and Third Report of the Federal Structure Committee submitted to the Second Session of the Indian 
Round Table Conference Cmd. 3997, 1932, p. 27. It is worthwhile keeping in mind that the Federal Court 
always remained subordinate to the Privy Council. The Government of India Act 1935 brought the 
Federal Court into existence and though this court was restricted to disputes between provinces and had 
no provisions for criminal appeals, it had a structure that would be reflected in the Court to follow.
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only pronounce a ‘declaratory judgment’ (Gadbois 1965, 40) and depended on the 
provinces for the enforcement of its orders. The Federal Court struggled to maintain and 
uphold citizens rights in the ‘federal vacuum’ (Pylee 1966, 2) that it was working in, 
surrounded as it was by a colonial government that had suspended many freedoms in 
making its last stand against the freedom movement. ‘Indeed, one had to be reminded 
that, during the period in which the Federal Court was boldly attempting to maintain a 
balance between individual freedom and the security of the State, the Federal Court 
itself was a part of the colonial administration’ (Gadbois 1965, 115). The Federal Court 
struck down many of the sedition, preventive detention and criminal courts orders and 
enactments passed by the colonial government. ‘Although each of these decisions was 
overridden by the alien rulers, the boldness of the Federal Court in handing down 
decisions embarrassing to the British won the acclaim of the Indian public, and served 
to increase the prestige of the Federal Court’ (Gadbois 1965, iv). Its legacy and 
influence were the most enduring of the institutions that came into being under the Act 
of 1935 (Pylee 1966, 1). These episodes of judicial assertion, even if unsuccessful, 
added prestige to the judges involved and are important for understanding the bold and 
assertive decisions of the Indian Supreme Court during the first years of its existence. 
This sentiment is reflected in the statement of Mrs Durgabai Deshmukh, a member of 
the Constituent Assembly, who stated:  
When the Constitution is passed our Federal Court will be designated as the 
Supreme Court. It will be the highest court of appeal for all high courts and also the 
judicial authority for the interpretation of the Constitution. We wish and we hope 
that the Supreme Court which is going to be the guardian of the Constitution and of 
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the fundamental rights guaranteed therein, will do its function very well and every 
citizen in India will have the occasion to say that it has protected his rights as a true 
guardian of this Constitution. (CAD Vol IX, 17th September 1949) 
It was against this background and with a relatively prestigious legacy that the Supreme 
Court was born, on 26 January 1950, under the new Indian Constitution. The Federal 
Court had continued to function in the interim under the Federal Court (Enlargement of 
Jurisdiction) Act, 1947. During this period, a committee was constituted by the CAD to 
advise on the structure and jurisdiction of the new court. This committee’s report 
suggested that the new court should have original, appellate and advisory powers 
(Gadbois 1965, 126) 
It also wanted flexibility to be given to the Parliament to increase the ambit of this 
jurisdiction if Parliament so decided. The appointment of judges was a problematic area 
then as now, and the Constituent Assembly debates attest to this. There were to be 10 
judges, but the number could be increased. The report was accepted and included in the 
Union Constitution Committee Report chaired by Nehru, but the two modes of 
appointment of judges suggested in the Supreme Court committee’s report were 
rejected. This Union Committee proposed that the chief justice should recommend the 
name to the President after consulting fellow judges and other such High Court judges 
(CAD Vol IV, July 21 1947, pp. 716-31, quoted in Gadbois 1965, 126). Most of the 
recommendations of these committees were followed by the Constituent Assembly. 
The Constitution had kept the structure of the Federal Court under the 1935 act. 
The new Constitution expressly gave jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in all matters in 
which the Federal Court had jurisdiction and which were not covered by provisions of 
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the new Constitution under Article 135. Article 32 of the Constitution defines the scope 
of the Supreme Courts jurisdiction with regard to writs, ‘perhaps the widest that any 
Court in any part of the world can be said to exercise’ (Pylee 1966, ix). The article 
confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court for writs that include habeas corpus, 
mandamus, quo warranto and certiorari for the protection of fundamental rights. For 
Ambedkar, it was the most important article — the soul of the Constitution (CAD Vol 
VII, December 9, 1948, p. 953). Article 32 as a device to approach the Supreme Court 
has been well used. It began as a plea to apply the writ of habeas corpus but soon 
expanded exponentially to use the means of writ to circumvent the procedural 
progression to the Supreme Court. Recourse to it was influenced to a large extent by the 
horrendous backlog and delay faced at all levels of the judicial system. It was also the 
route used by a lot of public interest litigation to get results and avoid the appeals 
process. The review and appeal powers in criminal matters are narrower on paper than 
the Courts civil appellate powers. However, the Article 32 and Article 136 provisions 
have been used to circumvent this technical narrowing of the court’s jurisdiction. In 
addition, with regard to writ jurisdiction, Parliament has the power under Article 139 to 
increase the scope of the writ jurisdiction under Article 32. This basically means the 
Parliament can increase the power of the Court so that it can issue writs for purposes 
other than the enforcement of fundamental rights. However, since the Court itself has 
increased the scope of fundamental rights, especially under Article 21, this provision did 
not have to be used. As the court says of its own powers under Article 136: ‘It possesses 
a special appellate power to permit appeal from any Tribunal, Court or High Court. In 
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the years that have followed after its establishment, this special jurisdiction has dwarfed 
all others.’  5
As per Article 131, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in disputes 
between the central government and the states as well as disputes between states. The 
exclusion to this article are treaties and covenants signed before the coming into force of 
the Constitution, as the members of the Constituent Assembly were quite clear they did 
not want the Court to hear about issues over which they had no control and could 
provide no relief, such as an ‘act of state’, including articles of accession. The other 
exclusions from the court’s jurisdiction are water disputes. If Parliament makes a law to 
this effect under Article 262, Parliament can also exclude the jurisdiction of the Court in 
matters of finance under Article 280, under Article 290, for pensions and adjustment of 
pensions, and under Article 363, with regard to certain specific treaties. 
The Court also has the power to transfer proceedings from one high court to 
another, or to itself if the same or substantially the same questions of law are pending in 
courts around the country under Article 139A. It is a court of record under Article 129, 
and this article gives it the power to hear contempt of court proceedings. This power of 
hearing contempt was an explicit addition by the Constituent Assembly. Ambedkar said 
in this regard:  
As a matter of fact, once you make a court a court of record by statute, the power to 
punish or contempt necessarily follows from that position. But, it was felt that in 
view of the fact that in England this power is largely derived from Common Law 
 The Supreme Court of India, Annual Report 2007-2008.5
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and as we have no such thing as Common Law in this Country, we felt it better to 
state the whole position in the statute itself.  
That is why Article 108 has been introduced (see CAD Vol VIII, 27 May, 1949), and it 
stood the court in good stead when it needed to enforce its order in the public interest 
proceedings beginning two decades later.  
Under Article 137, the Court also has the power to review its own decisions. As per 
the rules regulating these review decisions, the Supreme Court website clarifies that the:  
Supreme Court may review its judgment or order but no application for review is to 
be entertained in a civil proceeding except on the grounds mentioned in Order 
XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in a criminal proceeding except 
on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record. (From the website of 
the Supreme Court of India)  
International commercial arbitrations can also be initiated in the Supreme Court under 
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. One of the important roles of the Supreme 
Court lies in its advisory capacity. In this role, the president may refer a question of law 
or fact to the Supreme Court under Article 143. These cases are then known as special 
references. Cases involving the elections of the president or the vice- president will 
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directly come to the Supreme Court, and various other acts specifically allow for an 
appeal to the court.  6
The Parliament may increase the jurisdiction to the Court under Article 138, and 
under Article 140, it may increase the ancillary powers of the Court to enable it to 
function more effectively. With regard to Article 138, the idea was that the Court, which 
was at the apex of a unitary judiciary, would be given jurisdiction over the Union list 
(the three lists consisting of state issues, central issues and the concurrent list on which 
both the central and state legislatures had jurisdiction. This was another aspect of the 
1935 Act that was reflected in the new Constitution), but there could be flexibility in 
increasing its oversight to the other lists as well if required. In addition, the Parliament 
may refer a particular case to the Supreme Court if it feels that such a reference is 
required.  
The Federal Court had a very limited remit; it could interfere only in federal 
matters. In addition, it needed a certificate from the requisite high court that the 
petitioners had the right to appeal to it. In the absence of this certificate, it could not 
hear matters even if it was a federal question. However, once this certificate was 
obtained, the Federal Court was quick to construe liberally the questions related to the 
 ‘The Supreme Court has special advisory jurisdiction in matters which may specifically be referred to it 6
by the President of India under Article 143 of the Constitution. There are provisions for reference or 
appeal to this Court under Article 317(1) of the Constitution, Section 257 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, 
Section 7(2) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, Section 130-A of the Customs 
Act, 1962, Section 35-H of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and Section 82C of the Gold (Control) 
Act, 1968. Appeals also lie to the Supreme Court under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, Advocates Act, 1961, Contempt of Courts Act, 
1971, Customs Act, 1962, Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, Enlargement of Criminal Appellate 
Jurisdiction Act, 1970, Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities Act, 1992, Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 and Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Election Petitions under 
Part III of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections Act, 1952 are also filed directly in the Supreme 
Court.’ (From the website of the Supreme Court of India, http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/
jurisdiction.htm, last accessed 10 September 2015)
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matter that it could hear. The ability of the newly-independent Parliament to 
constitutionally circumvent the orders of the Supreme Court by amendment, most 
notably in the cases of property and land, which began soon after independence, and 
thereafter with the privy purses being abolished, meant that some commentators noted 
that the Court had suffered a decline in the prestige it had inherited from the Federal 
Court. Although limited in its jurisdiction and frequently overruled by the colonial 
legislature, the Federal Court had nevertheless carved out for itself a position of respect 
in handing out objective and, what were viewed as, just rulings in its sphere.  
Centre-state relations quickly became part of regular jurisdiction practices. The 
Court held in favour of the centre that the Constitution had envisioned a quasi-federal 
structure and gave it the central primacy in the question of acquiring land under the 
Union and the concurrent list. Gadbois comments after the first decade and a half of 
Supreme Court decision-making that: 
[T]he most important function performed by the Supreme Court in the Indian polity 
is that of seeking to reconcile freedom and justice for the individual with the needs 
of a modern government charged with the promotion of far-reaching social and 
economic reforms. The Court has found this task to be a difficult one, for a number 
of its decisions have provoked amendments to the Constitution which have had the 
effect of limiting its review powers, of reviving legislation earlier declared 
unconstitutional by the Court, and of restricting the scope of the fundamental rights. 
Whereas decisions of the Federal Court which embarrassed the British won the 
acclaim of the Indian nationalist leaders and served to increase the prestige of the 
Federal Court, decisions of the Supreme Court which have thwarted the Government 
of the Republic of India have produced the opposite effect. The ease with which the 
Indian Constitution may be amended in order to overcome the effect of a Supreme 
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Court decision indicates that while the Court's jurisdiction is extraordinarily wide, its 
ultimate power is limited. Ultimately, the Constitution means what the Congress 
Party says it means, and not what the Court wills. Judicial review has certainly not 
meant judicial supremacy in India. (Gadbois 1965,  312) 
It is apparent from a reading of the articles that the Constituent Assembly envisioned a 
Court where power would be granted within the federal structure to increase its 
jurisdiction without conflict with the other branches of government. The Court’s 
attempts at judicial power expansion only succeeded as the Congress Party lost the 
power to amend the constitution (Chapter Five). Thus, Gadbois’ analysis is closely 
aligned with the Constituent Assembly’s view — nobody had wanted to make the 
Supreme Court superior, they had wanted it to be independent. In fact, in 1950 nobody 
could even begin to imagine the expansion of judicial power in general, and the power 
of the Supreme Court, in particular. As Ambedkar put it: ‘that the independence of the 
Judiciary from the Executive should be made as clear and definite as we could make it 
by law’ (CAD Vol VIII, May 27, 1949, p. 397). The Court, though, had other ideas for 
itself and fought the Parliament in epic battles to enlarge its jurisdiction. It struck down 
(as in the judges’ cases discussed in chapters 4-5) any attempt by the Parliament to 
enforce the idea of legislative superiority, which meant in effect that it claimed the 
power of the last word for itself. Since the early 1990s, step by step, the Court has 
overcome limitations on its jurisdiction and then expanded even further into new fields 
via public interest litigation. Judicial review, after all, was a part of the basic structure of 
the Constitution and could not be tampered with.  
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At the cost of repetition it is to reiterate that judicial review is the basic feature of 
the Constitution. This Court has constitutional duty and responsibility, since judicial 
review having been expressly entrusted to it as a constituent power, to review the 
acts done by the coordinate branches, the executive or the legislature under the 
Constitution, or under law or administrative orders within the parameters applicable 
to a particular impugned action. (S.R. Bommai v Union of India 1994 SCC (3), 1) 
The most significant judicial innovation was inventing implied limitations to 
amendment power and thus establishing the Supreme Court as a veto player in relation 
to constitutional change (see Chapter 4); similarly, public interest litigation is based 
exclusively on judicial decisions and revolutionises the type of issues the Court can hear 
as well as the remedies and orders by which it can intervene (Chapter 6). Jurisdiction 
expansion happens in all realms, however, and with minute attention paid to competing 
institutions and each sphere of the hierarchy of triadic decision-making. The 
Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 was challenged in the case of S.P. Sampath Kumar v 
Union of India 1987 SCR (3) 233 as violating the basic structure of the Constitution due 
to the creation of new bodies with judicial attributes. The Supreme Court upheld the act 
but struck down its procedure for appointing the members of the administrative 
tribunals, as it muddied the separation of powers principle if the appointment was made 
by the executive, and the act could only be saved if ‘the government adopted an 
appointment process in which the government was required to consult with the Chief 
Justice and defer heavily to the Chief Justice's recommendations’ (Mate 2010, 189). In 
1997, in L Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261, the Supreme Court 
overruled its own judgment in the Sampath Kumar case, stating that removing the 
tribunals from the purview of the High Courts and allowing appeals only to the 
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Supreme Court was against the principles of the Basic Structure doctrine. We can again 
observe a pattern — the threat of retaliation in 1997 was much less than in 1987, and 
thus the Court aggressively expanded its jurisdiction.  
The Court even took aim at the international sphere and established principles of 
international commercial law in relation to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 
In the case of Bhatia International vs. Bulk Trading S.A. (2002) 4 SCC 105, interim 
protection was sought for the petitioners even though the arbitration was to be 
conducted in Paris. The Supreme Court read the general provisions of the act in such a 
way that it could extend it jurisdiction to grant interim protection even to arbitrations 
conducted outside of India. Based on this case, the Court slowly extended its 
jurisdiction to allow Indian courts to set aside foreign arbitration awards (Venture 
Global Engineering vs. Satyam Computer Services Ltd (2008) 4 SCC 190), rendering 
the act almost superfluous in its desire to take from the adversarial court procedure and 
introduce an element of speedy resolution to commercial matters.  
By the end of the 1990s, not one type of jurisdiction limitation had survived and 
the Supreme Court had reclaimed and expanded jurisdictional spaces in their totality, re-
establishing centralising judicial power over any decision-making process throughout 
the country. Judges have worked hard and jealously protect their power of the last word, 
and even the Ninth Schedule has come back into the Court’s jurisdictional space via 
basic structure review. 
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To handle corresponding workloads, the Court has grown in size as well (Table 2.1), 
with an increasing number of judges sitting on smaller and smaller benches for just a 
few years before retirement. Often this means — and Chapter Three will elaborate this 
point with detailed data — that the Supreme Court is speaking with multiple voices, and 
such polyvocality makes the power of the Court more acceptable. No single judge can  
take hold of a specific policy agenda for a long period of time. As Figure 2.3 illustrates, 
almost half of the judges appointed to the Supreme Court have been appointed after the 
judges’ case had put the Chief Justice in control of appointments, meaning that neither 
of the big political parties has had to worry about appointments of judges with specific  
policy preferences (as the Chief Justice too is often only in power for less than two 
years). The workload and short tenure of judges and, in particular, the fragmentation of 
benches thus make it next to impossible that the Court will be captured by a political 
TABLE 2.1   Number of Supreme Court Judges 
Year SC Judges
1950 8
1956 11
1960 14
1978 18
1986 26
2008 31
Source:   Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956 
 [as amended, latest amendment 2008].
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To conclude, a number of threads have been woven together over time. Perhaps Pandit 
Thakur Das Bharagava had a presentiment of the structural unfolding of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction:  
The Supreme Court would have more unrestricted powers with regard to the 
safeguarding of the public rights than any former court had. I would submit that 
under the Constitution the Supreme Court has been given the same criminal 
jurisdiction that the Privy Council has at present. The Supreme Court has been 
granted full powers and it may widen them daily by case law. (CAD Vol XI, 18 
November, 1949) 
Despite political resistance to the Federal Court, the institutional and structural logic of 
federal institutions and divided sovereignties necessitates judicial review mechanisms; 
likewise, the yearning for all sorts of veto powers by minorities and traditional forms of 
legitimacy go hand in hand with the functioning of non-representative institutions, such 
as courts and their unelected judges. A powerful legal profession was well established at 
the time of Independence, articulating political ideologies through rights and rule-of-law 
discourses. These various historical and structural sources of judicial power encouraged 
the Supreme Court throughout the 1950s and 1960s to pass assertive judgments, leading 
to a political backlash and jurisdiction stripping, with the real possibility (see Chapter 
Four) of the judicial review function being abolished during the Emergency.  This 8
 India’s apex court judges are not alone when it comes to patterns of judicial overreach and subsequent 8
retaliation by other branches. During the first ten years of the US Supreme Court — from its initial 
session in 1790 — the Court was considered weak, and appointments were rejected because of a lack of 
prestige. One of the US Supreme Court’s most important and controversial decisions  was, in Chisholm v. 
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), expanding the jurisdiction of federal courts, and challenging the states’ 
sovereign immunity from suits by private citizens was immediately overridden via the 11th Amendment to 
the constitution: ‘The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or 
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.’ 
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chapter provides an analytical narrative for such jurisdiction stripping, and then assesses 
the series of judgments that expanded the jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court well 
beyond the original institutional design. In line with the models proposed in Chapter 
One, the timing of this judicialisation of jurisdiction expansion runs side by side with 
the transformation of the Indian party system and the decreasing capacity of minority 
and coalition governments to override the Supreme Court via legislation, let alone make 
constitutional amendments (see Chapters Four and Five). The Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction expansion also goes hand in hand with dramatic workload increases, which 
in turn has had profound implications for court organisation and — as Chapter Three 
argues — requires theoretical re-orientations in order to understand this judicialisation 
and judicial power expansion.  
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Framing Supreme Court Power: 
Judicialization Theories in Context
Abstract   This Chapter traces the structures of the theoretical 
frameworks that inform scholarly analyses of judicial power. 
Various models and conceptual tools are discussed abstractly and 
then contextualised in relation to jurisdiction size and court 
organisation. Chapter Three relies extensively on data to support 
two elementary but weighty conclusions. Firstly, we distinguish 
legal formalism as important jurisprudential exercises within 
legal systems but without any explanatory value for our 
longitudinal study of judicial power in India. Secondly, a larger, 
separate dataset is presented to expose fundamental flaws in the 
standard application of U.S. style social-psychological models to 
the study of the India’s Supreme Court; as soon as we take into 
account size, workload and institutional organisation these 
approaches can only offer misleading information for our study 
— while they may explain judicial decision making in relation to 
an individual judge, or a small group of judges for a short period 
of time, such microscopic “snapshot” insights have no 
explanatory value for our macro-study of the Court as  a large 
institution with rapidly changing personnel and as a “moving 
image” across six decades. Based on this, Chapter Three 
concludes that strategic metaphors offer the best insights for the 
Indian Supreme Court and the most promising basis for a 
systematic model of judicial power variation across time.  
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[3.1] Competing Models of Supreme Court Power
Judicialisation is not easy to define. For Shapiro (1993), its essence is to be found 
within the triadic dynamic of judging itself, as authoritative third party decision makers 
incessantly transform the mechanisms of order and dispute (Roberts 1979). Viewed 
functionally, triadic processes thus also reign over the distribution of preferences and 
resources, emphasising the essentially political nature of the work courts do — in the 
words of Alec Stone Sweet: “[t]o move from the dyad to the triad is to construct 
governance” (Stone Sweet 1996:4). The second dimension of judicialisation relates to 
normative structures which can be described as a set of institutions, laws, customs or 
simply the rules of the game. Thus, judicialisation describes a process that stabilises 
dispute settlement mechanisms by sustaining an interdependence of dyads, triad and 
rules; simultaneously, judicialisation techniques constantly adapt the normative 
structure to the demands of a dispute in the process of its resolution.  Above all, 1
judicialisation is related to the structures and processes of constitutionalism and politics 
as successive waves of democratisation in the twentieth century have altered the 
juridical basis of the modern state and witnessed a sharp rise in judicial power (Stone 
Sweet 2002: 79). 
 Follows Fischer (2007)1
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Our model of judicialisation  is therefore based upon a dyadic social structure, 2
characterised by relations of direct exchange between individuals or social groups 
bound to each other by established principles of reciprocity; i.e. the legal and political 
actors that transact within the ever growing domain of constitutional. As “dyadic forms 
are inherently unstable because each party faces powerful incentives to ignore 
normative obligations,” the triadic entity introduces the authority of a dispute resolver 
as a third party. Finally, triadic dispute resolution usually functions within a normative 
structure which can be described as a set of institutions, laws, customs, or simply the 
rules of the game. Thus, judicialisation  in general generally describes a process that 
stabilises dispute settlement mechanisms by sustaining an interdependence of dyads, 
triad, and rules; simultaneously, judicialisation techniques constantly adapt the 
normative structure to the demands of a dispute in the process of its resolution. The 
judicialisation of Indian politics in particular is the process by which triadic dispute 
resolution and lawmaking is shifting towards the sphere of judges and legalism. 
Applying this model to the controversies surrounding India’s Supreme Court, it is 
argued that judges have increasingly asserted their own authority in the governance of 
the India whenever legislative politics, operating on the basis of majority rule, fails in 
finding efficient solutions. As soon as the executive or constitutional legislature become 
incapable of action, they will lose control of legislative authority and the Court – as an 
agency capable of independent or autonomous action – will act where the government 
and legislative is too fragmented to react. 
 Follows Fischer (2007).2
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In such circumstances, policymaking and lawmaking will tend to be judicialised 
and migrate towards the sphere of the Indian Supreme Court as the only body that is 
capable of decisive action. These are the conditions of a political system in which we 
see the development of a divided legislative, a “runaway” bureaucracy and the 
emergence of a powerful, activist court (Ferejohn 2002: 41 -63).  Consequently, the 3
mere institutional provision for judicial review with regard to administrative action and 
legislative competence is further enriched by the feedback mechanisms within processes 
of judicialisation. The power of the Supreme Court to “make laws” and to reform as 
well as create policies and legal institutions through rulings and interpretations grows 
systematically and continuously. 
The next question then is, how “rulings and interpretations” by judges can be 
understood. If a judicial system is nothing but a ‘giant syllogism machine, and the judge 
acts like a highly skilled mechanic’ (Tamanaha 2010, 1) then legal formalism’s postulate 
that judges only apply the law as it pre-exists in the text cannot account for any changes 
in judicial power unless the constitutional text was changed to encourage judicial 
assertiveness. Social-psychological models of judicial decision making,  on the other 4
hand, provide room for the assumption that judges have sincere ideological preferences. 
The law can play a role in the formation of judicial policy preferences but the point that 
truly matters for social-psychological approaches is the argument that different judges 
will have different preferences and will vote along those lines sincerely — i.e. 
untampered by strategic considerations about what other actors will do (Segal and 
 This paragraph follows Fischer (2007).3
 Not to be confused with cognitive or psychological dimensions of judicial decisions making (Baum 4
2006).
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Speath, 2002). The quantitative data of the following two sections reveals that formalist 
theories cannot account for judicial power variation and thus have no direct role to play 
in our arguments; social-psychological models naturally seem to be important factors 
for explaining judicial power expansion — however, the data in section 3.3 indicates 
that Indian Supreme Court judges are at the Court for a very short time, sit in small 
benches on multiple issues, and as a result their individual impact on the Supreme Court 
and the direction of case law is never negligible in principle, but in practice too small to 
measure for a longitudinal study. 
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[3.2] The Legal Lives of the Right to Life: Reinventing the Supreme Court
and the Indigenization of Judicial Review
Heraclitus’ river fragments encourage us to embrace the universality of change in all 
constitutional realms, for his assertion “that we never bathe in the same river twice, a 
brash legal realist might substitute the contention that we live only fleetingly under the 
same constitution once” (Murphy 1995, 165). Constitutional judicial review, in theory 
as well as in practice, reinforces such images of Heraclitean flux particularly strongly, 
given the enigmatic indistinctness and unfathomable generality of much constitutional 
text. Even where passages of constitutional text have remained unchanged over long 
periods of time, the meaning of these ‘same’ sequences of ‘changeless’ words would 
still flow like Heraclitus’ different waters; and judges — those who are stepping into the 
river — are of course perpetually changing too.  5
Despite the seemingly inescapable conclusion that the textual nature of law 
implies uncertainty of outcome, formalist theories of judicial decision and 
straightforward ideologies masquerading as jurisprudential techniques — such as 
“originalism” — view the meaning of constitutional text as fixed; all that judges have to 
do is to find the law. 
 Plato’s scepticism, whether one can step into the river even once (see, for instance, Kahn 1979; or Taraìn 5
2001, 131, 166) is a much deeper philosophical puzzle, not directly relevant here, but further nurturing 
our scepticism towards formalistic approaches to constitutional interpretation. We can also leave aside the 
problems of authenticity, paraphrasing and quotations, as well as the sophisticated nuances between the 
various versions of the river fragments (see, for instance, Sedley 2003; O'Connell 2006, 72). Heraclitus’ 
river image simply helps us to expose the plainly ahistorical and narrow dimension of legal formalism 
from a philosophical perspective.
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change the judges minds in future decisions they will no longer challenge the Article 21 
consensus. However, if we look at the empirical dimension of Article 21 litigation 
patterns (Figure 3.1 and 3.2) we find exactly the  opposite results. The vast majority of 
Article 21 decisions took place after 1990 (Figure 3.3 highlights the acceleration of the 
trend) as this short article becomes the cornerstone of judicial activism — Chapter 
Seven further explores how changes in litigation support 
FIGURE 3.2 Right to Life Cases (Article 21) Reported per Year, 1950-2009
Source: Compiled by author from SCC; n = 40,618 (total number of all reported cases in SCC 
database); n = 757 (total number of reported Article 21 cases in SCC database).
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due process principle due to the danger of judicial power expansion and the scope for 
activist interpretation — plus, Frankfurter warned that it could impose an unfair burden 
on the judiciary, given the political complexity of the type of cases that started coming 
to the U.S. Supreme Court because of the U.S. Constitution’s due process clause. The 
Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly concurred and a solution was only 
found when India opted for the Japanese way of framing the due process clause as 
“procedure established by law” (Khanna 2008, 288), thus signalling that the substantive 
content and “quality” of such procedures are not questions courts should entertain; this 
is also one example, in which the Indian Supreme Court deferred to the other branches 
from the beginning, when in 1950, in the Gopalan decision, the Court put the matter to 
rest; for a long time Article 21 disappeared completely from the judicial agenda (Figure 
3.2). That the very same article would then later become the basis for a new 
jurisprudence of social and economic rights and would turn the Directive Principles 
from abstract policy guidelines into specific justiciable rights is just one of the many 
examples that hint at the importance of context for understanding judicial decision 
making.  The judicial catharsis after the Emergency thus not only established a second 8
age of rights but also reminds us that the “death of the author” applies to constitutional 
text too: 
As we all know, not all constitutions are written as such. What is more or less 
theorised, at the same time, is the play and the war between what is written and what 
is unwritten in that something we call “constitutions.” Often called “conventions,” 
 Chapter Four’s analysis of judicial appointments will introduce another example, namely the 8
dramatically changing meaning of the word “consultation” and the scope of the Chief Justice’s power.
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the unwritten looms large over the written, at times supplanting what is “written.” 
Histories of slender texts (such as the American) and voluminous texts (such as the 
Indian) provide vivid examples of the unwritten at play and at war with the written 
texts. In Roland Barthes’ telling image, constitutions are not “writerly,” but 
“readerly,” texts. Constitutions entail not just the practices of writing but of reading 
to the point (as Barthes maintains) that the birth of the reader necessarily entails the 
death of the author. (Baxi 2000:1183) 
In a nutshell, the co-existence of multiple constitutions — the multitude of 
interpretations — illustrates the fertile contradictions and dialectical tensions within 
constitutional law. It is fatally flawed to try fit these contradictions within a singular set 
of postulates — such as legal formalism — and to obscure our understanding of the 
multiplex nature of the constitutional. Instead of a barren search for interpretative 
clarity, contradictions can be studies as expressive of constitutional experience and 
change. Instead of discovering a single fundamental framework of formal rules which 
create and restrict the relationships between governors and governed, we uncover a 
multitude of constitutional practices that institute multi-dimensional fields for the 
negotiation of governmental authority. In place of the monism of formalists, originalists, 
and legal positivists, we have thus learnt to appreciate constitutions — analogous to 
Greek conceptions of the divine — as ‘polymorphous’ (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, 61) 
creatures of manifold forms and orientations. How would we then know constitutional 
meaning or the “living constitutional law” (Ehrlich 1962) if we saw it? In terms of 
constitutional theory, we should certainly not trust Spinoza's optimism in our cognitive 
powers and his conception of adequate knowledge of a thing as correct definition.  It is 
more promising to maintain that the movement of constitutional meaning has to be 
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taken as an ascent of increasing abstraction, while each new platform of conditional 
understanding leads to new ways of knowing constitutional law; as a consequence, no 
form of understanding supersedes or corrects other forms of knowing constitutions, as 
— Sisyphus-like — each postulate implies a call for further investigation within itself, 
and indeed, ‘the irony of all theorising is its propensity to generate, not an 
understanding, but a not-yet-understood’.  Paraphrasing Oakeshott, and returning to 9
Heraclitus’ river, judges are perpetually en voyage. Judicial power then is not rooted in 
constitutional design or constitutional meaning per se — certainly, constitutional text 
does not exist in isolation. 
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just 
what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, 
“whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” 
said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.” (Carroll 1934 [1872], 
205) 
At the end of the day, whether judges have the last word, whether their judgments are 
implemented, overturned or even ignored, depends on other actors. In the short term, 
shared role understandings, shared legal education, shared preferences and believes in 
the “correctness” of the interpretative decision-making process, can stabilise legal 
interpretation (Tamanaha 2010, 205). But for longitudinal studies across decades, such 
low levels of interpretative stability are irrelevant when it comes to explaining the 
tectonic shifts of constitutional meaning we observe across time — just one example are 
shifting attitudes and judicial interpretation of constitutional laws governing race and 
 From Oakeshott’s On Human Conduct, quoted in McIntyre (2012, 18).9
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gender discrimination, or same-sex marriage.  Around the world, constitutional courts 10
are currently reading equality clauses in such a way as to deduct a right to same-sex 
marriage — not the text but the context changed; just 40 years earlier exactly the same 
equality clauses in the same countries had not even stood in the way of judges endorsing 
laws that criminalised homosexuality.  In conclusion then, legal formalist approaches 11
— despite their prominent role in law schools, legal scholarship, elite and even public 
discourses — have no explanatory value for a longitudinal study that stretches out 
across six decades. Law matters, but in different ways: as motivation, ideological 
framework, or cultural practice; whenever our case studies involve questions of legal 
interpretation and whenever we encounter jurisprudential debates within various legal 
communities these can be analysed and explained not on the basis of formalism but 
through thick description. 
[3.3] Contextualisation and Theory Choice 
About 70 years ago, C. Herman Pritchett (1941) began to count cases, dissenting 
opinions, and from his counting project shifted the ground away from legalistic 
narratives towards empirical observations that reshaped the way we think about the US 
Supreme Court (Epstein and Knight 2013), pioneering the study of judicial behaviour. 
 The US Supreme Court waited until 1967 to change its view on the constitutionality of legislation in 10
Southern States criminalising interracial marriage — there was no change in the constitutional text, but 
changing contexts meant that the same  words acquired different meanings.
 What seems striking about Indian judicial activism is not the scope of change in the meanings attached 11
to words when judges interpret constitutional text, but rather the speed with which precedent and 
established canons of interpretation were abandoned during the 1980s (Sathe 2002).
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For a long time, social-psychological paradigms dominated this field, in particular the 
attitudinal model’s (Segal and Spaeth 2002) bold view of judges as “politicians in 
robes” who decide sincerely in line with their policy preferences — like all other 
political actors.  Another milestone, and crucial for this thesis, is the explosion of 12
studies that adopt a strategic approach in the 1990s, following Brian Marks 1989 
dissertation (in economics, at Washington University), the ‘locus classicus’ of the 
‘modern day study of law and courts’ (Epstein and Knight 2000, 627).  
 Before we can focus exclusively on the strategic paradigm — having ruled out the 
applicability of legal formalist approaches to longitudinal studies — we need to assess 
the social-psychological paradigm that has animated the field for such a long time. With 
respect to India, it is in particular George H. Gadbois’ early work on the Indian Supreme 
Court that has pointed the field in that specific social-psychological direction. From the 
beginning his work thus described the background of Indian judges along the lines of 
caste, class, religion and education and other variables (1968 and 1970); even if these 
are useful pieces of information and suitable variables for many other research 
questions, they can be dangerously misleading in relation to judicial behaviour. It is too 
easy to overlook the complexity of judges’ motivations and the various ways in which 
identical backgrounds can play out differently in the development of a judges’ 
preferences. German legal sociologists learnt this the hard way when Kaupen and 
Rasehorn (1971) studied the bourgeois class and status group background of German 
judges and directly linked those results to judicial behaviour, trying to establish a 
 The attitudinal model is exceptionally successful when it comes to predicting judicial behaviour; the 12
type of explanatory theorising that this study aims at, may not even be the attitudinal model’s true 
purpose.
66
CHAPTER 3   ·   Judic ia l isat ion Theories
judicial bias against workers in labour law decisions. This study discredited the field for 
a long time, as it became immediately clear (Rottleuthner 1982) to what extent the 
complexity of motivations and biases had been underestimated by crude categories such 
as class and religion (and even at a simplistic level of Kaupen and Rasehorn’s analysis, 
correlation, let alone causality, between class or eduction and a judge’s preferences 
could not be confirmed by other scholars). Thus, Gadbois encyclopaedic achievements 
(2011) are powerful descriptive tools, but knowledge of a judges social and educational 
background only would provide the starting point for further research into individual 
judicial biographies that then explores the relationship between social-psychological 
variables and judicial-decision making for an individual judge (Chakrabarty 2002, 32). 
Moreover, the amount of information compiled for Indian judges is of very limited 
ambition in comparison to the sophistication of US style social-psychological models 
which collect data from newspaper clippings a judge may have written, his lower court 
decisions, his choice of clients as a lawyer, his speeches, or even the memo’s he wrote 
as a clerk.  Therefore, social-psychological scholarship on Indian judicial behaviour 13
seems currently quite limited (for instance Table 3.1) relying only on the actual voting 
behaviour as an expression of policy preference rather than conceptualising the vote on 
a bench of 2, 3, 5 or 7 judges in terms of dispositional or situational attribution. In other 
words, as we argue in the next section, it would be better to simply make a “black box” 
 To cut a long story short, U.S. universities and funding agencies have provided an excellent 13
institutional framework for the collection of social-psychological variables over decades, benefitting from 
a rigorous governmental record-keeping and public access culture (e.g. memos by clerks for judges, 
archives for judicial correspondence). Contemporary Indian scholarship relies on the efforts of individual 
scholars, massive but inevitably limited without a single university or law school department committed 
specifically to the study of judicial behaviour.
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approach explicit, rather than to open the Pandora’s box of whether a specific judicial 
attitude derives from gender, class, caste, or religious factors.   14
 Most importantly, social-psychological approaches fail to take into account 
workload and court organisation of the Indian Supreme Court. If we imagined a 
situation in which we had perfect information on Indian judges’ social-psychological 
background as well as policy preferences — and even understood how they relate to 
each other — the short tenure of Indian Supreme Court judges, the fragmentation of 
benches and issues (Table 3.2), the constant changes related to bench composition 
would make any model that tries to take into account the preferences of individual 
judges too complicated for meaningful insights; above all, the sample size would 
inevitably be too small as a judge may sit only once or twice on a case related to 
national security or affirmative action during his 3-5 years at the court; so even if we 
had perfect information about the judges’ social-psychological background, if we knew 
the preferences of the judge and if he then voted in line with our expectations we still 
cannot extract any meaningful empirical information from such evidence in relation to 
the Supreme Court as a composite whole, let alone from a longitudinal perspective. The 
fact that the Indian Supreme Court had only eight judges in the 1950s may have been 
responsible for Gadbois’ decision to apply U.S. models to India without significant 
modifications. But even during those first decades, the amount of time a judge spent at 
court differed radically: well below six years in India (Figure 3.5), compared to 14.9 
 Of course, the opening of this Pandora’s box remains an important research agenda for those studies 14
that are interested in individual judges or benches across short periods of time; however, it will require 
different methodological approaches, such as participant observation, detailed biographies, or even 
experimental research (this is where the field in the U.S.A. is moving towards). 
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years as average for the time period 1789 to 1970 in the USA. After 1970 the gap grows 
much wider, below five years of average tenure in India compared to 26.1 years for US 
Supreme Court judges (Calabresi and Lindgren 2005; without a single vacancy at all 
from 1994 to 2005). Similarly significant, are the different roles for the Chief Justice; 
from the earliest days of the Indian Supreme Court the rules relating to seniority and 
retirement resulted in the appointments of more than two dozens of chief justices who 
were destined to serve for less than two years, often only a few months.  As a result, 
Gupta’s  interesting observation that ‘the institutional support to the business as against 15
the state sharply declined from 64.47 per cent under Sikri to 37.68 per cent under 
Ray’ (1995, 189) has to be read in conjuncture with Table 3.2, illustrating that such 
periods of shifting judicial policy preferences must fluctuate rapidly due to the short 
tenure of Chief Justices in India. We find 16 different Indian Chief Justices before 1980 
but only three Chief Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court for the time period 1946 to 
1986; this trend accelerates and during the time period of the “Rehnquist Court”, 
defined by his role as Chief Justice for almost twenty years (1986-2005), there are again 
16 different Chief Justices of the Indian Supreme Court and only three served longer 
than two years. While the effort that flows into understanding individual judges of the 
U.S. Supreme Court thus seems well justified, the same information would not hold the 
same valuable insights for India as the study of individual judicial impact seems much 
less important than the study of the Court as institution.  
 Another example for the application of social-psychological models.15
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behaviour in terrorism cases is based on complex econometric models but then — 
according to the author herself — fails to reveal statistically significant insights for 
individual judges. However, looking at the Court as a whole Shankar finds strong 
evidence for judicial deference in matters of security laws, especially after the attack on 
the Indian Parliament in 2001. Accordingly, Shankar’s study of “the Court” as a whole 
provides strong insights, whereas her efforts to study individual judicial behaviour do 
not produce any significant results (2009, 115).  Chapter Three therefore suggests that 17
the short tenure, combined with the workload of the Indian Supreme Court and its 
institutional response (such as small benches of constantly fluctuating composition) lead 
to a situation in which the small number of decisions by an individual judge on a 
specific topic renders us unable to generalise results due to small sample size. While 
this insight seems microscopic at first sight, it is a crucial building block for the 
strategic model that section 3.4 develops and that then informs the following chapters. 
 To explain how short judicial tenure and workload play out in terms of internal 
Court organisation, we derive empirical evidence emphasising the fragmentation of 
judicial decision making units from a quantitative analysis of the 572 reservation cases 
decided by the Indian Supreme Court during the time period 1950-2009.   18
 For instance, Shankar investigates whether the religious background of Supreme Court judges leads to 17
different approaches to judging, but seems unable to find cases with Muslim or Sikh judges (94-95)
 The topic of reservations was selected for the following reasons: (1) This topic has led to inter-branch 18
conflict regularly since 1950 (see Appendix); (2) strong judicial policy interventions, such as the creamy 
layer doctrine, the 50% ceiling and the role of caste for the identification of beneficiaries; (3) constant 
litigation flow in all parts of the country because of the enormous practical relevance of reservations in 
day-to-day life. 
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in two important ways. Firstly, the number of judges increased;  secondly, more and 19
more cases are decided by increasingly smaller benches, so that fewer judges can decide 
more cases. Further analysis of bench composition in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 shows that the 
contemporary Supreme Court organisation manages to decide 88 cases (2006-2009) 
with 33 judges in total, who participate in reservation cases 200 times in total. On the 
other hand, the first 88 reservation cases the Court decided (1950-1985) have often been 
decided by larger benches of five or even seven judges; thus Supreme Court decision 
making during the first decades required more judicial personnel: 65 judges in total, 
who participated in reservation cases 303 times.   20
 Details in Table 2.1 as well as Figure 3.8.19
 Tables 3.3 to 3.6: The first sample of 88 reservation cases decided after 1950 stretches out until 1985. 20
We end up with the number 88 because a good sample size should be well above 50 and only 48 cases 
were decided before 1980; looking for a cut off point post-1980 it seemed best to pick 1985 so that Chief 
Justice Bhagwati and Chief Justice Chandrachud are included due to their high standing and because the 
latter served for seven years, longer than any other Indian Chief Justice. As a next step, the 2006-2009 
sample simply derives from taking the last 88 cases of the entire dataset to compare the most recent 
decisions 
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TABLE 3.3 	Fragmented Judicial Voice: Supreme Court Judges and 
	 	 	 Opinion Writing in Reservation Cases, 1950-85
Judges
Total Number 
Opinions 
Authored
Opinions Authored, 
Divided by Bench Size
7 Judge 
Bench
5 Judge 
Bench
3 Judge 
Bench
2 Judge 
Bench
P.B. Gajendragadkar 6 0 6 0 0
P.N. Bhagwati 5 0 1 2 2
Y.V. Chandrachud 5 0 2 2 1
A.N. Grover 5 0 2 0 3
K. Iyer 5 0 0 2 3
D.A. Desai 4 0 0 1 3
R.S. Pathak 4 0 0 2 2
O.C. Reddy 4 0 0 3 1
A.N. Sen 4 0 0 3 1
J.C. Shah 4 0 1 1 2
E.S. Venkataramiah 4 0 0 1 3
S.R. Das 3 3 0 0 0
A.N. Ray 3 1 0 2 0
K.N. Wanchoo 3 0 3 0 0
P.K. Goswami 2 0 0 1 1
K.S. Hegde 2 0 0 2 0
R.B. Mishra 2 0 0 1 1
J.R. Mudholkar 2 0 2 0 0
A. Varadarajan 2 0 0 1 1
A. Alagiriswami 1 0 0 0 1
S.M. Fazal Ali 1 0 0 1 0
Venkatarama Ayyar 1 0 1 0 0
M.H. Beg 1 0 0 1 0
V. Bhargava 1 0 0 0 1
S.K. Das 1 0 1 0 0
A.C. Gupta 1 0 0 1 0
M. Hidayatullah 1 0 0 1 0
A.D. Koshal 1 0 0 1 0
G.K. Mitter 1 0 1 0 0
D.G. Palekar 1 0 1 0 0
V. Ramaswami 1 0 1 0 0
K. Subba Rao 1 0 1 0 0
A.K. Sarkar 1 0 1 0 0
Patanjali Sastri 1 0 1 0 0
A.P. Sen 1 0 0 1 0
J.M. Shelat 1 0 0 1 0
J. Singh 1 0 0 1 0
C.A. Vaidialingam 1 0 0 0 1
TOTALS:        38 88 4 25 32 27
Source:  Compiled by author from SCC; n = 40, 618 (total number of all reported cases in SCC 
database);n = 572 (total number of reported reservation cases in SCC database) and n = 88 (number 
of reservation cases analysed for bench composition and opinion authorship; the 88 cases are the 
first 88 cases decided after the creation of the Supreme Court).
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TABLE 3.4 	Fragmented Judicial Voice: Supreme Court Judges and 
	 	 	 Opinion Writing in Reservation Cases, 2006-2009
Judges Total Number Opinions Authored
Opinions Authored, 
Divided by Bench Size
5 Judge 
Bench
3 Judge 
Bench
2 Judge 
Bench
S.B. Sinha 27 0 0 27
K.G. Balakrishnan 11 3 5 3
Arijit Pasayat 8 0 0 8
H.K. Sema 6 0 1 5
B.N. Agrawal 5 0 3 2
A.K. Mathur 5 0 0 5
C.K. Thakker 5 0 0 5
Tarun Chatterjee 4 0 0 4
A.R. Lakshmanan 4 0 0 4
R.V. Raveendran 3 0 0 3
Altamas Kabir 2 0 0 2
Ashok Bhan 1 0 0 1
B.P. Singh 1 0 0 1
D.K. Jain 1 0 0 1
G.P. Mathur 1 0 0 1
Lokeshwar Singh Panta 1 0 0 1
Markandey Katju 1 0 0 1
P.K. Balasubramanyan 1 1 0 0
S.H. Kapadia 1 1 0 0
TOTALS:        19 88 5 9 74
Source:  Compiled by author from SCC; n = 40, 618 (total number of all reported cases in SCC 
database); n = 572 (total number of reported reservation cases in SCC database) and n = 88 
(number of reservation cases analysed for bench composition and opinion authorship; the sample 
represents the last 88 reservation cases decided before 2009).
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TABLE 3. 5	Fragmented Participation: Supreme Court Judges Si?ing on 
	 	 	 Benches Deciding Reservation Cases, 1950—85
Judges
Participation in 
Decisions 
(Total Number) 
Participation, 
Divided by Bench Size
7 Judge 
Bench
5 Judge 
Bench
3 Judge 
Bench
2 Judge 
Bench
R.B. Mishra 13 0 0 8 5
O.C. Reddy 13 0 1 9 3
J.C. Shah 13 0 7 3 3
K. Iyer 12 1 1 6 4
E.S. Venkataramiah 12 0 1 6 5
R.S. Pathak 11 0 0 4 7
K.N. Wanchoo 11 0 11 0 0
P.N. Bhagwati 9 1 3 3 2
P.B. Gajendragadkar 9 0 9 0 0
S.M. Fazal Ali 8 1 1 6 0
Y.V. Chandrachud 8 0 2 5 1
K.S. Hegde 8 0 3 3 2
M. Hidayatullah 8 0 7 1 0
S.M. Sikri* 8 0 7 1 0
D.A. Desai 7 0 1 1 5
A.N. Grover 7 0 2 2 3
A.N. Sen 7 0 0 6 1
A. Varadarajan 7 0 0 6 1
M.H. Beg 6 1 1 3 1
V. Bhargava 6 0 2 1 3
A.N. Ray 6 1 3 2 0
B.P. Sinha* 6 1 5 0 0
G.K. Mitter 5 0 4 1 0
J.M. Shelat 5 0 4 1 0
N. Rajagopala Ayyangar* 4 0 4 0 0
Raghubar Dayal* 4 0 4 0 0
S.R. Das 4 3 1 0 0
K.C. Das Gupta* 4 0 4 0 0
J.R. Mudholkar 4 0 4 0 0
B.K. Mukherjea* 4 2 2 0 0
V. Ramaswami 4 0 3 1 0
Continued on next page.
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TABLE 3.5	 Continued from previous page
Judges
Participation in 
Decisions 
(Total Number) 
Participation, 
Divided by Bench Size
7 Judge 
Bench
5 Judge 
Bench
3 Judge 
Bench
2 Judge 
Bench
R.S. Bachawat* 3 0 3 0 0
Vivian Bose* 3 2 1 0 0
S.K. Das 3 1 2 0 0
A.C. Gupta 3 1 1 1 0
Syed Jafar Imam* 3 1 2 0 0
J.L. Kapur* 3 1 2 0 0
K.K. Mathew* 3 1 0 1 1
K. Subba Rao 3 0 3 0 0
Patanjali Sastri 3 2 1 0 0
A.P. Sen 3 0 1 2 0
J. Singh 3 0 1 2 0
C.A. Vaidialingam 3 0 2 0 1
 Fazl Ali* 2 2 0 0 0
Venkatarama Ayyar 2 1 1 0 0
V.B. Eradi* 2 0 0 1 1
P.K. Goswami 2 0 0 1 1
P.S. Kailasam* 2 0 0 2 0
Harilal J. Kania* 2 2 0 0 0
M.C. Mahajan* 2 2 0 0 0
D.G. Palekar 2 0 2 0 0
P.J. Reddy* 2 0 1 0 1
A.K. Sarkar 2 0 2 0 0
V.D. Tulzapurkar* 2 0 0 1 1
N.L. Untwalia* 2 0 0 2 0
A. Alagiriswami 1 0 0 0 1
I.D. Dua* 1 0 0 1 0
S.N. Dwivedi* 1 0 1 0 0
Ghulam Hasan* 1 0 1 0 0
B. Jagannadhadas* 1 0 1 0 0
H.R. Khanna* 1 1 0 0 0
A.D. Koshal 1 0 0 1 0
S. Mukharji* 1 0 0 1 0
R.S. Sarkaria* 1 0 0 0 1
M. P. Thakkar* 1 0 0 1 0
TOTAL:        65 303 28 125 96 54
* Judges who participated in reservation cases, but never wrote any opinions. 
Source:  Compiled by author from SCC; n = 40, 618 (total number of all reported cases in SCC database); 
n = 572 (total number of reported reservation cases in SCC database) and n = 88 (number of reservation 
cases analysed for bench composition and opinion authorship; the 88 cases are the first 88 cases decided 
after the creation of the Supreme Court).
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TABLE 3.6	 Fragmented Participation: Supreme Court Judges Si?ing on 
	 	 	 Benches Deciding Reservation Cases, 2006-2009
Judges
Participation in 
Decisions 
(Total Number) 
Participation, 
Divided by Bench Size
5 Judge 
Bench
3 Judge 
Bench
2 Judge 
Bench
S.B. Sinha 27 0 0 27
K.G. Balakrishnan 12 4 5 3
Markandey Katju 12 0 0 12
C.K. Thakker 12 5 1 6
R.V. Raveendran 11 2 4 5
Lokeshwar Singh Panta 10 0 1 9
Arijit Pasayat 10 2 0 8
D.K. Jain 9 0 3 6
Dalveer Bhandari* 7 2 1 4
Harjit Singh Bedi* 6 0 0 6
Tarun Chatterjee 6 0 0 6
Cyriac Joseph* 6 0 0 6
A.R. Lakshmanan 6 0 0 6
A.K. Mathur 6 0 0 6
H.K. Sema 6 0 1 5
B.N. Agrawal 7 0 3 2
P.K. Balasubramanyan 5 3 0 2
P.P. Naolekar* 5 0 1 4
Altamas Kabir 4 0 1 3
S.H. Kapadia 4 2 0 2
P. Sathasivam* 4 0 1 3
V.S. Sirpurkar* 4 0 0 4
G.P. Mathur 3 1 1 1
J.M. Panchal* 3 0 2 1
Y.K. Sabharwal* 3 3 0 0
G.S. Singhvi* 3 0 2 1
Aftab Alam* 2 0 0 2
H.L. Dattu* 2 0 0 2
Arun Kumar* 2 1 0 1
Mukundakam Sharma* 2 0 0 2
Ashok Bhan 1 0 0 1
B, Sudershan Reddy* 1 0 0 1
B.P. Singh 1 0 0 1
TOTALS:        33 200 25 27 148
* Judges who participated in reservation cases, but never wrote any opinions. 
Source:  Compiled by author from SCC; n = 40, 618 (total number of all reported cases in SCC 
database); n = 572 (total number of reported reservation cases in SCC database) and n = 88 
(number of reservation cases analysed for bench composition and opinion authorship; the sample 
represents the last 88 reservation cases decided before 2009).
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These findings have significant implications for the judicial voice, namely shrinking 
representativeness and polyvocality. Representativeness simply describes the 
relationship between the size of the Court and the weight of the voice judicial, 
reminding us that the trend of shrinking bench sizes has to be understood in relation to 
the trend of a growing court. To give an example, an unanimous 5-judge bench decision 
in 1950 means that 5 judges speak for a Court of 8 judges, giving the decision a 
representativeness-weightage of 62.5%. In 2004, an unanimous 2-judge bench decision 
means that 2 judges speak for a court of 26 judges, giving the decision a 
representativeness-weightage of 7.7%. Figure 3.8 reveals how these developments play 
out across six decades, providing further support for the principal theoretical 
implication that the “conclusions” of social-psychological studies of individual judicial 
behaviour are hollowed out by the actual low weight of individual judicial opinions. 
Combining the trends of growing court, growing workload, and shrinking bench 
size, our dataset also explains why the sample size for social-psychological studies 
regularly remains too small for inferential statistical analysis. Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 
reveal that  during their five years at the court Indian Supreme Court judges have to 
write a plethora of opinions without opportunities for specialisation given the 
discontinuities of small benches composition combined with the diversity and scope of 
workload. This means that social-psychological scholars searching for the preferences 
of individual Indian Supreme Court judges — say for fundamental rights (Chakrabarty 
2000) or for terrorism cases (Shankar 2009) — will often find just a handful of cases.  21
 Other courts are organised along the lines of specialist benches (e.g. a tax bench that then hears all tax 21
cases) and judges work for 8 to 16 years on the same bench, hearing only hundreds of cases per year, and 
not thousands; every week, Indian Supreme Court judges lose two full work days just dealing with 
admissions matters. 
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The narrative mode of the Indian Supreme Court thus is one of radical polyvocality, 
with multiple, rapidly changing, judicial voices speaking about the same legal fields. 
Both, legal formalist as well as social-psychological approaches are blind to such 
relationships between judicial-decision making and the actual context of court 
organisation. With   their tendency to structure judicial decision making as an input-
output-system both theories provide unsatisfactory and incomplete accounts of the 
Indian Supreme Court in general, and from a longitudinal perspective in particular. 
Section 3.3 therefore has paid attention to the details of intra-institutional design, 
opening the “black box” of court organisation in order to explore at least some of the 
internal dynamics and external workload pressures that structure judicial decision 
making and thus must shape our theory choice. As a next step, we further expand our 
theoretical framework from intra-institutional towards inter-institutional contexts. 
[3.4] Towards Strategic Accounts of Supreme Court Power
Even if we assumed that judging was a mechanistic exercise, the purely logical 
application of the governing law to the facts of a case producing single correct 
outcomes, we could still make a cogent case that judges have good reasons for strategic 
decision-making: whether a judge deliberately pursues policy or ideological goals or 
whether a judge is convinced of his judicial objectivity and sincere in his belief that he 
merely discovers the law, none of these diverging ends affects the utility of strategic 
thinking in principle. Both, a judge trying to impose a policy preference on politicians 
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as well as a judge trying to impose the ‘correct’ interpretation of constitutional rules on 
the other branches of government, require sophisticated strategic behaviour to achieve 
their goals. Any court decision can trigger a response from the other branches. If the 
costs of a judgment are high, institutional action springs in and the other branches may 
decide to overrule the Court. However, this is not just a question of abstract institutional 
design but also political reality: overriding the Supreme Court comes with transaction 
costs, such as the time and effort it takes to pass legislation and the task of building a 
majority (for constitutional amendments such costs are even higher because of 
additional institutional hurdles). Figure 3.9 depicts the ideal preference points of all the  
 
FIGURE 3.9	 Hypothetical Distribution of Preferences over the Question of 
	 	 Compensation for the Expropriation of Land
Source: Adapted by author from Eskridge (1991). The figure shows hypothetical ideal points for any 
actor who can introduce or veto legislation.
G = Government ideal point.   P = Parliament ideal point.   PR = President ideal point.
SC = Supreme Court ideal point.
×
SCPG PR
No 
Compensation
Full 
Compensation
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actors involved in setting and applying the rules related to the expropriation of land. The 
arrangement of ideal points in Figure 3.9 is not purely hypothetical as we can use the 
Bela Banerjee case and Nehru’s Statement of Objects and Reasons  in the Constitution 22
(Fourth) Amendment Act, 1954 to build an analytical narrative. The sequence of moves 
begins with the decision of the Indian Supreme Court on December 11, 1953 in State of 
West Bengal vs. Bela Banerjee 1954 AIR 170. A five judge bench, by unanimous 
decision and the opinion written by Chief Justice Shastri, declares sec. 8 of the West 
Bengal Land Development and Planning Act, 1948 unconstitutional and void as the 
principles on which compensation is paid are based on 1946 market values only. The 
Supreme Court also asserts that compensation ‘is a justiciable issue to be adjudicated by 
the court’ (para 562). In terms of Figure 3.9 the policy preference expressed in the Bela 
Banerjee case is represented as (SC). As a next step, President (PR), Parliament (P) and 
the Government of India (G) can decide whether to ignore the judgment, to overturn it, 
or retaliate against the Supreme Court in other ways.  It is the Government which 23
chooses to act next, introducing a constitutional amendment and overseeing its passage 
through Parliament and Presidential assent before May 1955. Sec. 2 of Art. 31 of the 
Constitution is substituted, the new clause reads as follows” 
No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public 
purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the 
property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the 
 Dated and signed by Nehru December 17, 1954. 22
 The President could only speak out against the judgment or encourage Parliament or Government to 23
act; apart from overturning the decision, other forms of retaliation are for instance, court budget cuts, 
attacks on judicial independence, or court packing by appointing new, additional judges. 
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compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the 
compensation is to be determined and given; and no such law shall be called in 
question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is 
not adequate.  
As a result, the decision of the Supreme Court in the Bela Banerjee case is overturned 
and expropriation and compensation policies now continue to be formulated and 
implemented in line with the Government’s preferences (P). This represents not just a 
defeat but also a missed opportunity for the Supreme Court. Whether the Court’s 
preference point (SC) is based on the judges’ sincere belief in their correct legal 
interpretation of the Constitution (formalism) or whether the judges think of themselves 
as policy- or law-makers is irrelevant for our strategic model;  the question is not about 24
good policy and good law, the question is why the Indian Supreme Court does not act 
with more strategic savvy and places its decision between (P) and (PR), thus at least 
opening up the possibility that the other actors can accept the judgment and decide not 
to invest their time and political capital into overturning the Court. The Supreme Court 
then would have not gotten everything it wanted but at least would have brought the 
policy a little bit closer in line with its own preferences. By ignoring the other actors 
completely the Court not only ensured maximum loss for a particular case but even 
provoked retaliation in the form of jurisdiction stripping, taking the question of what 
constitutes fair compensation away from all courts completely.  
If we refine our strategic model further, and integrate the idea of “tolerance 
intervals” of the various actors (Figure 3.10) we can then construct a suitable model for  
 Similarly, we are not interested in the social-psychological dimension as to why and how the judges 24
have developed their preferences. 
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explaining patterns of judicial power expansion as well as contraction. Epstein, Knight 
and Shvetsova (2001) introduced the idea of tolerance intervals  into the study of 25
strategic judicial decision making, which provides another useful heuristic tool for 
understanding the power of the Indian Supreme Court; especially to understand why the 
Court lost again and again, and for so long, and how the Indian Supreme Court then 
starts to win and eventually breaks free of the traditional restraints and controls of 
separation of power games in the 1990s.  
Figure 3.10 reframes the Bela Banerjee case along the lines of Brian Marks’ 
separation-of-powers model (1989), placing the ideal points (G), (P) and (SC) within a 
two-dimensional policy space, and paying careful attention to the tolerance intervals of 
the three key players. Our starting point is now the assumption that a strategic court is 
aware that its range of possible decisions is constrained by the preferences of other 
actors. In addition, we expect the Court to learn  and to become better at understanding 26
the tolerance intervals to avoid retaliation and disempowerment. For this strategic 
model we do not need much in terms of assumptions: We ‘proceed from the assumption 
that social phenomena are to be explained as the outcome of interactions among 
intentional actors […] but that these interactions are structured, and the outcomes 
shaped by the characteristics of the institutional settings in which they occur’ (Scharpf 
 Tsebelis calls the same idea ‘indifference curves’ (2002) — the key fact remains that each player 25
always prefers points closer to him than further away, the tolerance interval indicates all the points that 
are “acceptable” to an actor; as long as a court decision falls within a tolerance interval, the other actor 
will not retaliate. Maybe the most important dimension of the strategic model is thus the possibility for 
judicial disempowerment and de-judicialisation (neither seem to be concerns of Stone Sweet’s dyad-triad 
theorising for France, but crucial research dimensions for India until the emergency). 
 The strategic model fits the ambition of longitudinal perspectives as well, as the repetition of the 26
“games” underlying the strategic model tie sequences together, thus connecting them across time — 
whereas the snapshots of textual interpretation or judicial behaviour disconnect.
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1997, 1). As a next step, Chapter Four explores the promise of the strategic approach to 
generate new substantive insights into the most famous and most important judicial 
innovation of the 20th century— the basic structure. Figure 4.1 is directly connected to 
Figure 3.10, and the chapters are closely connected via the success of the Swatantra 
Party in the 1967 election (from 18 to 44 seats), and the loss of seats by the Congress 
party (from 361 to 283). In Figure 3.10, the optimal winset for a Parliament-Supreme 
Court alliance is marked as line scp-psc. Chief Justice Subba Rao’s strategic 
calculations are solid, and even his bet on the Congress’ loss of amendment power in 
1967 (see Figure 5.3) pays off as the Supreme Court decides the Golak Nath case 
February 27, 1967 and blocks Parliament from amendment fundamental rights 
altogether. It is rational to assume that a Government without solid amendment power in 
Parliament would not be able to stop smaller players, such as the pro-property 
Swatantry party, to shift the policy away from the Government’s ideal point. This 
decision’s radical, direct and immediate impact on politicians — and in this respect 
Chapter Four will demonstrate how Golak Nath is very different from Kesavananda — 
provokes years of anti-Supreme Court rhetoric and all sorts of retaliation by the other 
branches. In addition, the fact that Chief Justice Subba Rao resigns after the Golak Nath 
case in February, and then runs for presidential office May 1967 with Swatantra 
support, further undermines the ability of other actors to trust the Supreme Court. 
Chapter Five then continues to apply the model presented here, focusing on the 
repetition of strategic decision making and illustrates that the tolerance intervals of the 
other branches expand under coalition and minority government rule to such an extent 
as to give the Supreme Court almost complete freedom in terms of situating its ideal 
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preferences in any policy space (except reservations). Last but not least, Chapter Six 
asks to what extent we have to adjust our strategic model in light of India’s basic 
structure constitutionalism and the transformation of the role of the Supreme Court in 
separation-of-powers games. 
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CHAPTER FOUR
Kesavananda and the Rules of the Game: 
Political Origins of the Basic Structure
Abstract   Chapter Four applies game theory to the workings of 
the Indian Supreme Court. The arguments presented model the 
Court’s most legendary decisions in terms of a separation of 
powers game, with players and strategies and the 
epistemological tools of winning and losing. The game theory 
applied is on a basic level, and the purpose of this chapter is not 
to make any advances in formal political theory but to go 
beyond the normative dimension of inter-branch conflicts and 
develop a systematic framework for analysing judicial decisions 
as responses to institutional constraints in order to systematically 
explain the political origins of the basic structure doctrine and 
how its deep entrenchment fundamentally transformed the rules 
of the separation of power games in India through heresthetics. 
Thus, the chapter concludes that the original basic structure 
cases are not only about winning and losing, but also about the 
fact that the court — although apparently losing overall — has 
managed to change the rules of the game. Over time, the 
interactive process of judicial reviews has unfolded dynamically, 
but only when elections and the diffusion of political power in 
the other branches of government open up the space for — if not 
invite — judicial power expansion.
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[4.1] Pouvoir Constitué and Pouvoir Constituant:
Theoretical and Practical Implications of a Paradox
An uncanny coincidence has occurred within the history of modern written 
constitutions. In his famous debates with James Madison, Thomas Jefferson disparaged 
the search for the durability of constitutional laws and lamented the theocratic 
constitutional undertones applied by those who ‘look at constitutions with 
sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the arc of the covenant, too sacred, to be 
touched’ [letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816 (Appleby and Ball 1999, 215)]. In 
1789, Jefferson had already discussed with Madison sunset clauses for laws, and 
partially implemented the idea in early US legislation (Ranchordás 2014, 18). The 
optimal duration of a constitution, Jefferson stipulated, was 19 years, freeing future 
majorities from present day ones. He was, basing his thinking on the average life 
expectancy of Europeans at the time (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton 2009, 1). Uncannily, 
the quantitative analysis by Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton‑  revealed that the average 1
lifespan of constitutions was 17 years — and the constitutional crisis triggered by the 
Golak Nath decision,‑  could have easily condemned the Indian Constitution to precisely 2
such an average lifespan of 17 years and one month after its inauguration. Instead, the 
 Their database includes all written constitutions from 1789 to present. All constitutions were translated 1
into English. 
 Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643; date of the decision is February 27, 1967. 2
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famous judicial opinions in Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala‑  vindicated 3
judicial power through a strategic retreat from the unsophisticated doctrines set out by 
the Golak Nath case. In Golak Nath, the sort of mistake that derails constitutions was a 
direct attack on the other branches, causing an immediate and significant limitation of 
their powers — resulting in strong retaliation via constitutional amendments. The 
Kesavananda basic structure doctrine establishes implied limitations on Parliament’s 
amendment power merely as an abstract principle, but without any immediate impact on 
any politician. This nurtures judicial power by stealth as nobody loses anything and 
nothing becomes concrete when the court hands down a decision; thus, there are really 
no stakeholders yet. Who could be concerned about whether some day in the distant 
future a Supreme Court may assert the right to veto constitutional amendments. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical earthquake was so strong that the other branches took 
note. Kesavananda pushes Indian constitutionalism beyond Dicey’s parliamentary 
sovereignty ideas and into the realm of French and, in particular, German constitutional 
theory. Chapter Two has illustrated how such ideas travel and how every legal transplant 
undergoes processes of indigenisation.  
For the basic structure doctrine, the metaphor of migration is particularly apt as 
Abbe Sieyes’ distinction between constituent and constituted power inspired great 
debates within Austrian and German Staatslehre — in particular, in Heidelberg, between 
Carl Schmitt and Anschütz, and via Schmitt’s colleague, Ernst Forsthoff. His doctoral 
student, Dieter Conrad would eventually ‘migrate’ to India.  Of course, neither Kelsen, 4
 (1973) 4 SCC 225.3
 Sieyes’ political pamphlet What is the Third Estate? already had a concrete political objective in the 4
constitution making of revolutionary France (Colon-Rios, 84). 
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Schmitt nor Anschütz, nor the judges deciding the Kesavananda case, could escape the 
paradox within Sieyes’ distinction (Laughlin and Habermas). ‘Constitutional doctrine 
presupposes the existence of that which it creates: the demos which is called upon to 
accept the constitution is constituted, legally, by that very constitution (Weiler 2001, 
184). On the contrary, instead of resolution, the circularity of the argument seems to be 
its key characteristic and a driving force behind inherent conceptual openness and the 
constant movement of constitutional life. Whatever the level of theoretical 
sophistication, at some point constitutional scholars or actors fall on one or other side of 
the equation. Anschütz, who always spoke out in favour of a legal revolution through 
amendment power, resigned from his post in 1933. Schmitt, Anschütz’s critic, 
underwent a sea change by embracing new constitutional theories to serve the Nazi 
regime. Kelsen would immigrate and continue to struggle to come to terms with the 
political implications of legal positivism. The Supreme Court of Pakistan based the 
judgments empowering the first phase of dictatorship on Kelsen’s constitutional theory 
and changing Grundnorms.  
In all these cases, the theoretical implications of the paradox of constitutional 
power remain unresolved. At peculiar constitutional moments (Ackerman), a 
constitutional system follows one path or another. There is no logic or better normative 
reasoning that can be applied to it — ‘the life of the law has not been logic; it has been 
experience.’  When Dieter Conrad spoke about implied limitations of the amending 5
power at Banaras Hindu University (February 1965), he did not resolve this paradox. 
But he gave Indian lawyers the all important rhetorical tools to reframe Diceyan 
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, quoted in Lefebvre (2008, 98).5
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parliamentary sovereignty.  We know from the written briefs that Palkhivala — the lead 6
lawyer in the Kesavananda case arguing against Parliament’s unlimited amendment 
power — used and cited Conrad’s work, and eventually the Supreme Court cited 
Conrad too and embraced his core idea. 
As Kesavananda leaves Indians with a new type of paradox, it is important to 
keep in mind that Dicey’s parliamentary sovereignty collapses too as a theory when it 
comes face to face with significant constitutional moments.  We know that Motilal 7
Nehru’s father cited Dicey extensively, and Dicey is also one of the few academics who 
is mentioned in the constituent assembly. It is plausible to assume that Nehru must have 
encountered Dicey’s work as a student in England and that Dicey must have played a 
prominent role in the way Nehru articulated the role and powers of Parliament. Some of 
the best evidence on this derives from Lord Butler’s memoirs. —Staying with Nehru in 
1954, Lord Butler had conversations with him that touched on constitutional history, 
and we have the following report: 
The gradualness of the progress towards self-government meant that Indians 
themselves had grown used to the daily administration of parliamentary government: 
that it also at the same time made inevitable the domination of the Congress party 
was unavoidable. When, in 1954, I stayed with Nehru in Delhi, he affirmed without 
hesitation that our Government of India Bill, founded as it was Dicey and Anson, the 
two great constitutional lawyers, was the basis of the Independence Bill itself. 
(Butler of Saffron Walden 1971, 60) 
 That the Constituent Assembly had not been elected on the basis of an adult franchise and chose an easy 6
amendment procedure precisely because it questioned its own democratic legitimacy illustrates that those 
opposing implied limitations of amendment powers had equally good arguments — it is not a binary 
question of right or wrong, but rather a positioning within the circularity based on the context. 
 The German Constitutional Court Judge, Böckenförde, thus uses the term Grenzbegriff.7
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It is also likely that Nehru and other politicians followed Irish developments carefully 
— but whether they picked up on Dicey’s constitutional theory flip-flopping is 
unknown. The original doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has been discussed in 
Chapter One and is summed up by Dicey as follows: 
Neither the Act of Union with Scotland nor the Dentists Act, 1878, has more claim 
than the other to be considered a supreme law. Each embodies the will of the 
sovereign legislative power; each can be legally altered or repealed by Parliament; 
neither tests the validity of the other. Should the Dentists Act, 1878, unfortunately 
contradict the terms of the Act of Union, the Act of Union would be pro tanto 
repealed ... The one fundamental dogma of English constitutional law is the absolute 
legislative sovereignty or despotism of the King in Parliament. (A.V. Dicey, 1885) 
This radical statement collides with Dicey’s writing in relation to Irish home rule: 
The statesmen of 1707, though giving full sovereign power to the Parliament of 
Great Britain, clearly believed in the possibility of creating an absolutely sovereign 
legislature which should yet be bound by unalterable laws ... [T]he enactment of 
laws which are described as unchangeable, immutable, or the like, is not necessarily 
futile. The declaration contained in the Act for Securing the Protestant religion and 
Presbyterian Church government within the Kingdom of Scotland, which is 
embodied in the Act of Union ... is not unmeaning (A.V. Dicey and R.S. Rait, 1920). 
Dicey reaches new heights when he calls for armed rebellion and stipulates that the 
unelected House of Lords represents the true will of the nation. As the Ireland Act 1914 
was passed — after four consecutive elections had produced a majority in favour of 
Irish home rule — by the House of Commons (but without the Lords’ consent), Dicey 
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commented: ‘ … acts of oppression on the part of a democracy, no less than of a king, 
which justify resistance to the law, or, in other words, rebellion’ (quoted in McLean and 
McMillan 2007, 438). 
Not much follows from all these paradoxes and contradictions. In a nutshell, this 
thesis — and Chapter Four in particular — does not advance the argument that such 
normative and theoretical constitutional debates are irrelevant. They shape and inspire 
the discourses that frame institutional decision making and influence the preferences of 
legal and political actors; we merely postulate that in the realm of constitutional 
practice, the normative and the theoretical are always at best epiphenomenal. The 
purpose of Chapter Four is not to engage with the paradox of constituent and constituted 
power, adding yet another layer to a debate that is structured to be circular. One scholar, 
who would not have been surprised by the gap between constitutional theory and reality, 
and the fact that so many great constitutional theorists have seen their theories melt 
away when turned to practice, is J.A.G. Griffith, who taught that a constitution ‘lives on, 
changing from day to day, for the constitution is no more and no less than what happens. 
Everything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing happened, that would be 
constitutional also’ (Griffith 1979, 19). 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[4.2] A Revionist Analysis of India's Basic Structure
The following section adopts a reductionist, nomothetic perspective on the Supreme 
Court and the separation of powers in India: reductionism is a necessary and potent tool 
for constructing the game argument and to bring the strategic approach into play 
prominently and in opposition to the existing basic structure debate, which is heavily 
normative.  The judicial decision can trigger either compliance, i.e. judges win, or 8
backlash (overriding decisions or retaliation aiming at the institutional independence of 
the court) by the other branches, i.e. judges lose. That is, the image of a separation of 
powers game is only a basic aspect of constitutional design. But it helps us straight 
away to imagine how institutional structures can matter for judicial decision-making 
and how the logic of institutionalism encourages us to think about the Indian Supreme 
Court not as an autonomous legal but as a rational, strategic decision-maker, seeking to 
maximise preferences, on the one hand, and to avoid sanctions, on the other. 
Irrespective of the specific ideological orientation of Indian judges at various points in 
time, the separation of powers game allows us to understand judges as strategic players 
that navigate a policy space just as other Indian political actors do. 
 The strategic approach in Chapter Five is similarly reductionist, as it only looks at the interplay between 8
the court, the legislature and the executive, although it begins to introduce strategic alliances outside the 
realm of Montesquieu and the separation of powers, looking at divided, fragmented sovereignty and thus 
alliances between the court and media elites, cause lawyers, bar associations and litigation organisations. 
Normative constitutional thought can play an important role, not in the sense of a right or wrong binary 
code and a map for finding ‘constitutional truth’, but indirectly by shaping political ideologies and 
influencing the specific preferences of specific constitutional actors.  
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Figures 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrate the relationship between the players: the Supreme 
Court strikes down laws believed to be unconstitutional; clearly, until the 1980s at least, 
judges rarely had the last word in the matter (see Chapter Five). Instead, the legislature 
and the executive often chose to override the Supreme Court, even if it meant passing a 
constitutional amendment (other forms of retaliation could be judicial transfers, budget 
cuts or simply ignoring judgements at times; ordinary legislative statutes can also 
modify the terrain of constitutional decision-making through modifying procedures and 
jurisdiction). Consequently, figures 4.1 and 4.2 also illustrate the capacity of the other 
branches to amend the Constitution and to correct a judicial decision found to be sub-
optimal. The interpretative process is thus shaped through these various strategic 
mechanisms of interaction between political actors. The Indian Supreme Court, then, 
participates in political dialogues with other forces, dialogues that create the 
understanding of what the Constitution says over time. Hence, in order to understand 
the emergence of the basic structure doctrine, we have to trace the interactions between 
the court and other actors in shaping the interpretation of laws and the Constitution. The 
exercise of judicial power — whether or not it is to strike down a constitutional 
amendment — is directly affected by the preferences and by the power of other 
branches. As figures 4.1 and 4.2 indicate, we can assume that Supreme Court judges 
may wish to decide cases in certain ways, maybe sincerely in line with their own policy 
preferences or their understanding of what the law says, but judges can stop themselves 
from doing so by their awareness of the preferences of other branches. Judicialisation 
theory, therefore, is important not because courts have some mystical ability to 
understand the intentions of  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CHAPTER 4   ·   Kesavananda
the political founders, but because it enables us to see more precisely what the 
constitutional boundaries of a system are. The basic structure is revealed, not by the 
pronouncements of a special class of wise men, but through continuous interaction 
among branches of government. Judges make laws as a process; they do not discover it. 
In terms of legal realism, the Indian Supreme Court has never been constrained by 
interpretative rules of ‘exegesis’ — but the judges are constrained by other political 
actors. The timelines underline that there is a risk of false assumptions, missteps and 
errors: if judges challenge powerful political actors at the wrong point in time, they may 
provoke a counterattack that can undermine the judicialisation process. Strategic 
judicial thinking is thus key to the ongoing process of interpretation, as the constitution 
is continually being developed and, more or less, subtly adjusted to new political 
conditions. Judicialisation is deepened whenever the Supreme Court does not have to 
fear a counterattack from either the executive or the legislative — for instance, because 
other branches are too weak or because of influence and the political preferences of 
other actors have already become judicialised and aligned with the Supreme Court’s 
preferences. 
Chapter Four has a special place in this thesis, as the Raj Narain case, the first in a 
series of case studies on the question of ‘what do judges maximise?’, does not raise any 
complex problems in a short-term sequence bounded by the sheer struggle for 
institutional survival — we do not have to distinguish various time phases with different 
policy preferences, or change judges with different preferences; rather, our assumption 
is confined to the most basic judicial self-interest in the institutional integrity of the 
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court.  The judges must have been aware that their predecessors overreached themselves 9
twice — in 1950 and in 1967 — and then backtracked and chose not to challenge the 
sitting government in the 1973 Kesavananda decision and during the emergency. The 
basic structure is, first, a retreat, and we would be wrong to conceptualise winning as a 
question of judicial assertion. To understand the political origins of the basic structure 
doctrine, the chapter remained attentive to the longue durée, as characterised by 
Ferdinand Braudel.  
The case study presented in Chapter Four focuses on a single game, a short 
sequence of events in a short period of time, and only one key aspect of judicial 
strategy. Chapter Five looks at recurring sequences of separation of powers games over 
longer periods of time, and then the thematic case studies of Chapters Five to Eight 
explore further the strategic dimensions of judicial decision-making.  Needless to say, 10
the Raj Narain case discussed in this section is peculiar due to its authoritarian context 
— in other words, the checks and balances functioned without elections, thus putting 
the judiciary on a weak footing. The emergency was at its root, a struggle between the 
desire for political supremacy, on the one hand, and a sacrosanct judiciary, on the other. 
As Austin puts it: ‘But the short-run need was clear to the Prime Minister and her 
 The most plausible assumption as a first step is to illustrate the ways that Indian judges negotiate the law 9
politics tension differently at different points of time (This tension is about the ideal typical images of 
what judging is, within the judges’ heads — even if a judge preferred ‘purely’ legal decision making, they 
may decide that political considerations must come first in some cases.).
 There are many strategic dimensions that will not be explored in this thesis: SC judges are acting 10
strategically all the time, when sitting on a bench, convincing colleagues and building majorities. Other 
elements of strategy could be the role of the Chief Justice, assigning cases and exercising docket control 
within the PIL cell. In the case of India, which has low judiciary salaries, a very low compulsory 
retirement age and many government perks that disappear after retirement, the question of what judges do 
after leaving the court seems important too, given that almost none of the judges stop work, but continue 
to serve in embassies, government institutions and commissions, and very often in arbitration 
proceedings. 
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associates: to protect her prime ministry and her Emergency proclamation from judicial 
challenge.’ Most authors conceptualise this struggle in terms of normative political 
philosophy (pouvoir constituant vs. pouvoir constitués) and view the basic structure 
doctrine as a question of interpretative logic. For legal realists, it is a question of 
strategy and institutional struggle. 
The story begins to unfold in the Allahabad High Court. The facts of the case 
were, as Justice Krishna Iyer later puts it, typical of a humdrum case. In 1971, there was 
an election contest between Raj Narain and Indira Gandhi in Rae Bareli, which Indira 
Gandhi won. Raj Narain was convinced that she had done so through corrupt practices. 
He therefore filed a case calling for the election result to be invalidated and he won his 
case. On June 12, 1975, Justice Jagmohanlal Sinha of the Allahabad High Court ruled 
agains the prime minister, finding Indira Gandhi guilty (misuse of government 
machinery for her election campaign). While allowing for a stay, the order of the High 
Court left no doubt that the prime minister’s election was null and void, that she had to 
be give up her seat in Lok Sabha, and would be banned from electoral contests for the 
next six years. 
Indira Gandhi appealed and Justice Krishna Iyer announced the judgement on the 
case during the vacation of the Court — on June 24, 2975 — and granted a conditional 
stay of the order of the Allahabad High Court as well as allowing Indira Gandhi to 
continue in office as prime minister. But he did impose restrictions on her as a member 
of the Lok Sabha: for the time she could attend Parliament, she could not vote or draw a 
salary as a member. However, the possibility of defeat at the hands of Supreme Court 
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judges was too much for Indira Gandhi. Two days later, on June 26, 1975, she opted for 
emergency rule.  
The story continues with her efforts to formally limit the powers of the Supreme 
Court and to exclude election disputes from its jurisdiction. In the statement of objects 
and reasons of the Constitution (39th Amendment) Act, 1975, H.R. Gokhale elaborated 
on behalf of Indira Gandhi: 
Article 71 of the Constitution provides that disputes arising out of the election of the 
President or Vice-President shall be decided by the Supreme Court. The same article 
provides that matters relating to their election shall be regulated by a parliamentary 
law. So far as the Prime Minister and the Speaker are concerned, matters relating to 
their election are regulated by the provisions of the Representation of the People 
Act, 1951. Under this Act the High Court has jurisdiction to try an election petition 
presented against either of them. 
 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker are 
holders of high offices. The President is not answerable to a court of law for 
anything done, while in office, in the exercise of his powers. A fortiori matters 
relating to his election should not be brought before a court of law but should be 
entrusted to a forum other than a court. The same reasoning applies equally to the 
incumbents of the offices of Vice-President, Prime Minister and Speaker. It is 
accordingly proposed to provide that disputes relating to the election of the President 
and Vice-President shall be determined by a forum as may be determined by a 
parliamentary law. Similar provision is proposed to be made in the case of the 
election to either House of Parliament or, as the case may be, to the House of the 
People of a person holding the office of Prime Minister or the Speaker. It is further 
proposed to render pending proceedings in respect of such election under the 
existing law null and void. The Bill also provides that the parliamentary law creating 
a new forum for trial of election matters relating to the incumbents of the high 
offices abovementioned shall not be called in question in any court.  
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With the help of the 39th Amendment Act, Indira Gandhi absolved herself 
completely, and it is interesting to note her efforts to use every legislative device to 
ensure that the judges would not come after her through a judicial interpretative 
backdoor.  11
4. Insertion of new article 329A.-In Part XV of the Constitution, after article 329, 
the following article shall be inserted, namely:-  
 329A. Special provision as to elections to Parliament in the case of Prime 
Minister and Speaker.-(1) Subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Part V [except 
sub-clause (e) of clause (1) of article 102], no election-  
 (a) to either House of Parliament of a person who holds the office of Prime 
Minister at the time of such election or is appointed as Prime Minister after such 
election;  
 (b) to the House of the People of a person who holds the office of Speaker of 
that House at the time of such election or who is chosen as the Speaker for that 
House after such election, shall be called in question, except before such authority 
[not being any such authority as is referred to in clause (b) of article 329] or body 
and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by Parliament 
and any such law may provide for all other matters relating to doubts and disputes in 
relation to such election including the grounds on which such election may be 
questioned. 
 (2) The validity of any such law as is referred to in clause (1) and the 
decision of any authority or body under such law shall not be called in question in 
any court.  
(3) Where any person is appointed as Prime Minister or, as the case may be, chosen 
to the office of the Speaker of the House of the People, while an election petition 
 Given the arguments advanced in this thesis, legislative skill will never save the lawgiver as judicial 11
review is a function of preferences and the distribution of political power.
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referred to in clause (b) of article 329 in respect of his election to either House of 
Parliament or, as the case may be, to the House of the People is pending, such 
election petition shall abate upon such person being appointed as Prime Minister or, 
as the case may be, being chosen to the office of the Speaker of the House of the 
People, but such election may be called in question under any such law as is referred 
to in clause (1). 
(4) No law made by Parliament before the commencement of the Constitution 
(Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975, in so far as it relates to election petitions and 
matters connected therewith, shall apply or shall be deemed ever to have applied to 
or in relation to the election to any such person as is referred to in clause (1) to either 
House of Parliament and such election shall not be deemed to be void or ever to 
have become void on any ground on which such election could be declared to be 
void or has, before such commencement, been declared to be void under any such 
law and notwithstanding any order made by any court, before such commencement, 
declaring such election to be void, such election shall continue to be valid in all 
respects and any such order and any finding on which such order is based shall be 
and shall be deemed always to have been void and of no effect. 
 (5) Any appeal or cross appeal against any such order of any court as is 
referred to in clause (4) pending immediately before the commencement of the 
Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975, before the Supreme Court shall 
be disposed of in conformity with the provisions of clause (4). 
 (6) The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything 
contained in this Constitution. 
Against this background, the election dispute between Indira Gandhi and Raj 
Narain remained before the judges of the Supreme Court of India.  Where Justice 12
Krishna Iyer failed to resolve the dispute in a strategic fashion, Chief Justice Ray 
 The case was decided on November 7, 1975 and is reported as Indira Nehru Gandhi vs. Raj Narain 12
1975 (Supp) SCC 1.
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offered a lesson in judicial skills. So far, there has been no attempt to apply traditional 
game-theory approaches in the study of this case. 
It is reasonable to begin the analysis by reconstructing the election case as a two-
person, non-zero-sum game, with Indira Gandhi and Chief Justice Ray as players.  To 13
begin with, it is useful to first construct a decision tree that encapsulates the alternatives 
available to the players at each stage of the conflict (see figure 4.3), with the 
corresponding possible outcomes (see table 4.1). 
 This is a simplified model as the decision was actually taken by a five judge bench — the decision-13
making process of judges as a group is a separate game that requires no further attention here.
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Table 4.1:  Judicial Review Strategies, Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain
Outcome Sequence of Choices Description
Indira 
Gandhi’s 
Value
Chief 
Justice 
Ray’s 
Value
A a
Election upheld, 
Prime Minister’s complies, 
Prime Minister in power, 
Legitimacy bonus for Prime Minister, 
39th Amendment upheld, 
Jurisdiction and judicial power reduced, 
Basic structure weakened.
4 0
B b-d
Election struck down, 
Prime Minister’s complies, 
Prime Minister not in power, 
No legitimacy bonus for Prime Minister, 
39th Amendment struck down, 
Jurisdiction and judicial power strengthened, 
Basic structure strengthened.
0 4
C b-e
Election formally struck down, 
Prime Minister does not comply, 
Prime Minister in power, 
No legitimacy bonus for Prime Minister, 
39th Amendment formally struck down, 
Jurisdiction and judicial power formally 
strengthened, 
Basic structure formally strengthened.
1 2
D c-f
Election upheld, 
Prime Minister’s complies, 
Prime Minister in power, 
Legitimacy bonus for Prime Minister, 
39th Amendment struck down, 
Jurisdiction and judicial power strengthened, 
Basic structure strengthened.
3 3
E c-g
Election upheld, 
Prime Minister does not comply, 
Prime Minister in power, 
Legitimacy bonus for Prime Minister, 
39th Amendment formally struck down, 
Jurisdiction and judicial power formally 
strengthened, 
Basic structure formally strengthened.
2 1
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1 2
3
2
a 
d
e
f
g
b 
c 
3
B (4/0)
A (0/4)
C (2/1)
D (3/3)
E (1/2)
=  Ray's move =  Gandhi's move
=  Gandhi's move=  denotes an endpoint of a tree
FIGURE 4.3   Decision Tree for Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain
Notes: Please read in conjunction with Table 4.1; lowercase letters indicate choices and uppercase 
letters denote outcomes, both described in table and text.
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As the case is pending before the court, the initial move is clearly Chief Justice Ray’s. If 
he simply accepts the 39th Amendment, the lawsuit will be dismissed, and the game is 
over; the choice a of the judge leads to outcome A and no countermoves are necessary. 
If Chief Justice Ray opts for b and strikes down the election as well as the 39th 
Amendment, there will be no reason for the prime minister to comply (unless she values 
legitimacy over political power). If the chief justice decides in favour of the prime 
minister’s election on the basis of the merits of the case, but at the same time reaffirms 
the basic structure doctrine and strikes down the 39th Amendment, there will be good 
reasons for the prime minister to comply and opt for it.   14
While many commentators have emphasised the significance of the personal 
political views of the judges appointed by Indira Gandhi, in particular Chief Justice Ray, 
Chapter Four illustrates that this is not sufficient to explain the Supreme Court’s 
response to India’s authoritarian interlude. On the contrary, the key argument in this 
chapter is that the behaviour of Indian judges under emergency rule is attributable 
largely to institutional factors. This analysis emphasises that textbook accounts of the 
basic structure have overstated the legal dimensions of the cases and judicial activism in 
‘contriving’ the decision. Conversely, politics and law makes strange bedfellows. To the 
extent that the basic structure was a ‘political’ decision, it seems to work as a tacit 
political compromise between two institutions that have most often been considered 
mortal enemies in the early parts of the drama of Indian constitutional history. While 
 Because of the difficulty of arriving at estimates of cardinal utility with respect to the outcomes for the 14
two players, we can only attempt to judge the relative merits of the outcomes for each of them. Since 
there are five such outcomes, I assign the value four to the most preferred, three to the next most 
preferred, and so on down to zero for the least preferred. The analysis assumes throughout that 
institutional factors (judicial power vis-a-vis executive and legislative) are paramount for both players.
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this game fails to produces clear winners and losers in the short term, section 4.4 
illustrates the tremendous impact of the basic structure in the long run: what is more, the 
strategic perspective of actors is a useful building block for the key hypothesis that 
political diffusion creates judicial power, and decisions change as judges no longer have 
to fear constitutional amendments. This will be explored in the next section with 
reference to judicial assertion in the realm of judicial appointments and transfers. 
[4.3] Separation-of-Powers Games and the Dynamics of
Judicial Supremacy after the Emergency
The emergency period provides a window on the harshest forms of executive retaliation 
against the Supreme Court, such as jurisdiction stripping and the threat by the Swaran 
Singh Committee of further loss of jurisdiction:  
The committee has further recommended that a new directive be included in Article 
39 to provide that the state shall direct its policy also to secure population control, 
through family planning or other suitable measures. It has proposed that parliament 
may, by law, provide for the imposition of such penalty or punishment as may be 
considered appropriate for any noncompliance with, or refusal to, observe any of 
these duties. To safeguard the fundamental duties from being challenged in any court 
of law the committee has suggested the inclusion of an explicit provision that ‘no 
law imposing such penalty shall be called in question in any court on the ground of 
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infringement of any of the fundamental rights or on the ground of repugnancy to any 
other provisions of the constitution’.  15
Similarly, without checks and balances, the emergency period took the punitive transfer 
of judges and the politicisation of the appointment of judges to a new level. In 1976, 
shortly after emergency was declared, there was a mass transfer of 16 high court judges 
who had displeased the government, and this was acceded to by the Chief Justice A.N. 
Ray in direct contravention of the convention until then of the consent of the judge 
being transferred being required as well as the consent of the Supreme Court chief 
justice (Dua 1983, 467; Noorani 1980). When Chief Justice Ray retired, the government 
again ignored the seniority convention, superseding Justice Hans Raj Khanna, who had 
retained his nerve during the emergency and had been the sole dissenting voice in some 
of the notorious cases (such as the habeas corpus decision) and installed Justice Mirza 
Hameedullah Beg as the chief justice of the Supreme Court. 
We continue to observe executive interference in judicial appointments and 
transfers even after the emergency and despite the fact that the Janata government not 
only repealed the 42nd Amendment and reintroduced the seniority principle in the 
appointment of judges; the discussion on basic structure and cancelling the mass 
transfer of the high court judges a year earlier helped distance the new government from 
the previous one, although not all judges were reinstated or transfers cancelled 
(Nariman 2012: 185-188). The norm of appointing the senior-most judge to the chair of 
chief justice had become convention when Justice Kania succeeded Justice Spens as the 
 ‘Duty is right, rights are left: Swaran Singh committee recommends new chapter on fundamental duties 15
in the Constitution’, India Today, July 15, 1976; available at: <indiatoday.intoday.in/story/swaran-singh-
committee-recommends-new-chapter-on-fundamental-duties-in-the-constitution/1/436571.html>; last 
accessed October 10, 2015).
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chief justice of the Federal court (as mentioned in Chapter Two). The Congress 
government went against this convention twice and threatened to upset the 
independence of the judiciary by packing it with sympathetic judges as well as 
appointing judges without the agreement of the chief justice. When Nehru had tried to 
appoint a judge who was not the most senior, the pressure exerted by the other judges 
prevented this from happening. But during the Indira years, the violence and 
hooliganism that marked politics cowed the judiciary. Justice Gajendragadkar was 
appointed as chief justice despite Justice Sinha, a judge senior to him, being next in line, 
but this was because of Justice Sinha’s illness and it occurred with his acquiescence. 
The more balanced approach of the Janata government had given the judges a taste of 
how public approbation for right action could be. Though some of the judges tried to act 
in the area of social rights, they were careful not to step on the government’s political or 
economic toes until the 1990s and continued to be circumspect when it came to defence 
or territorial issues. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud was appointed chief justice in 1978 as the 
Janata government sought to upturn convention. This was despite him not being popular 
given his compliance with the judgment in the habeas corpus case. Yet the support of 
the new government seemed to work wonders for the Supreme Court because it started 
infusing its orders with a new zest for judicial review. In the 1977 case of Maneka 
Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248, it started what would turn out to be a long 
and path-breaking journey into the examination of Article 21. Justice Krishna Iyer found 
good use for his eloquence as did Justice Bhagwati, as they set about improving their 
image as well as that of the Supreme Court, which had been tarnished during and 
immediately after the emergency.  
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But the court could not help but be drawn into the political struggle that was going 
on outside its doors. It decided to uphold the Janata government’s decision to dismiss 
nine Congress state governments (State of Rajasthan & Ors v. Union of India (1978) 
SCR 1). This was a move that was reciprocated when the central Congress government 
dismissed the Janata state governments using the same judgment as that applied to 
Indira Gandhi two years later) and in the special reference case (In re Special Courts 
Bill (1979) 1 SCC 38), where it upheld the constitutionality of special courts and 
suggested ways to make these courts constitutional (Dua 1983: 470). 
While the Court had flexed its muscles in the Janata era, this quickly changed 
when Indira Gandhi came back to power in 1980. The case against Sanjay Gandhi was 
also dropped even though it had been found that he had tampered with the witnesses (he 
was accused of burning the negatives of a film supposedly lampooning the Congress, 
Sanjay Gandhi and his mother, although the producer denied this). Even though he was 
convicted and sentenced, the decision was overturned. All 35 criminal cases against 
Sanjay Gandhi were thereafter withdrawn or settled (Dua1983:473). 
The judiciary was mixed in its reactions to the powerful Gandhi family and the 
Congress party and so for a while, certain judges were towed the party line. By his own 
admission, after losing his nerve, Chief Justice Chandrachud, now post emergency, 
stood up against them. As a chief justice appointed by the Janata party, he was not a 
favourite, but the decisions in the Minerva Mills case (AIR 1980 SC 1789) and others 
antagonised the Congress government further. In an article published in 1981, he stated 
his position that the head of the judiciary does not interfere with the Cabinet and so the 
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head of the executive should not interfere with the functioning of the judiciary (Dua 
1983: 474).  
Matters were coming to a head, and the government refused to extend the terms of 
O.N. Vohra, who had passed the order of imprisonment for Sanjay Gandhi, and S.N. 
Kumar, who was labelled a Janata candidate and was recommended by Chief Justice 
Chandrachud. This was in addition to hints made of large scale transfers of judges 
appointed during the Janata government (this was evidenced by a letter written by the 
then law ministers to governors of Congress-ruled states) and the transfer to the Kerala 
high court of the chief justice of the Madras high court, M.M. Ismail, and the transfer of 
Chief Justice K.B.N. Singh of the Patna High Court to the Madras High Court. A case 
was brought before the Supreme Court with regard to Justice Kumar’s removal and 
these other issues.  
The predecessor to this case was the 1978 case of Union of India v. Shanklal 
Chand Himmatlal Sheth 1978 (1) SCR 423, where the transfer of a judge without his 
consent was held to be against the spirit of the Constitution. But this was a case brought 
after the Congress had lost power and did not result in the vicious battle that was to 
follow in the next case. 
The case recorded as S.P. Gupta v, Union of India (1982) 2 SCR 365 was 
bombastic, in that it basically allowed the government to do as it wished. The three to 
two judge majority decision held that the chief justice’s consent for transfer was not 
required; he only needed to be consulted. The transfer from one high court to another 
was in order and there could be a transfer of judges. Although Justice Bhagwati later 
claimed to be very social minded at this time, he seemed to take pleasure in 
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embarrassing the chief justice, as did Justice Krishna Iyer, who made his personal 
battles public (Dua 1983: 477). This decision was very public evidence of this divided 
and weak judiciary. An article in India Today after this judgment categorises the 
position of the judges as left, right and centre, and in the context of the Minerva Mills 
(AIR 1980 SC 1789) case, which had come before the court before the judges transfer 
case, suggests there were deep rifts between the judges — including public 
disagreements between Justice Tulzapurkar and Justice Krishna Iyer and between 
Justice Bhagwati and Chief Justice Chandrachud. It also records the combative nature of 
government-judiciary relations with regard to the primacy of fundamental rights or 
directive principles (the government preferring the latter) and ends by stating: 
 Left, right or centre, the judges who crown the pyramid of the Indian judicial 
system will have to step very warily before pronouncing judgement on an issue that 
has extremely important implications for Indians and Indian democracy.  16
And yet the government was not satisfied. As Dua succinctly put it: 
Apart from the issue of parliamentary supremacy in constitutional matters and 
despite the historic suicide committed by the Supreme Court in the Judges Transfer 
case, the ruling party is not likely to give up its tirade against the judiciary until it 
toes the government line. (Dua 1983: 478) 
The second judges case came 12 years after this, and by sheer dint of being vocal about 
social issues and working with the idea of social action and public interest litigation, 
judges like Justice Bhagwati did much to restore their reputation as well as the 
 Supreme Court: A Bench Divided: 1981, <indiatoday.intoday.in/story/supreme-court-a-considerably-16
controversial-public-institution/1/401490.html>; last accessed 15 October 2015.
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reputation of the Court. By this time, both Indira Gandhi and Sanjay Gandhi were long 
gone. The judges had changed, with the Supreme Court seeing nine chief justices during 
this period. 
The Congress party that came to power in late 1984 had 78.5% of the seats in the 
Parliament. It was the largest majority that the party or any other had enjoyed in 
Parliament until then. Shortly after, allegations of appointments of sympathetic judges 
were rife. The chief justice publicly declared that the consultation and appointment of 
judges was not a transparent process. The supreme irony was that the judge who took 
office as chief justice in 1985 was Justice P.N. Bhagwati, and when his list of 
recommendations for the appointment of judges went to the government, it used his 
own judgment in the first judges cases to decline to appoint many of the names on this 
list. The lack of clarity and the public squabbling between the judiciary and the 
executive created the conditions for another case to come before the courts. The 
fundamental struggle for the court was in asserting its validity not to mind its 
supremacy at this point.  
 Rajiv Gandhi, who was prime minister, was accused of ‘court packing’. An article 
of the time records the government flouting its own guidelines and continuing the 
practice of systematically trying to weaken the judiciary: 
the Government was violating its own guidelines by permitting junior judges to act 
as chief justices in at least 10 high courts for over a year in 1981-82 and again in 
1984-85. Nor did the policy change after Rajiv Gandhi took over as prime minister.  
… The three appointments of chief justices since then — to Allahabad, Madhya 
Pradesh and Jammu & Kashmir — follow the same pattern in violating the 
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guidelines. 
... 
The Supreme Court evidently concurs with the widespread belief that all this has 
been done in order to pack the judiciary with pro-Congress (I) judges. During the 
hearing, Sen observed that after the retirement of the chief justice in Madhya 
Pradesh, the next judge in seniority was ‘kept as the acting chief justice so that he 
clears all the 10 names recommended for appointment’ to the court by the 
Government.  
The message was clear: keep a judge in an acting position so that he concurs with 
the Government’s recommendations on appointments to the bench in the hope of 
getting confirmed himself. 
There is circumstantial evidence to back this: in the last 15 months, of the 53 high 
court judges appointed, no fewer than 32 were made by acting high court chief 
justices, and 25 of these were in two courts, Allahabad and Madhya Pradesh.  17
The large majority in Parliament and the Congress governments in most states rendered 
it almost moot that the judiciary could wag the dog. The executive retained total control 
of appointments and transfers: 
The views of the bench headed by Tulzapurkar, who ranks next to Bhagwati in 
seniority, indicate that the judiciary is likely to remain divided on this issue. But 
since the Government has already made it clear in Parliament that all high courts in 
the country will be headed by chief justices from outside benches, the court is 
unlikely to be able to do much. 
Central Government spokesmen deny the charge that it is undermining the judiciary. 
Says Law Minister Asoke Sen: ‘A loyal judge is not worth his salt. We cannot let the 
judiciary degenerate as that will undermine the rule of law.’ 
But judicial circles believe that Sen has not been able to carry the rest of the 
government with him. Sen's junior minister Hans Raj Bhardwaj has played a key 
 Flouted Guidelines, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/supreme-court-accuses-government-of-packing-17
judiciary-with-sycophant-judges/1/354213.html, last accessed 15 October, 2015.
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role in many appointments, and he has been touring state capitals to discuss potential 
candidates for elevation to the high courts.  
With divisions in the Supreme Court and such differences within the Government, 
the course of events can hardly be smooth. But eventually it will be the nature of the 
appointments made which will determine whether the judiciary will flounder or 
flourish.  18
Even though the judiciary was slowly garnering some goodwill for itself, the problems 
of appointments, the loyalty of judges, corruption charges and even the attempted 
impeachment of one of the sitting judges of the Supreme Court (V. Ramaswamy) 
generated a lot of controversy and bad press for the judiciary, with connections being 
drawn to its lack of collective spine during the emergency. 
The air of despair in the country was also felt with regard to the empty seats in the 
courts as judges appointments were stalled. The V.P. Singh government had lasted a 
year and had kept the appointment of 67 judges pending (Chandrachud 2014:117). This 
led to the filing of a PIL in 1990 by the Supreme Court Advocates on Record 
Association (advocates who had taken an exam to be registered to enable them to file 
pleadings in the Supreme Court). The three-judge bench that heard this case referred it 
to a larger bench as it was felt that the issues it raised required reconsideration of the 
earlier first judges case.(Subhash Sharma v. Union of India 1990 SCR Suppl (2) 433). 
The Union raised a preliminary objection as to the justiciability of the issue in light of 
the first judges case, but this was later withdrawn by the Attorney General appointed by 
the next government. 
Flouted Guidelines, <indiatoday.intoday.in/story/supreme-court-accuses-government-of-packing-18
judiciary-with-sycophant-judges/1/354213.html>; last accessed October 15, 2015). 
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In his judgment, Justice Rangnath Misra, writing for the three judge bench, observed: 
We are living in an age when all traditional institutions are under scrutiny, suspicion 
and challenges of reassessment. If the current mood of disillusionment infects the 
core of the law and its institutions, we may have lost our last opportunity for the 
preservation of freedom under the Law. It is, therefore, a matter for immediate 
attention of all concerned — and of Government in particular — that the need is 
recognised and the Administration of Justice is made a plain subject and given 
appropriate attention.  (par. 16)
We are alive to the position that in S.P. Gupta's case this aspect has been held to be 
not justiciable. We do not agree with the opinion expressed by the majority on this 
aspect and are of the opinion that that aspect requires reconsideration. For the 
present we suggest to Government that the matter should be reviewed from time to 
time and steps should be taken for determining the sanctioned strength in a 
pragmatic way on the basis of the existing need. If there be no correlation between 
the need and the sanctioned strength and the provision of judge-manpower is totally 
inadequate, the necessary consequence has to be backlog and sluggish enforcement 
of the Rule of Law. 
…... 
We may, at this stage, advert to the Constitution (Sixty-Seventh Amendment) Bill, 
1990, which is pending before the Parliament. In the statement of objects and 
reasons of this Bill, it has been stated: ‘The Government of India have in the recent 
past announced their intention to set up a high level judicial commission, to be 
called the National Judicial Commission for the appointment of Judges of the 
Supreme Court and of the High Courts and the transfer of Judges of the High Courts 
so as to obviate the criticisms of arbitrariness on the part of the Executive in such 
appointments and transfers and also to make such appointments without any delay. 
The Law Commission of India in their 121st Report also emphasised the need for a 
change in the system.’ 
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This part of the statement obviously accepts the position that Government are 
satisfied that there is basis for criticism of the arbitrariness on the part of the 
Executive and the modality adopted following S.P. Gupta's ratio has led to delay in 
the making of appointments which the Constitutional Amendment seeks to 
eliminate. (par. 26, 27)
The order is unequivocal when it states that the primacy of the chief justice and the 
consultative process were not properly considered in the first judge’s case and that the 
weakening of the judicial review was a weakening of the constitutional importance of 
such review. 
During this time, two governments had fallen (the Chandrashekhar government 
fell after four months and, before that, the V.P. Singh government had collapsed after 
almost a year). Fresh elections were declared, but during the campaigning the leader of 
the Congress party, Rajiv Gandhi, was assassinated. The Congress came back to power 
again on a wave of sympathy, this time for  Indira Gandhi’s son, who had become prime 
minister under similar circumstances.  
The nine-judge bench heard the second judges case on 6 October 1993. The 
number of judges on the bench was increasing with every case: the first case of Sankal 
Chand Sheth had a five judge-bench, S.P. Gupta had a seven-judge bench, and this case 
had a nine-judge bench. The judiciary was fighting for its life, and lack of forces was 
not going to keep it from victory. There was no doubt that the larger bench could 
overrule and be free from the order of a smaller bench. The bench was relatively strong 
also: it was relatively free because the government at the centre had its own problems of 
a crumbling economy requiring large-scale reforms, lack of confidence and a series of 
no-confidence motions in Parliament that it had to overcome. The majority of judges 
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were the senior-most judges of the court and represented different regions of the country 
(Chandrachud 2014:121). The case was recorded as Supreme Court Advocates on 
Records Association v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 268. Of the five opinions recorded, 
two were dissenting ones. 
The judges had to answer two main questions: 
the primacy of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India in regard to the appointments 
and transfer of the Judges to the Supreme Court and the High Court, and in regard to 
the transfers of High Court Judges/Chief Justices; and Justiciability of these matters, 
including the matter of fixation of the Judge-strength in the High Courts.  (par.415)
The court order, written by Chief Justice Verma, states: 
These questions have to be considered in the context of the independence of the 
judiciary, as a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, to secure the 'rule of 
law' essential for the preservation of the democratic system, the broad scheme of 
separation of powers adopted in the Constitution, together with the directive 
principle of 'separation of judiciary from executive' even at the lowest strata, provide 
some insight to the true meaning of the relevant provisions in the Constitution 
relating to the composition of the judiciary. The construction of those provisions 
must accord with these fundamental concepts in the constitutional scheme to 
preserve the vital and promote the growth essential for retaining the Constitution as 
a vibrant organism. (par. 421)
The order notes the flowery language and the controversial nature of Justice Bhagwati’s 
order in the S.P. Gupta case despite the tame ending of that judgment, and it spelt out a 
new procedure for the appointment of judges The judges then held by a majority that the 
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opinion of the chief justice would be binding on the President for appointment of 
supreme court judges. There would be only two exceptions to this rule: the president 
could decide on an appointment if, in case of the appointment of high court judges, 
there was a disagreement between the chief justice of the supreme court and the high 
court and, second, if the next senior-most judge of the supreme court disagreed with the 
chief justice. There were certain other minor points in the case, but for our purposes, the 
fact was that this was the first time the judges had claimed primacy over the legislature 
and thus began the ascent of the Supreme Court. 
The political situation in the country was not improving: there were two elections 
and four governments in this time. The judiciary was also making life difficult, having 
passed orders on the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 and on corruption, in addition 
to a host of environmental cases, and was constantly requiring the legislative to improve 
its performance. There were efforts to curb this self-created monster, including efforts 
by the Congress party to move a bill to make judicial appointments political again, as 
well as to limit public interest litigation, but the ruling party did not have the requisite 
majority and the opposition found a new ally in the courts (Chandrachud 2014: 
134-136) in making the ruling government’s life miserable.  
The court exploited its new role and grew from strength to strength in the 
accountability it demanded from the legislature and executive, even though it gave little 
in these areas of itself. It finally grew so uncontrolled that the only charge that could be 
levelled was the politicking of the judges themselves, and this led to the third judges 
case, which was again a nine-judge bench. This meant they could not overrule the 
earlier case but only interpret it, and the judgment was written by Justice Sam Piroj 
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Bharucha, who had been on the bench for the previous case. The case was brought as a 
reference from the President to the court in its advisory capacity. 
The short order first states: 
We record at the outset the statements of the Attorney General that — (1) the Union 
of India is not seeking a review or re-consideration of the judgment in the second 
Judges case, and (2) that the Union of India shall accept and treat as binding the 
answers of this Court to the questions set out in the Reference. (par. 11)
The judge then goes on to discuss the second judges case and outlines the guidelines for 
the appointment of judges in this light:  
1. The expression ‘consultation with the Chief justice of India‘ in Articles 217(1) of
the Constitution of India requires consultation with a plurality of Judges in the 
formation of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India. The sole, individual opinion 
of the Chief Justice of Indian does not constitute ‘consultation’ within the meaning 
of the said Articles. 
2. The transfer of puisne Judges is judicially reviewable only to this extent: that the
recommendation that has been made by the Chief Justice of India in this behalf has 
bot been made in consultation with the four senior-most puisne Judges of the 
Supreme Court and/or that the views of the Chief Justice of the High Court from 
which the transfer is to be effected and of the Chief Justice of the High Court to 
which the transfer is to be effected have not been obtained. 
3. The Chief Justice of India must make a recommendation to appoint a Judge of the
Supreme Court and to transfer a Chief Justice or puisne Judge of a High Court in 
consultation with the four senior-most puisne Judges of the Supreme Court. Insofar 
as an appointment to the High Court is concerned, the recommendation must be 
made in consultation with two senior-most puisne Judges of the Supreme Court. 
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4. The Chief Justice of India is not entitled to act solely in his individual capacity,
without consultation with other Judges of the Supreme Court, in respect of materials 
and information conveyed by the Government of India for non-appointment of a 
judge recommended for appointment. 
5. The requirement of consultation by the Chief Justice of India with his colleagues
who are likely to be conversant with the affairs of the concerned High Court does 
not refer only to those Judges who have that High Court as a parent High Court. It 
does not exclude Judges who have occupied the office of a Judge or Chief Justice of 
that High Court on transfer. 
6. ‘Strong cogent reasons’ do not have to be recorded as justification for a departure
from the order of seniority, in respect of each senior Judge who has been passed 
over. What has to be recorded is the positive reason for the recommendation. 
7. The views of the Judges consulted should be in writing and should be conveyed to
the Government of India by the Chief Justice of India along with his views to the 
extent set out in the body of this opinion. 
8. The Chief Justice of India is obliged to comply with the norms and the
requirement of the consultation process, as aforestated, in making his 
recommendations to the Government of India. 
9. Recommendations made by the Chief Justice of India without complying with the
norms and requirements of the consultation process, as aforestated, are not 
binding upon the Government of India. (par. 44)
This goes beyond the usual patterns of judicial law making through interpretation, and 
enters the realm of explicit rule. From the point of view of the executive, and in 
particular the prime minister, the judgment constitutes a judicial coup d’état, abrogating 
established rights and amounting to a unilateral rewriting of constitutional conventions 
by the Supreme Court. The court itself expressed the significance of the decision in the 
following — almost theocratic — description:  
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The foregoing considerable deliberation leads to an inexorable conclusion that the 
opinion of the Chief Justice of India in the process of constitutional consultation in 
the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court and the 
High Courts as well as transfer of Judges from one High Court to another High 
Court is entitled to have the right of primacy. In sum, the above logical conclusion 
and our special sense dictate: Like the Pope, enjoying supremacy in the 
ecclesiastical and temporal affairs, the CJI being the highest judicial authority, has a 
right of primacy, if not supremacy to be accorded, to his opinion on the affairs 
concerning the ‘Temple of Justice’. It is a right step in the right direction and that 
step alone will ensure optimum benefits to the society.  19
[4.4] Heresthetics: When Losers Win, When Judges
Change the Rules of the Game
Ginsburg’s study of judicial review in Asia (2003) — focusing on constitutional courts 
in Korea, Mongolia and Taiwan — dedicates only a few paragraphs to the Indian 
Supreme Court, yet it still provides a suitable starting point for our concluding analysis 
for Chapter Four.  
In 1971, after the Twenty-fifth Amendment sought to preclude judicial review of 
property rights claims, the Supreme Court struck down parts of the amendment as 
conflicting with the constitution’s ‘basic structure’. Indira Gandhi’s government 
attacked the court as an institution, announcing publicly that it intended to limit 
appointments to those sympathetic to it and bypassing the usual seniority norm 
19 Par. 197.  
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concerning appointments to the chief justiceship. When Gandhi declared emergency 
rule in 1975, the Parliament passed a constitutional amendment preventing the court 
from scrutinising future constitutional amendments for conformity with the 
constitution. In the face of these attacks on jurisdiction and threats to judicial 
independence, the court largely submitted to politicians’ desires. While this stance 
was criticised by many, it did mean that the court was able to maintain institutional 
integrity to fight another day. After emergency rule ended, the court became bolder 
and rejected the amendment that had purported to prevent review of constitutional 
amendments. (Ginsburg 2003: 97) 
Despite the fact that this account of the facts and the law is a little misguided, 
Ginsburg’s astute theoretical intuition still provides a sound rationale for our focus on 
political power within a separation-of-powers context, as is commonly found in positive 
political theory. Without making any specific claims about the nature of the strategic 
institutional concern shown by the Supreme Court, Ginsburg’s succinct observation that 
the court lived to ‘fight another day’ immediately draws attention to the prospect of 
institutional retaliation as an obvious concern of judges. Strategy may not be the only 
reason why Indian judges have shown institutional deference during the emergency — 
but it suggests that it is a material factor. If we take into account the full complexity of 
executive-judiciary relationships during the emergency regime as well as the 
sophistication of the election case decision, we can also go beyond Ginsburg’s 
characterisation of the Indian Supreme Court judges as a matter of fact; much more so, 
the Indian Supreme Court ‘borrowed a leaf from Chief Justice John Marshall’s book, 
edging principles forward while deciding for those most likely to oppose them in 
practice’ (Helfer and Slaughter 1997, 314). The judges, contrary to Ginsburg’s claim, 
were not allowed to delay their decisions but had to pass judgement in a number of 
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important cases, in particular the dispute relating to Indira Gandhi’s election. Instead of 
a simple ‘fight another day strategy’, the Supreme Court immediately claimed the 
power of the basic structure doctrine, paradoxically combining it with judicial self-
restraint in terms of the practical outcomes of the litigation against Indira Gandhi. In 
this way, the court avoided, in the short run, the fierce opposition to the judicial 
assertion that we saw from 1950 to 1977. In the long run, we see how the basic structure 
became part of the routine agenda of the Indian Supreme Court, both in terms of the 
numbers of cases — three to four per year (figure 4.2) — and in terms of the doctrine 
spreading across all bench sizes of the  
130
CHAPTER 4   ·   Kesavananda
 
FIGURE 4.4  Distribution of Basic Structure Cases:
Bench Strength and Frequency
Source: Compiled by author from SCC; n = 40,618 (total number of all reported cases in SCC 
database); n = 118 (total number of reported basic structure cases in SCC database).
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Supreme Court, thus losing its association with India’s largest and unique bench, 
namely the 13 judges who decided the Kesavananda case (figure 4.3). After the 
emergency, looking at court-executive tensions in relation to appointments and transfer, 
we observe a court that displays a lot of strategic savvy and did not assert its basic 
structural power against any powerful opponents; but when the time came, and elections 
and politics kept reinforcing governmental instability in the 1990s, the court claimed 
(invented) total judicial control over appointments and transfers. Looking at the basic 
structure through the lens of game theory thus points towards the origins of the ability 
or institutional capacity of the Indian Supreme Court to impose its will on other actors 
to defend its institutional integrity, and then to enlarge its jurisdiction. The basic 
structure introduced new rules of the game by stealth, and for the losing party, a 
manoeuvre that we can best understand via Riker’s work on heresthetics.  
With the emergence of the ‘chaos theorem’ of voting at the end of the 1970s, 
social choice theory illustrated that majority rule equilibria virtually never appear and 
that the voting chaos ensures disequilibria or voting cycles. While equilibria of 
preferences might produce stable institutional rules, the institution itself remains in 
equilibrium in its own right.  
The losers [in a constitutional rule system] are likely to want to change the 
committees and jurisdictions in the hope of winning on another day. In the end, 
therefore, institutions are no more than rules and rules are themselves the product of 
social decisions. Consequently, the rules are also not in equilibrium. One can expect 
that losers on a series of decisions under a particular set of rules will attempt (often 
successfully) to change institutions and hence the kind of decisions under them. 
(Riker 1980: 445)  
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Riker offers an explanation in terms of the notion of heresthetics or ‘the dynamic 
manipulation of the conditions of choice’ (Riker 1984). His intuition that losers will 
attempt to change an institution is certainly plausible (Schofield 2004), and with the 
basic structure, we find a radically altered institutional environment, in which the 
Supreme Court empowers itself as a veto player in the constitutional amendment 
process, thus radically altering the power of the other branches to change the 
constitution (which is actually the key power they had to change the rules of the game 
themselves). In other words, the Supreme Court reinvents itself as a veto player 
whenever the other branches are tempted to change the rules of the game; at first, this 
takes the shape of merely preserving the court’s institutional integrity and jurisdiction, 
but Chapter Six illustrates how far the basic structure can go in the long run.  
The distinction between these strategies is that rhetoric consists of an appeal to the 
reason or emotion of the auditor, while heresthetic requires no appeal because it 
consists of a redefinition of the situation. Sometimes, of course, redefinition is 
rendered salient and palatable by rhetorical flavoring, but for heresthetic maneuvers, 
the flavoring is only incidental. (Riker 1990, 48)  
In the Raj Narain election case, the Supreme Court emerges as a master of heresthetics, 
giving Indira Gandhi everything she really wants — a valid election and a legitimacy 
bonus through judicial support — while the ‘price tag’ of a basic structure argument 
redefines the entire electoral corruption case from the particular to the general: whether 
courts can review election cases in principle, and whether judicial review is part of a 
basic structure. The heresthetic manoeuvre consists of agenda control — the judges 
redefine ‘what is this case about’ and thus change the conditions of choice: Indira 
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Gandhi no longer faced a situation in which the exercise of judicial review equalled the 
cancellation of her election, loss of her prime ministership and a criminal record. 
Therefore, she had to undo judicial review powers to avoid such dire consequences. 
Instead, she then faced a Supreme Court which offered her an entirely different choice: 
a valid election confirmed and legitimated by the Supreme Court judges (the 
legitimation implying the validity of judicial review) as long as she recognised that the 
judges remained committed to the basic structure and were unwilling to give it up. As 
the basic structure is a fuzzy idea, without any precise meaning and without any 
immediate costs for Indira Gandhi or any other Congress politician, the heresthetic 
manoeuvre presented her with an attractive choice. Most politicians will not worry too 
much about the long-term impact a principle such as the basic structure may have. Plus, 
there is always the option to attack the Supreme Court again at a later point of time, or 
to interfere even more strongly in judicial appointments and transfers to control courts 
(and maybe even benefit from their regime support).  20
Apart from the regular flow of Supreme Court decisions engaging with basic 
structure doctrines that both figures illustrate (4.2 and 4.3), the most significant aspect 
of the afterlife of parliamentary sovereignty is the politicians’ praise for the basic 
structure that we encounter today. When the NDA pushed for a national commission to 
 From Arthur Miller, we learn about the distinction between stage time and street time — ‘to enter a 20
theatre is to acknowledge that we enter a time warp in which the normal laws of physics no longer apply. 
Time flows at a speed determined by the author. The price of entry into this world is that we experience a 
temporal anomaly in which past and present may co-exist within a factitious moment’ (Bigsby 2005, 
124). Similar to Miller’s idea of condensed time and keeping in mind that courts and theatres are not 
unrelated (Geertz, Negara), we can think of time warps and the bending of time as a crucial element of 
judicial heresthetics. Instead, in Miller’s idea of condensed time (Willy Loman’s story is played out in 
two hours, not 62 years), judges have the power to stretch and postpone — i.e. create extended time — 
legal doctrines and principles may have a two hours existence within the actual court room proceedings 
but play out over decades, becoming practically relevant only 20 or 30 years later (which means low or 
even no costs when it comes to accepting them, politicians and their shorter time horizons). 
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review the working of the constitution, the Congress party opposition undermined the 
review through a basic structure discourse — while, at the same time, prime minister 
Vajpayee and his government framed the commission’s terms of reference as basic 
structure bounded: 
To examine in the light of the experience of the past 50 years as to how best the 
Constitution can respond to the changing needs of an efficient, smooth and effective 
system of governance and socio-economic development of a modern India within 
the framework of the parliamentary democracy, and to recommend changes, if any, 
that are required, in the Constitution without interfering with its basic structure or 
features.  21
Political actors learn to support the basic structure. Many BJP and NDA politicians may 
have yearned for judicial interventions during the emergency, in particular if jailed and 
unable to rely on habeas corpus. Furthermore, in the 1990s of course, Congress had 
learnt about being out of power — the power to appoint judges, declare emergency rule, 
impose the president’s rule — and how it could be thus affected. Knowing that these 
powers are exercised by political opponents half of the time changes the calculus of 
consent — a powerful Supreme Court seems more of a boon than a threat: politicians 
view the court not just as an enemy, but as a protector, a long-term guarantor of 
entrenched policies, as an actor who can extend a friendly hand (see Chapter Eight), a 
shield for blame avoidance, and a forum for policymaking or vetoing when out of power 
(see Chapter Seven and public interest litigation). In contrast to the conflicts of the first 
 Quoted in Venkatesan (2000), A Controversial Review. Frontline (17:4).21
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25 years of constitutional history, today, almost all party manifestoes celebrate the basic 
structure and commit themselves to agitation within constitutional boundaries.   
Using analytical narratives framed by game theory, the focus on the basic 
structure in Chapter Four reinforces our argument that the decisions of the Indian 
Supreme Court are dependent on the expected conduct of future players, such as the 
Parliament, which may choose to overrule the Supreme Court or choose other forms of 
retaliation. If the Supreme Court can expect that the Parliament and executive are too 
weak, divided or dysfunctional to override court decisions or to retaliate against 
judgments in other forms, nothing is beyond its power to review it and a political 
scenario of actors that welcomes this power. The judiciary has won, against fierce 
resistance. The question never has been whether the textual interpretation of the 
constitution is correct or not. As a sphere of rhetoric, the plausible is good enough, and 
there can be no doubt that the argument in favour of implied limitations of amendment 
power is sound, just as the argument for an unlimited amendment power of Parliament 
is coherent and logical.  Paraphrasing Griffiths (see above, end of section 4.1), the 22
basic structure, specifically, and the expansion of judicial power, generally, are what 
occur. As a next step, Chapter Five establishes elections as focus for explaining what 
happens in constitutional politics and why judicial power increases, sticking to the same 
game rationale as Chapter Four, but moving across much longer time periods, with 
repeat game sequences and actors who learn to better predict the behaviour of other 
players. 
 (Jacobsohn 2006). 22
137
CHAPTER FIVE
The Vanishing Amendment Process: 
Judicializing Constitutional Change
Abstract  Chapter five explores the judicialisation of constitutional 
change. Two processes run side by side, both reinforcing the power 
of the Indian Supreme Court: On the one side, we observe the 
vanishing of the formal constitutional amendment process, 
illustrating the diminishing power of Parliament as an agent as well 
as a guardian of constitutional change. On the other side, we cannot 
escape to note the rise of the Supreme Court: first, as a powerful 
veto-player in amendment processes — emerging slowly in the 
seventies. Then, as a powerful “agenda-setting” as well as agenda 
enforcing agent since the early 1990s, imposing its will to 
constitutional change upon legislature and executive. In a nutshell, 
the court is becoming more powerful, while Parliament, the 
institution which had been originally in charge of drafting, debating, 
and passing constitutional amendment acts, ceases to produce 
substantial legislative commands that govern constitutional change. 
Following Chapter Four, we thus continues to explore the 
judicialisation of the core of the Indian polity as the Supreme Court 
takes almost total control over the rules of the game — not merely 
via basic structure heresthetics but also because other actors have 
mostly lost the capacity to engage with constitutional politics. 
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[5.1] Amendment Politics: Battleground for Judicial Ascendency
The question of constitutional change has often played a key role in Indian politics and 
the formal constitutional amendment process provides an instructive guidebook to the 
study of judicial power.  Chapter Five extends the strategic paradigm to the question of 1
constitutional change. Who changes the constitution? Who has the last word? If the 
Constitution sets the rules of the game, this may be the most significant aspect of 
judicial power. The clash between the various branches of government over the question 
of constitutional amendment had not been inevitable though; it was not necessary that 
the SC adopted a narrow minded approach to the scope and functioning of property 
rights — given the post-partition and poverty contexts, the insistence on property rights 
was unfortunate to say the least. Consequently, it is not wrong to think of the Court as 
provoking Parliament, and undermining its standing in Indian society — culminating in 
 There is a vast body of literature relating to legal and normative debates about the limits of amendment 1
power and the scope of judicial review. Basu’s (1999, 2001) commentaries on the Constitution illustrate 
the jurist’s perspective on separation-of-powers-games and account for all details of the legal rules 
surrounding the amendment process. Sathe (1989) and Austin (1999) have looked at individual 
amendments and provide a historical narrative with respect to important constitutional cum political 
controversies. Both books are of great help, yet, both do not provide a theoretical framework that could be 
linked to a political scientists’ view of the entire amendment process since 1950. Similarly, Sathe as well 
as Austin concentrate on the substantive aspects of the amendments’ contents, not the institutional design 
of the amendment process. Two other important books have been written by Bhardwaj (1995) and Pylee 
(2003). Both give minute details of the legislative history of all Amendment Acts since Independence, 
however, the texts are of an encyclopaedic nature – not analytical. The two best books on individual 
amendments in the 1970s have been written by Rajeev Dhavan (1978a, 1978b). Again, the analysis is 
mainly engaged in discussing individual amendments and their contents from a normative, ‘macro-angle’; 
they neither consider the institutionalised process of amending the constitution nor the micro-politics of 
constitutional change. In a nutshell, there are a number of ‘classics’ dealing with constitutional 
amendments in India but they all have an entirely different research agenda and, what is more, their 
methodological techniques are poles apart from those projected by Chapter Five.
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Indira Gandhi’s election campaign 1971, with explicit anti-court slogans. While Chapter 
Four has explored the dynamics of judicial politics in the context of snapshots of 
specific case studies, Chapter Five places Indian judicial politics in time. In other 
words, Chapter Five is a moving image, focusing on time, and especially the sequencing 
of decisions in inter-branch separation-of-power-games, as the central dimension in 
which judicial power evolves. 
 The quarrels between Parliament and the Supreme Court about limitations of 
amendment power and judicial vetoes were mostly triggered by land reform legislation 
(in the name of the social revolution) and judicial review of it. The Golak Nath case 
(1967) reversing precedents, was the first case that defended property rights by the 
radical assertion that Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution was limited. As the 
judges thus denied the legislature the right to abridge fundamental rights as laid down 
by Part III of the Constitution, Parliament set itself on collision course with the judges, 
culminating in strong anti-judiciary rhetoric in Indira Gandhi’s election campaign. As 
the formal procedures for amending the Indian Constitution are simple, and at most 
require that an amendment bill is passed “in each House by a majority of the total 
membership of that House, and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members 
of that House present and voting,” the massive mandate of the 1971 elections made it 
then easy for the dominant Congress party to amend the Constitution in response to 
unwelcome judicial pronouncements and to keep conservative judges away from the 
economic policy. Congress’s electoral success became the democratic mandate to pass 
and implement further constitutional amendments in accordance with a socialist 
electoral campaign. Eventually, the 24th and the 25th Amendment were passed, thus, 
140
CHAPTER 5   ·   Vanishing Amendment Process
allowing for large scale nationalisations in industry and commerce – and “saving” the 
social revolution from a conservative and capricious Supreme Court. In terms of theory, 
we observe again how India’s colonial tradition of parliamentary sovereignty 
(Westminster style) clashed with a written constitution and judicial review (American 
style). In terms of practice, India’s judges did not prove sensitive enough to understand 
the rules of the game and the tolerance intervals of the other branches. Failing to adapt 
to the strong position of the legislator, many judicial decisions merely invited retaliation 
without hope for persuasion. At least, in Kesavananda, judges begin to reassess the role 
and relevance of the Directive Principles of State Policy, as laid out in Part IV of the 
Constitution, which ‘set forth the humanitarian socialist precepts that were the aims of 
the Indian social revolution,’ the majority of the judges still declared that Golak Nath 
had been wrongly decided and upheld the validity of the 24th and 25th Amendment; 
Chapter Four has analysed this as a heresthetic manoeuvre. Judges did their best to 
arrive at Kesavananda judgment in a very confusing and contradictory way, extending 
the power of judicial review via the invention of the basic structure doctrine but without 
practical impact but merely proclaiming certain basic features of the Constitution to be 
beyond Parliament’s power of amendment. Nevertheless, the Court yet again misread 
the tolerance intervals of the other branches and Indira Gandhi amended the 
Constitution to override this decision — this time however, she was not empowered by 
elections but empowered herself by declaring an internal emergency (1975-1977), 
which gave her the power to push the 42nd Amendment through a Parliament controlled 
via emergency rule.  2
 Following Fischer (2007).2
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 At the end of the 1970s the following compromise emerged: After Indira Gandhi 
lost the 1977 elections, the Janata government would try to override the 42nd 
Amendment, yet, needed the support of the Congress to pass constitutional amendment 
bills so that the 44th Amendment falls short of a complete repudiation of the 42nd 
Amendment. In the bargaining process surrounding the 44th Amendment, the left-
leaning Janata government ensured an end to the disputes over the constitutional status 
of the right to property by removing it from the fundamental rights section of the Indian 
Constitution once and for all. At the same time, the basic structure doctrine has been 
accepted over time by the legislators, so that the judges have safeguarded their right to 
control the constitutional amendment process. The Supreme Court, more attuned to 
separation-of-power games  during the 1980s, has accepted the abolition of 3
constitutionalised property rights without reservations — at the same time, the judges 
also understand the collapse of Parliament’s amendment power in the 1990s and step by 
step redefine the Supreme Court, going beyond the original basic structure role of 
simple veto-player in the amendment process. Chapter Four has already illustrated how 
the Supreme Court single handedly removed the Prime Minister and any other member 
of the executive from the judicial appointments process; this is equivalent to agenda 
setting and agenda-implementation in the realm of constitutional change and Chapter 
Five assesses in greater detail the structural changes that have transferred amendment 
power away from Parliament. 
 Following Fischer (2007).3
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[5.2] The Diffusion of Amendment Power through Elections
To begin with, the first specific question posed is how to best decipher the patterns and 
characteristics of India’s seemingly chaotic and rapid amendment process  to understand 4
the changing nature of separation of powers games before and after the Emergency. 
Firstly, Chapter Five proposes a fresh look at our empirical standards for the systematic 
study and measurement of judicialisation of formal constitutional change: we argue that 
the customary indicator for measuring Parliament’s ability to change the constitution — 
the average number of amendments passed per year (Lutz 1994) — has to be modified 
according to length, type, significance (qualitative) as well as debating time and voting 
patterns. To begin with, Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 show some of the main characteristics 
of amendment patterns in India as the measurement of the length of amendment acts 
already provides a more accurate quantitative image than the simple amendment rate 
(Table 5.1). Almost diametrically opposed to the pie-charts that deal with increases in 
 Popular mythologies hold that the Indian Constitution is constantly, maybe even too frequently, 4
amended. However, from a comparative perspective, India’s amendment rate does not stand out. The 
country with the highest amendment rate is New Zealand; Austria, Brazil and Portugal have amendment 
rates similar to India’s. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany has been amended at least 
once a year and the Constitution almost doubled in size (10,636 words in 1949 and 17,050 words in 
1994), a process that is mainly linked to the fine tuning of the federal system (the amendment with respect 
to Germany’s unification was significant, but a one-off and cannot account for the extent of constitution 
change). Comparative studies of amendment rates usually link a high amendment rate to federalism, 
length of the constitution and the difficulty of the amendment process (e.g. simple-size or qualified 
majorities, bicameralism, referendum). Given this background and given that India’s Constitution (a) 
governs an entire subcontinent, (b) provides for an abundance of complex federal institutions, (c) is one 
of the longest Constitutions of the world, and (d) codifies a fairly simple amendment process, some of the 
really interesting questions are: Why is it not amended more often and what would be the benefits of a 
higher or a more moderate amendment rate? 
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the federal population and majorities in a majority of the constituent units. In 
Switzerland over 110 formal constitutional amendments have met this requirement since 
1891, but in Australia of 42 attempts since 1901 only 8 have succeeded’ (Watts 1999: 2). 
Constitutional change, then, appears to take place within a web of distinct political, 
social contexts. For India, as most amendment acts require not more than “special 
majorities” in the national legislature, India’s amendment procedure has been aptly 
described as “facile,” avoiding the difficulties that are usually associated with formal 
constitutional change in other countries, such as a referendum or the formation of a 
convention. Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 suggest that this facile amendment procedure has 
provided a sturdy institutional advantage for Congress system, as long as it could 
control the supermajorities required by Article 368. However, as the shift towards 
coalition governments and the emergence of strong regional parties closed the doors to 
the amendment process (Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4), the Supreme Court is left in charge 
of revising the constitutional text by means of interpretation and taking an ‘activist’ 
stance. a significant change in amendment patterns has been brought about by other 
events, e.g. the transformation of India’s party system. As the Indian National 
Congress’s ceased to dominate the commanding heights of India’s polity, the 
amendment patterns change: constitutional amendments are no longer an intra-party 
affair but are shaped by inter-party compromises and the rise of strong regional parties. 
The increasing fractionalisation of the Union legislative as well as the rise of powerful 
regional parties (which have, for instance, successfully blocked any amendment 
restricting State rights since 1977) can only be explained with reference to the socio-
political context. 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For instance, Congress wins 364 seats in 1952, overall there were 489 seats in the Lok 
Sabha. This means that the amendment blocking power is 164 - even if all members of 
the Lok Sabha were present and voting, any party controlling 164 votes can block any 
amendment. The Congress party majority is so large however that only 125 seats are left 
for other parties. That means Congress is 38 seats above the number of seats required 
for total control of the amendment process. Congress can block and pass any 
amendment that the party approves (of course within the party, factions have different 
constitutional preferences).  Since Congress had absolute amendment power from 1950 
(provisional Parliament) until the 9th Lok Sabha it is a useful indicator, showing the 
scope of change within the party system and the depth of transformation of amendment 
politics. The next question posed is how the judicialisation of constitutional change after 
the Emergency has been consolidated as a stabilising and stable political practice, 
transforming the separation of power settlements of the 1950s without upheaval? The 
following three data sets illustrate this further, in addition to measuring the length of 
amendments, we observe similar, even stronger, trends for debate time [Figures 5.5-7], 
yes votes [Figures 5.8-9], no-votes [Figures 5.10-5.12], all indicators illustrating how 
Parliament silently withdrew from almost all constitutional controversies after 1990. 
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CHAPTER 5   ·   Vanishing Amendment Process
amendment debates are scheduled for the same day, so that the required quorum is 
present and multiple amendments are passed on the same day without any meaningful 
debate. The vanishing amendment process thus does not have to be understood as a sign 
of organisational weakness — there are elements of effectiveness, as political parties 
have the capacity to identify which bills will be going nowhere and thus any 
controversial initiative does not even make it to the floor to begin with; a process is in 
place in committees and amongst parties for sorting out amendments before they reach 
the realm of Parliamentary debate. They are then passed quickly — with less debate 
time.  Most importantly, we no longer find any significant sections of Parliamentarians 6
who show up for debates and express their dissent by voting no — needless to say, this 
is not due to an absence of political conflict but because controversial amendment 
politics no longer take place within the parliamentary forum. At the same time, the fact 
that the amendment processes changes radically, and that constitutional politics have 
been dislocated from the floor of Parliament does not mean that amendment power has 
vanished too — as the Appendix and the next section of Chapter Five illustrate  there 
are realms of strong cross-party policy consensus and Parliament can still overturn 
Indian Supreme Court judgments on reservations within a few weeks. 
 The only exception to this pattern — as there are not many examples of failing amendments — seems to 6
be the amendment for the introduction of gender quotas in all legislatures but as the Appendix and the 
narrative illustrate, reservations and quotas stand out as the only topic. 
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[5.3] Persistent Puzzles: Fluctuating Amendment Power and the Transfer
of Amendment Power from Parliament to the Supreme Court
It was Wednesday morning, 31 October 1984, when Indira Gandhi stepped out of her 
Bungalow at one Safdarjang Road in New Delhi, and greeted two guards, Beant Singh 
and Satwant Singh, standing along the path to her office. ‘The two men were no more 
than seven feet away as she greeted them. Beant Singh drew a .38 revolver and fired 
three shots into her abdomen. As she fell to the ground, Satwant Singh pumped all 30 
rounds from his Sten automatic weapon into her crumpled body. At least seven bullets 
penetrated her abdomen, three her chest and one her heart. The Prime Minister was 
dead’.  For those who study India’s elections and her legislatures, this assassination 7
constitutes one of those rare events that thrust scholars outside the realm of normal 
expectations, and into the realm of the uncertain and outside our model: probabilities are 
becoming so small to be non-computable and extreme outliers, not the force of regular 
occurrences, govern the chain of events. Such unexpected events highlight our problem 
of induction, undermine our ability to analyse India’s constitutional history within the 
realms of causality and determinism. In fact, there are multitudes of overlapping black 
swan events that disrupt the structure of constitutional politics: the assassination of 
Indira Gandhi catapults her son into the post of prime minister with absolute 
amendment power — Figure 5.3 shows that no other government ever had had a better 
starting point for changing the constitution via the formal amendment process. Yet, 
 Smith, W. (1984). ‘Indira Gandhi: Death in the Garden’, Time (November 12, 1984).7
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having massive legislative support on paper does not translate into amendment power 
automatically and Rajiv Gandhi fails to pass the panchayati raj reforms. It is then the 
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi which brings Rao into power, who makes the necessary 
compromises to take into account the wishes of State governments and then manages to 
pass the panchayati raj reforms; thus, a minority government can achieve more than a 
government with absolute amendment power, depending on type of politician and the 
prime minister’s political skill set. In a nutshell, without such narratives and attention to 
qualitative evidence we cannot make sense of the fluctuations of in the ways 
amendment power manifests itself.  8
 The analytical narrative of constitutional amendments is presented as a table 
(Appendix) since the amount of information and type of information (taxonomy & 
patterns) are a perfect match for a table-style-arrangement. The Appendix thus 
introduces a set of categories (all in capital letters) that allows for grouping of recurring 
amendment topics (e.g. federalism, taxation, language). Hence, the Appendix allows us 
to fuse quantitative and qualitative insights and to find further patterns where 
quantitative evidence alone may have left us puzzled. Instead of simply counting 
amendments as an indicator of constitutional change, we get better results if we use the 
Appendix to understand the content of each amendment, the parts of the constitution 
that are being changed (or restored) and the difference between ruptures and continuous 
flows of constitutional change (e.g. the increase in official languages).  
 The large amounts of data collected for Chapter Five hint at the fact that this Chapter had originally 8
been conceptualised on the basis of quantitative models; however, the search for meaningful correlation 
was long and hard and unsuccessful. Despite strong trends — such as the vanishing amendment process 
or the increase in political competition that Table 5.2 presents — the long and deep experience of 
parliamentary politics of skilled politicians like Rao and Vajpayee seems to make all the difference in the 
realm of amendment politics.
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TABLE 5.3   Amendments and the Distribution of Formal Constitutional Change in Relation to
Government Type and Prime Minister
Source:
Notes:
Compiled by author from IndiaCode, Sridharan (2012) and Ziegfeld (2012).
The hours in the right column refer to the total debating time in both houses (Provisional Parliament for the 1st 
Amendment); the word count refers to the combined length of amendment acts. 
* The 17th Amendment was introduced in the Lok Sabha on the day of Nehru's death and then debated in both 
houses while G.L. Nanda was Prime Minister, receiving presidential assent after Shastri had taken office. 
** While Indira Gandhi's government was a single party minority government - after the 1969 Congress split, 
before the 1971 elections - only the 23rd Amendment was introduced and passed (a routine ten-years extension of 
reserved seats in legislatures).  Amendments 38 to 42 were passed during the internal emergency period. 
† The 49th and 50th Amendment had been introduced before the assassination of Indira Gandhi and were passed 
while Rajiv Gandhi was Prime Minister but before his 1984 election victory. 
†† The Rao government became a single party majority government December 1993 but only Amendments 75 to 
78 fall into that time period.
NEHRU  -  Congress
SHASTRI  -  Congress*
I. GANDHI  -  Congress**
I. GANDHI  -  Congress
R. GANDHI  -  Congress†
V.P. SINGH  -  Janata Dal led NF (Minority Coalition)
VAJPAYEE  -  BJP led NDA (Minority Coalition)
SHEKHAR  -  Samajwadi Janata Party
(Single Party Minority Government)
(Single Party Minority Government)
RAO  -  Congress††
DESAI  -  Janata Party
(Single Party Majority)
(Single Party Majority)
(Single Party Majority)
(Single Party Majority)
Legislative Coalition: 2 Parties
Legislative Coalition: 6 Parties
Legislative Coalition: 14 Parties
External Support: Congress
External Support: Varying/Undeclared
Executive Coalition: 5 Parties
Executive Coalition: 13 Parties
Executive Coalition: 6 Parties
(Single Party Majority)
(Surplus Coalition with Majority Party)
M. SINGH  -  Congress led UPA (Minority Coalition)
Executive Coalition: 2 Parties
1st Amendment
18.6.1951
16 Amendments
25 Amendments
2 Amendments
4 Amendments
6 Amendments
1 Amendment
10 Amendments
14 Amendments
2 Amendments
13 Amendments
1 Amendment
253.8 h
317.2 h
35.3 h
87.5 h
29.4 h
112.3 h
38.0 h
1.9 h
43.4 h
75 h
13.2 h
13,573 Words
21,706 Words
1,049 Words
5,414 Words
1,789 Words
5,290 Words
2,084 Words
8,974 Words
4,533 Words
59 Words
321 Words
16th Amendment
5.10.1963
20.6.1964
27.8.1966
30.4.1979
18.12.1976
13.4.1978
25.1.1980
11.9.1984
28.3.1989
4.10.1990
12.3.1991
30.8.1995
21.1.2000
7.1.2004
20.1.2006
12.6.2006
21.12.1991
25.1.1990
26.8.1984
17th Amendment 
18th Amendment 
42nd Amendment 
43rd Amendment 
45th Amendment 
48th Amendment 
49th Amendment 
61st Amendment 
62nd Amendment 
67th Amendment 
68th Amendment 
69th Amendment 
78th Amendment 
79th Amendment 
44th Amendment 
93rd Amendment 
94th Amendment 
92nd Amendment 
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A good example for the importance of the Appendix is the 9th Lok Sabha. If we were 
limiting ourselves to a quantitative view of the world, it would look like the 9th Lok 
Sabha, and the unstable minority coalition under V.P. Singh, followed by the unstable 
single party minority government under Shekhar, has the highest amendment rate, 
namely 5.4 amendments per year, or in other words 7 amendments passed within 467 
days and only 109 sittings of Parliament (see Table 5.1 and Table 5.3). While this may 
be true in terms of the standard indicators political scientists use to study formal 
constitutional change, it also misleading. This is where the Appendix comes into play, 
illustrating the amendments passed by the 9th Lok Sabha are dominated by the 
emergency in Punjab. Out of the 7 amendments passed by the 9th Lok Sabha, four 
amendments simply extend special emergency powers in relation to Punjab — this is 
not a question of constitutional change, but simply reflects the changes to the rules for 
emergency declaration and extension after 1977 — in other words, the constitution 
works exactly in the way it was intended to in 1977, putting Parliament in charge of 
serious emergencies. Two of the other three amendments passed by the 9th Lok Sabha 
are reservation amendments — the long term plan for the establishment for a National 
Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (replacing the Special Officer) 
and the routine extension of reserved seats by ten years, which passes — since 
Independence — each time within hours and mostly without any no votes; plus, the 9th 
Lok Sabha changes the Ninth Schedule to accommodate routine amendments to State 
land reform legislation that are already included in the Schedule. As a result, the 9th 
Lok Sabha has actually not brought about a word of constitutional change - but merely 
took caretaker style control of routine constitutional work. These are the sort of 
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arguments, throughout Chapter Five for which the Appendix is crucial, providing 
supporting evidence in a straightforward manner. As well as this, the Appendix 
illustrates that Parliament can still be in charge of constitutional developments, when 
the Supreme Court fails to understand (or ignores) public opinion: Every time the 
Supreme Court intervenes in the realm of reservation policy, Parliament is able to 
overrule the Court within months.9 
 Taken together, these findings suggest three periods of intensive constitutional 
change: The session of the First Lok Sabha as a period of rapid constitutional change 
due to the first conflict between Parliament and the judiciary as well as the “delayed” 
constitution-making process. The second period of rapid change occurs between 1970 
and 1977 and is dominated by the second clash between politicians and judges (electoral 
fraud allegations against Indira Gandhi and the scope of judicial review). A third period 
of concentrated constitutional politics begins and ends with the session of the tenth Lok 
Sabha and the panchayat raj reforms. In terms of structural changes the Chapter has 
advanced the argument that changing political contexts de facto changed what remained 
de jure an unchanged amendment process: What used to be a “facile amendment” 
procedure has become a difficult hurdle to clear as coalition politics and regional parties 
begin to dominate Indian politics. While Parliament now mainly produces a large 
number of “lame-duck amendments” India’s judiciary has thus found the political space 
to reinvent itself in terms of judicial assertion within the realm of constitutional change 
 Particularly interesting for the BJP led NDA, as the Court’s limitations on reservations are immediately 9
undone and the policy expanded. 
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as well.  Since 1983, Parliament has been unable to overrule a Supreme Court decision, 10
with the important exception of cases relating to questions of India’s reservation 
policies where a strong policy consensus stretches across all coalition cleavages 
(Appendix). Otherwise, the power to bring about decisive constitutional change now 
vests with India’s Supreme Court. 
 Chapter Four has already analysed how the Indian Supreme Court turned the judicial appointments 10
process on its head — clearly an example of the Court setting and implementing an agenda of 
constitutional change. Another prominent example, discussed in Chapter Two, would be the Ninth 
Schedule Case, I.R.Coelho vs. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2007 SC 861, which extended basic structure 
review into the realm of the Ninth Schedule and thus set aside the 1st amendment to some extent S. R. 
Bommai vs. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1918 is a similarly significant landmark case for understanding 
the power of the Supreme Court to change the “constitutional rules” of the game, simply by hinting at the 
justiciability of President’s rule and putting curbs on the exercise of Art. 356. 
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CHAPTER SIX
Under Basic Structure Rule: The 
Representation of the People (Third 
Amendment) Act, 2002, and the 
Judicialization of the Electoral System
Abstract   How has the Constitution’s basic structure played out 
over time? Chapter Six provides a case study approach to the 
Association for Democratic Reforms case, a public interest 
litigation that upheld the judicial construct of ‘a right to 
information’ and rewrote the Representation of the People Act, 
1950. This is one of the few examples in which all political 
parties agreed to override the Supreme Court decision that 
candidates standing for election had to declare their assets and 
disclose any criminal record. The Supreme Court set the agenda, 
implemented it via judicial legislation and, last but not least, 
pushed aside any legislative objections from the other two 
branches as unconstitutional. The chapter thus begins with 
“normal” dimensions of judicial power — the governing with 
judges, exploring how the day-to-day resolution of electoral 
disputes by the Indian Supreme Court judicialised the 
preferences of all actors over time. The Association for 
Democratic Reforms case, however, is more aptly described as a 
new form of judicial power — governed by judges — as the 
Basic Structure moved the Supreme Court outside the confines 
of regular separation-of-power games, fusing agenda setting, law 
making and veto-player roles within a single judicial institution. 
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[6.1] Governing with Judges: Elections and the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has been exceptionally active in the field of electoral politics. It 
would not be amiss to state that in large part, it has created the system as it stands today 
through judicialisation. It has supported and made powerful the Election Commission, 
which is a highly regarded and respected institution. It has refused to question the 
Commission’s decisions on fact, although it has tinkered with and kept the ultimate 
interpretation of issues such as what constitutes a corrupt practice or the extent to which 
the use of language or religion to sway voters can be used. The Court has encouraged 
the creation of a multiparty-system because of its strict interpretation of anti-defection 
laws, which forced political actors to create new parties rather than join existing ones. It 
decided which of the state’s policies could use the instrumentality of election laws to 
bring about the sort of social engineering it approved of and, finally, it created a robust 
discourse on anti-corruption, transparency and good governance by ensuring that laws 
demanding the declaration of assets, disclosure of criminal records and the right to 
information were enacted.  
Political scientists looking at the mechanics of electoral democracy in India 
seldom realise the extent of judicialisation and its role as a catalyst within the process of 
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the evolution of India’s electoral system. Judicialisation governs every legislative 
loophole to keep the voting process moving forward, focusing on the preferences of 
judges and judicial law making. Judicial interventions in electoral systems are a normal 
part of judicial routines around the globe. Courts settle electoral disputes, intervene in 
electoral processes and shape electoral systems in general and everywhere. For instance, 
in India, judges might decide, whether a candidate really is a member of the Scheduled 
Caste after conversion or re-conversion or whether a symbol offends a community?  1
From the early days of Indian elections, laws have required interpretation and disputes 
have had to be settled, thus creating rules. In the Shubhnath vs Ram Narain AIR 1960 
SC 148 case, the Supreme Court adjudicated on what constituted a corrupt practise 
when it held that the symbol of a cock, which seemed to suggest not voting for the 
candidate would incur his displeasure, was undue influence as the cock had religious 
significance for the Adivasi tribal population in the constituency. In Ramanbhai 
Ashabhai Patel vs Dabhi Ajithkumar Fulsinji 1965 SCR (1) 712, five years later, the 
mere use of a star was not held to be corrupt as it did not have an obvious and clear 
religious context, although it too was linked to the religious dhruva star in Hindu 
philosophy. In these case examples, the Supreme Court decided when an action fell 
short of what it deemed improper, thus holding onto the reigns of interpretation, even 
for issues that were very similar. In the religious symbols cases, for instance, in 
Ramanbhai, it stated that nothing could be called a Hindu symbol as Hinduism has a 
large pantheon and contains many ideas. The Court could just as well have decided the 
 G.M. Armugam vs. S Rajagopalan 1976 SCR (3) 82.1
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opposite; what matters is the presence and legitimacy of an institution that settles 
disputes, what Stone Sweet calls the move from the dyad to the triad. 
Table 6.1 points towards more assertive forms of judicial power and judicial 
making not linked to specific disputes but more abstract policy interventions. The 
Election Commission, in particular, is one of the actors that learned to use PIL to shift 
electoral laws in specific directions and bypass the legislative and executive branches. 
We can describe these as higher level of judicialisation as the agenda is set in the style 
of policymaking, and the judicial decision does not derive from a specific dispute but 
from rather abstract ideas. For instance, in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of 
India (2009) 3 SCC 200, a case later referred to a Constitution bench and which was 
decided in 2013, the Supreme Court followed the arguments presented by NGOs as well 
as the Election Commission and introduced a new ballot design, including the right to a 
‘none of the above’ vote — generations of political scientists will have to study the 
impact of this case. Similarly, the imposition of strict anti-defection laws by the 
Supreme Court (Nikolenyi 2008) is an important reason for the fractionalisation of the 
Indian party system.  2
 Although, this is an example of routine judicialisation patterns as the anti-defection agenda emerged 2
from the other branches and was introduced as a constitutional amendment by a two-thirds majority.
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To illustrate the key differences between regular judicialisation — governing with 
judges as opposed to being governed by judges — we explore a series of acts passed in 
relation to Panchayat elections. The case originated as an appeal against writ petitions 
filed in the High Court at Chandigarh. The issue at the heart of the matter was the 
validity of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 which disqualified people having 
TABLE 6.1 
Percentage of Public Interest Litigation Cases Dealing with Election Commission Ma@ers
Year Number of PIL Writ Petitions
Election Commission 
Matters (%)
1997 215 1.29
1998 177 1.60
1999 158 1.72
2000 183 0.39
2001 182 1.42
2002 199 3.25
2003 177 0.44
2004 193 7.80
2005 227 3.72
2006 243 3.28
2007 258 5.77
Source:  Compiled by author from the Annual Report of the Supreme Court of  
 India 2008/9 and Gauri (2009).
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more than two children a year after the commencement of the act from standing for 
Panchayat elections.  A quick overview of the chronology of the acts serves to put the 3
Haryana Act in context. Haryana was one of seven states that enacted such legislation; 
Rajasthan introduced this rule first for both the Panchayat and municipal elections in 
1992, Andhra Pradesh introduced this rule in 1993, Orissa introduced it in 1993, 
Himachal Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh in 2000, and Maharashtra in 2003 (with 
retrospective effect from 2002), while Chhattisgarh enforced the law it inherited from 
Madhya Pradesh upon its recognition as a separate State (Buch 2005). In the writ 
petition against the Haryana Act, it was argued that this provision of the act was 
arbitrary and discriminatory and violated Article 14 of the Constitution, and also that the 
disqualification did not serve the purpose the act sought to achieve, namely the 
structuring of local elections. The other main argument was that it interfered with the 
freedom of religion and violated Article 25 of the Constitution. The Court answered 
both objections in the negative and stated that no discrimination had arisen. 
In response to the first issue, the Court said that Article 14 forbids class legislation 
but it does not prohibit classification for the purpose of legislation and discusses the 
tests for this intelligible difference citing case law from India and abroad. The Court 
almost summarily dismissed the argument that the provision did not serve the purpose 
of the act by saying it served the purpose of the act, as one of the aims in creating grass-
roots governance models was family planning and welfare. ‘There is no merit in the 
 The use of election laws as a means for furthering public policy in medical campaigns against 3
tuberculosis and leprosy has been upheld by the Supreme Court; in Dhirendra Pandua vs State of Orissa 
(2008) 17 SCC 311, the Supreme Court accepted the constitutionality of Section 38 of the Orissa 
Municipal Act, 1950, which disqualifies candidates suffering from such a disease putting forward their 
names.
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submission. We have already stated that one of the objects of the enactment is to 
popularise Family Welfare/Family Planning Programme. This is consistent with the 
National Population Policy.’  This was also the rationale with regard to the argument 4
that the section was discriminatory, as the Court held that the section was directly 
related to the general purpose of the statute and since people with two children were 
distinct from those having more or less children, as a distinct group they were subject to 
legislation and so the policy decision was not open to judicial scrutiny. 
In response to objection 2, the Court said that there is no discrimination against 
any religious practice or faith as per Article 25 as the act did not stop people having 
more than two children, it just forbade them from standing for Panchayat elections. The 
Court also states that such policies could be implemented step by step, and 
implementing it only for certain posts was not necessarily discriminatory. It also did not 
find it odd in any way that only a few states have this legislation. Even more 
interestingly, it was happy to decide that in one state, the omission of the word ‘living’ 
implied all children living and dead, and in another, the use of the word implied that in 
that state, parents who had suffered the loss of their third child could stand for elections. 
Similarly, we find cases in which children were adopted by the candidate would 
disqualify them or the child might be given up for adoption to the candidate’s brother so 
that the candidate would not be disqualified. In each of these cases, the judicial 
intervention specified the rules and judicialised over time. In the following sections, we 
shift towards a very different form of judicial power in its raw Weberian meaning of 
making others do something they do not want to do. A qualitative close-up of the 
 Javed vs State of Haryana (2003) 8 SCC 369.4
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landmark decisions Union of India (UOI) v Association for Democratic Reforms 
(ADR), 2002, (hereafter ‘the ADR case’) and People’s Union for Civil Liberties 
(PUCL) vs. Union of India, 2003, Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India 
2003 (4) SCC 399) (hereafter the ‘PUCL case’) renders a clear picture of the judges’ 
powerful impact on free and fair elections. Both cases address the problem of the 
criminalisation of elections after the 170th Report of the Indian Law Commission 
(1999), while the Vohra Committee of the Ministry of Home Affairs already had called 
for election law reforms. In a nutshell, the Supreme Court adopted the Law 
Commission’s recommendations for debarring any candidate if he faces charges in any 
court in respect of certain criminal offences; any candidate seeking to contest an 
election will have to reveal all details regarding criminal cases (pending) as well as 
correct statements of assets owned by the candidate, his spouse and dependant relations. 
The most important aspect of our narrative is the fact that this has become the law of the 
land because the Supreme Court struck down legislation overriding its original 
judgement under the basic structure doctrine.  
[6.2] The Right to Information — Pure Judicial Power? 
It is necessary to trace the evolution of the right to information laws as an excursus 
because it serves to show how the main case study, dealing with transparency and 
corruption in elections, turned on this issue and galvanised public opinion to such an 
extent that it fed into the debate for a strong RTI Act, which then was passed in 2005. 
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So, the progression of the two cases symbiotically fed each other, and we are able to 
explore the full extent of judicialisation as the right to information is a judicial 
innovation to begin with and, consequently, the entire judicial intervention in electoral 
laws stems from judicialisation.  
The passing of the RTI Act in India coincided with increases in moves towards 
transparency around the world — yet for India the push towards the act came from the 
judiciary.  The story behind the formulation of this act began much earlier and again 5
highlights the importance of the ‘little’ or minor judicialisation issues leading to such 
upheaval in governance mechanisms. For the first real movement was an effort to find 
out about what daily wages were being paid to unskilled labourers. As early as 1987, the 
Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sanghathan in Devdungri in Rajasthan began agitating for 
information on minimum wages.  Movements such as these and the increasing 6
importance of transparency in good governance slowly led to a progression via the 
courts towards formal legislation on the issue. The legislative movement for the Right to 
Information Act, 2005, exposes the full scope of the judicialisation of governance 
discourses and the ordering of political preferences in terms of legal debates. In 1996, a 
retired Supreme Court judge, Justice P.B. Savant was put at the helm of legislative 
drafting efforts by the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI) 
and Press Council of India (PCI). The Government constituted committee, chaired by 
H.D. Shourie, also proposed a draft law in 1997, which was later Parliament as the 
 According to data compiled by Ackerman (Ackerman et al. 2006) India passed the law at a time when 5
there was most activity in relation to freedom of information laws around the world.
 The Movement For Right to Information in India - People’s Power for the Control of Corruption 1999, 6
<www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/rti/india/articles/The%20Movement%20for%20RTI%20in
%20India.pdf>, last accessed September 24, 2015.
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Freedom of Information Bill, 2000. After recommendations by the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Home Affairs, the Freedom of Information Act, 2002 was 
passed by Parliament, December 2002, with presidential assent January 2003 - then, due 
to lack of notification, the Act never came into force (RTIFR 2013, 30).  The change in 7
government from BJP to Congress in 2004 meant the 2002 Act was dropped and a 
reworked act, which claimed to have answered more of the misgivings of the parties 
involved, was passed five years later. The Right to Information Act 2005 came into 
force four months after being passed, on 12 October 2005. The PUCL case order, 
however, leaves no doubt who the judges credited with the enactment of an RTI law — 
as the right to information had already been invented and ‘entrenched’ by judicial 
decisions and the provisions of the act reflected the existing case law. As Justice Reddi 
stated in the second paragraph of his opinion: 
Freedom of expression and right to information in the Constitution of our 
democratic Republic, among the fundamental freedoms, freedom of speech and 
expression shines radiantly in the firmament of Part III. We must take legitimate 
pride that this cherished freedom has grown from strength to strength in the post 
independent era. It has been constantly nourished and shaped to new dimensions in 
tune with the contemporary needs by the constitutional courts. Barring a few 
aberrations, the Executive Government and the Political Parties too have not lagged 
behind in safeguarding this valuable right which is the insignia of democratic culture 
of a nation. [(2003) 4 SCC 399] 
 While the enactment of a Union act was slow, the States had enacted their own versions of RTI statutes 7
in line with court decisions and their established parameters of the new right. Amongst the first were 
Tamil Nadu and Goa, which enacted legislation in 1997 and Karnataka and Rajasthan followed suit in 
2000 and Delhi in 2001; a year later, Maharashtra and Assam followed.
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[6.3] 	Elections and the Right to Information: 
	 From Inter-Branch Conflict to Judicial Command 
If the right to information had been a creature of judicialisation to begin with, the 
extension of the idea into the realm of elections would take place against powerful, yet 
futile, opposition by the executive and legislature. The Association for Democratic 
Reforms case  was filed before the Delhi High Court in 1999 for directions to 8
implement the 170th Law Commission Report by making changes to Rule 4 of the 
Conduct of Elections Rules 1961. The Law Commission had made recommendations 
for ensuring election processes that were ‘more fair, transparent and equitable’ and ‘to 
reduce the distortions and evils that have crept into the Indian electoral system’ by 
making a comprehensive study of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951. One 
recommendation was the debarring of a candidate if he had charges brought against him 
in a court with respect to certain offences. In addition to furnishing details if a candidate 
had pending criminal cases against him, the recommendation was that the financial 
position and assets of the candidate and immediate family should also be declared. 
The ADR in its petition in the High Court stated that successive governments had 
not acted on these recommendations. But in its order, the High Court correctly ruled that 
legislating was not in its purview and it could not therefore pass any order amending the 
act or rules. However, at the same time the High Court held that information about the 
candidate was essential to the voter to ensure they knew who they were voting for, and 
 Union of India (UOI) vs.Association for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294.  8
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this was covered under their fundamental rights. In this regard, it directed the Election 
Commission to ‘secure to voters’ certain information regarding each candidate. This 
information included whether they were being prosecuted or accused of any offence 
punishable with imprisonment, what their assets as well as the assets of the spouse and 
dependent relations were, facts giving an ‘insight into the candidate’s competence, 
capacity and suitability for acting as a parliamentarian or legislator, including details of 
his/her educational qualifications’ as well as their capacity to run for that office: 
Whether the candidate is accused of any offence(s) punishable with imprisonment? 
If so, the details thereof. 2. Assets possessed by a candidate, his or her spouse and 
dependent relations? 3. Facts giving insight to candidate’s competence, capacity and 
suitability for acting as parliamentarian or legislator including details of his/her 
educational qualifications. 4. Information which the election commission considers 
necessary for judging the capacity and capability of the political party fielding the 
candidate for election to Parliament or the State Legislature. [(2002) 5 SCC 294] 
Both the Indian National Congress, which was in opposition, and the BJP government 
appealed and asked that the Supreme Court hold that the High Court should not have 
directed Election Commission to directly implement these changes — instead the writ 
petitioners who filed the public interest litigation should have been ordered to approach 
Parliament instead. In short, the unified stance of the political parties was simply 
ignored. 
The Peoples Union for Civil Liberties in the meantime had also filed a writ 
petition in 2001 under Article 32: 
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[P]raying that writ, order or direction be issued to the respondents — (a) to bring in 
such measures which provide for declaration of assets by the candidate for the 
elections and for such mandatory declaration every year during the tenure as an 
elected representative as MP / MLA; (b) to bring in such measures which provide for 
declaration by the candidate contesting election whether any charge in respect of any 
offence has been framed against him/her, and (c) to frame such guidelines under 
Article 141 of the Constitution by taking into consideration 170th Report of Law 
Commission of India. (par. 6) 
The two cases were heard together and a joint order was passed. The Solicitor General 
argued on behalf of the government that the changes directed by the High Court should 
not come into effect until amendments were made to the act and that various provisions 
of the existing act contained in effect what these two petitions sought to do. He 
submitted that political parties would decide on the amendments and the High Court had 
gone outside the Representation of the People Act in the declaration of assets issue as 
the act as it existed did not provide for it.  
 The lawyer for the intervening party, the Congress, argued that the CAD had 
provided evidence that there had been discussions on educational qualifications and 
such criteria were expressly rejected. This was also true with regard to a declaration of 
the property a candidate might have. The Election Commission filed a counter affidavit 
to this, and its lawyer argued that the criminalisation of politics was an issue the 
Election Commission was greatly troubled by and had, since 1997, actively engaged 
with, and a lack of resolution meant that ‘law breakers have become law makers’. It also 
recommended that prospective candidates declare their assets and that offences be 
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punishable with more than two years’ imprisonment where charges had been brought by 
a court. 
The Supreme Court order of the three-judge bench notes that Election 
Commission and High Court have identical preferences with regard to transparency 
rules in relation to pending criminal cases as well as assets and educational 
qualifications. Above all, the Supreme Court had no doubts about its judicial law-
making powers: 
The powers conferred on this Court by the Constitution are ample to remedy this 
defect and to ensure enforcement of the concept of equality. There are ample powers 
conferred by Article 32 read with Article 142 to make orders which have the effect 
of law by virtue of Article 141 and there is mandate to all authorities to act in aid of 
the orders of this Court as provided in Article 144 of the Constitution. In a catena of 
decisions of this Court, this power has been recognised and exercised, if need be, by 
issuing necessary directions to fill the vacuum till such time the legislature steps in 
to cover the gap or the executive discharges its role. 
The order records the statement of one of the counsel for the original petitioners and 
states that: 
[D]emocracy is a part of the basic structure of our Constitution; and rule of law and 
free and fair elections are basic features of democracy’ and that the ‘entire history, 
background and the antecedents of the candidate are required to be disclosed to the 
voters so that they can judiciously decide in whose favour they should vote. (par. 18) 
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The Court whittled the issue down to two main questions, namely: 
 1. Whether the Election Commission is empowered to issue directions as ordered by 
the High Court? 2. Whether a voter — a citizen of this country — has right to get 
relevant information, such as, assets, qualification and involvement in offence for 
being educated and informed for judging the suitability of a candidate contesting 
election as MP or MLA? 
It then brings in the Basic Structure argument in the next paragraph, wherein it says that 
the Election Commission’s ability to control all elections was a fundamental tenet of 
democracy and thus basic to the Constitution. 
Further, it is to be stated that — (a) one of the basic structures of our Constitution is 
`republican and democratic form of government’; […] Under Article 324, the 
superintendence, direction and control of the conduct of all elections’ to Parliament 
and to the Legislature of every State vests in Election Commission. The phrase 
`conduct of elections’ is held to be of wide amplitude which would include power to 
make all necessary provisions for conducting free and fair elections. (par. 21) 
The order quotes various sources to lend weight to the argument that democracy was 
based on the voter and their right to know. The scope and ambit of Article 324 was 
discussed and the Court sought to establish that it ‘operates in areas left unoccupied by 
legislation’, and that when a statute is silent, there is no bar to the authority acting as it 
deems proper, since silence is not to be construed as a bar on such action. 
Finally, in our view this Court would have ample power to direct the Commission to 
fill the void, in absence of suitable legislation, covering the field and the voters are 
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required to be well-informed and educated about contesting candidates so that they 
can elect proper candidate by their own assessment. It is the duty of the executive to 
fill the vacuum by executive orders because its field is coterminous with that of the 
legislature, and where there is inaction by the executive, for whatever reason, the 
judiciary must step in, in exercise of its constitutional obligations to provide a 
solution till such time the legislature acts to perform its role by enacting proper 
legislation to cover the field. The adverse impact of lack of probity in public life 
leading to a high degree of corruption is manifold. Therefore, if the candidate is 
directed to declare his/her spouse's and dependants’ assets immovable, moveable 
and valuable articles it would have its own effect. (par. 45) 
At the end of the judgement, the Court provides a seven-points summary, holding that 
‘the jurisdiction of the EC is wide enough to include all powers necessary for the 
smooth conduct of elections’; that the limit of plenary power is when an act of law on 
an issue exists and when it is silent, the Commission has the right to act and is ‘a 
reservoir of power’ till the vacuum is filled (Kanhiya Lal case); that elections include 
the entire process; to maintain purity and transparency, the expenses can be asked for by 
the EC; the right to information means that the electorate shall have access to relevant 
information — and here it quotes the international Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights; that a reading of all past Supreme Court judgements shows that the Supreme 
Court has ample jurisdiction under Article 32 read with Articles 141 and 142 to issue 
directions to the executive to serve public interest; and, finally, that the right to know is 
included in Article 19(1) (a). It states that the High Court order could not be said to be 
unjustified, but it modified it to the extent that it directed the Electoral Commission to 
call for information on criminal offences, assets and educational qualifications. Without 
doubt, this judgment, decided on 2 May 2002, fundamentally changed the status quo of 
182
CHAPTER 6   ·   Judicialisation of the Electoral System
electoral laws as well as general public policies relating to the electoral process. It 
constituted an unprecedented judicial intervention into candidate selection, intra party 
governance and inter-party relations; also, it fundamentally shaped campaign styles and 
campaign issues (assets of opponents and so on). Moreover, there can be no doubt that 
the Supreme Court’s decision contradicted the policy preferences of the legislative as 
Parliament was quick to pass the Representation of the People (3rd Amendment) Act, 
2002, overriding the Court’s decision in the ADR case. The second public interest 
litigation, pursued by the People’s Union for Civil Liberties, India’s most active ‘cause 
lawyer,’ thus arose out of the need for the judges to clarify their understanding of the 
separation of powers as well as the effects of legislation overturning earlier judgements. 
The majority judgement in the PUCL case at the outset states bluntly that the amending 
legislation was ultra vires because, by overturning the judgment, the legislature was 
assuming judicial power for itself. 
 Justice Shah began his judgement with a colourful analogy:  
There was an era when a powerful or a rich or a strong or a dacoit aged more than 
60 years married a beautiful young girl despite her resistance. Except to weep, she 
had no choice of selecting her mate. To a large extent, such a situation does not 
prevail today. Now, young persons are selecting mates of their choice after verifying 
full details thereof. Should we not have such a situation in selecting a candidate 
contesting elections? In a vibrant democracy — is it not required that a little voter 
should know bio-data of his/her would be Rulers, Law-makers of Destiny-maker of 
the Nation? (PUCL case, para. 2) 
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The circumstances of this second case were as follows: While the appeal against the 
ADR case was brought to the Supreme Court by the Union government, they also took 
legislative steps to circumvent the issue. During the course of the hearing in the 
Supreme Court, and before the judgment could be pronounced and an order passed, the 
ordinance was repealed, and on December 20, the Representation of People (Third 
Amendment) Act, 2002 was passed. It came into force with retrospective effect. 
Parliament and Government thus override judicial decisions, the Amendment reads as 
follows: 
33A. Right to information .— (1) A candidate shall, apart from any information 
which he is required to furnish, under this Act or the rules made thereunder, in his 
nomination paper delivered under sub- section (1) of section 33, also furnish the 
information as to whether- 
(i) he is accused of any offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more 
in a pending case in which a charge has been framed by the court of competent 
jurisdiction; 
(ii) he has been convicted of an offence [ other than any offence referred to in sub- 
section (1) or sub- section (2), or covered in sub- section (3), of section 8] and 
sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more. 
(2) The candidate or his proposer, as the case may be, shall, at the time of delivering 
to the returning officer the nomination paper under sub- section (1) of section 33, 
also deliver to him an affidavit sworn specified in sub- section (1). by the candidate 
in a prescribed form verifying the information 
(3) The returning officer shall, as soon as may be after the furnishing of information 
to him under sub- section (1), display the aforesaid information by affixing a copy of 
the affidavit, delivered under sub- section (2), at a conspicuous place at his office for 
the information of the electors relating to a constituency for which the nomination 
paper is delivered. 
184
CHAPTER 6   ·   Judicialisation of the Electoral System
3. Insertion of new section 33B.- After section 33A of the principal Act as so 
inserted, the following section shall be inserted and shall be deemed to have been 
inserted with effect from the 2nd day of May, 2002 , namely:- 33B. Candidate to 
furnish information only under the Act and the rules.- Notwithstanding anything 
contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court or any direction, order or 
any other instruction issued by the Election Commission, no candidate shall be 
liable to disclose or furnish any such information, in respect of his election, which is 
not required to be disclosed or furnished under this Act or the rules made thereunder. 
The sequence of moves does not end with the legislative override. The PUCL filed a 
case immediately challenging the ordinance, but by the time the matter was heard, it had 
already been passed as an act. The order, dated March 13, 2003, records that the petition 
was against the ordinance, but since the wording of the sections in the act were the same 
as in the ordinance, the Court accepted the amendment application filed by PUCL, 
allowed the modification of the petition as challenging the act and struck down the two 
sections. The order asserts that the legislature cannot pass a law in direct contravention 
of a court order so as to render the directions of that order irrelevant or require the 
instrumentalities of the state, i.e. the Election Commission, to flout Supreme Court 
decisions. 
While Justice Reddi in his order expresses his wish that PUCL had been referred 
to a Constitution bench, it is perhaps telling that the government and all of the political 
parties did not have any hope that the Constitution bench would go against the order of 
the three judges in the ADR case. In the new order, the court used the word ‘diktat’ with 
regard to the Supreme Court’s recommendations, which the legislative attempt at 
amendment did not choose to follow. The Court further stated in the course of its order 
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that the right to information once recognised as a fundamental right could not be 
truncated. 
[T]he Legislature can remove the basis of a decision rendered by a competent court 
thereby rendering that decision ineffective. But no Legislature in this country has 
power to ask the instrumentalities of the State to disobey or disregard the decisions 
given by courts […] A declaration that an order made by a court of law is void is 
normally part of the judicial function and is not a legislative function. Although 
there is in the Constitution of India no rigid separation of powers, by and large the 
spheres of judicial function and legislative function have been demarcated and it is 
not permissible for the Legislature to encroach upon the judicial sphere. It has 
accordingly been held that a Legislature while it is entitled to change with 
retrospective effect the law which formed the basis of the judicial decision, it is not 
permissible to the Legislature to declare the judgment of the court to be void or not 
binding. […] we would reiterate that the primary duty of the Judiciary is to uphold 
the Constitution and the laws without fear or favour, without being biased by 
political ideology or economic theory. Interpretation should be in consonance with 
the Constitutional provisions, which envisage a republic democracy. Survival of 
democracy depends upon free and fair election. […] That all constitutional 
interpretations have political consequences should not obliterate the fact that the 
decision has to be arrived at in the calm and dispassionate atmosphere of the court 
room, that judges in order to give legitimacy to their decision have to keep aloof 
from the din and controversy of politics and that the fluctuating fortunes of rival 
political parties can have for them only academic interest. Their primary duty is to 
uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear or favour and in doing so, they 
cannot allow any political ideology or economic theory, which may have caught 
their fancy, to colour the decision. […]. It is also equally settled law that the Court 
should not shirk its duty from performing its function merely because it has political 
thicket […] merely because the question has a political complexion that by itself is 
no ground why the court should shrink from performing its duty under the 
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Constitution if it raises an issue of constitutional determination. Every constitutional 
question concerns the allocation and exercise of governmental power and no 
constitutional question can, therefore, fail to be political. So long as a question arises 
whether an authority under the Constitution has acted within the limits of its power 
or exceeded it, it can certainly be decided by the court. Indeed it would be its 
constitutional obligation to do so. It is necessary to assert the clearest possible terms, 
particularly in the context of recent history, that the Constitution is suprema lex, the 
paramount law of the land, and there is no department or branch of Government 
above or beyond it (para. 9). 
In a word, the Supreme Court of India declared the Representation of People (Third 
Amendment) Act, 2002, null and void and ordered the Election Commission to ensure 
the original judicial instructions were implemented. 
[6.4] Governed by Judges: Beyond the Marksian Model 
Putting this case into the context of the Marksian model discussed in Chapter Three, we 
can develop a new formal analysis of legislative-judicial interaction in the context of the 
judicialisation of the electoral process to illustrate the impact of the Basic Structure. 
Regardless of the fractionalisation of the political system, the possibility of a 
presidential veto or the influence of legislative committees, this model is based on Brian 
Marks’ classic rational choice approach to judicial power (Marks 1989) and the general 
assumption that the Supreme Court of India will opt for those interpretations of the 
Constitution that are as close as possible to judicial policy preferences, yet, do not carry 
187
CHAPTER 6   ·   Judicialisation of the Electoral System
the danger of being overturned by legislative action. Studying the influence of judicial 
decisions on the legislature provides an important insight into the measurement of the 
judicialisation of the electoral process. The purpose of Figure 6.1 is to determine the 
policy space accessible to the Indian Supreme Court and thus the power of the judges to 
implement their own policy preferences.  
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FIGURE 6.1 Election Law Reforms: Marksian Separation of Powers Model
and Basic Structure Implications
SC  =  Supreme Court ideal point.
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In this particular case, we have moved beyond a mere political competition model of 
checks and balances as the traditional separation-of-powers model no longer applies. 
Normally, the successful judicialisation of a specific policy field implies that the judges 
face a legislature and government that is unlikely to overturn their decisions, or rather, 
that judges are aware of the tolerance intervals of other branches (hence the learning 
experience from the property disputes). Applying the Marksian model from Chapter 
Three, we assumed that the Supreme Court’s decision would have to fall in the area, 
winset of the status quo for government and parliament (Figure 6.1). The ability of the 
Indian Supreme Court to completely ignore the policy preferences as well as the 
tolerance intervals of the executive and legislature is what makes this case so 
remarkable. For the Representation of People (Third Amendment) Act, 2002, the story 
no longer unfolded along the lines of general separation-of-powers games, and Marks’ 
model fails to explain a Basic Structure game. The legislative amendment was a 
classical override move, invalidating the judicial decision and explicitly stipulating that 
candidates only had to furnish information if required by the act and not by any judicial 
decision. In most countries, even those with very strong Supreme Courts, the game 
would end at that point (at best, judges might by stealth and over a long time shift the 
meaning of the amendment act via interpretation). However, with a strong and 
established Basic Structure doctrine this story continued in India as the Court came back 
into the game and declared that the legislature was overstepping its boundaries by 
framing a law that literally nullified the Supreme Court order — essentially forcing the 
legislature to adopt the Court’s view and negating the possibility of overriding occurring 
in the Basic Structure sphere. Consistent with Shapiro’s political jurisprudence, these 
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cases exemplify the political elements of judicial decision-making as the judges clearly 
understood the changing political context and then enforced new policy preferences 
despite a majority of legislators preferring the old policies. As well as this, the PUCL 
case is a striking demonstration of judicial power, a de facto overriding of a legislative 
amendment, although it is obvious that the judges had perfect and complete information 
about the preferences of the legislature. In other words, the Supreme Court of India was 
able to choose not to defer to the other branches of government.  In terms of Marks’ 9
spatial model (Figure 6.1), the ADR case represents a simple Court (SC) decision (ideal 
point) within a two-dimensional policy space. Secondly, the legislature (P) and the 
executive (G) overturned the judges’ decision via legislation and pulled the law back 
into the area, winset of the status quo for government and parliament. Usually, as 
suggested in Chapter Three, an equilibrium would emerge over time, maximising the 
preferences of all three institutions. In a Basic Structure game, however, the Supreme 
Court does not have to move at all, and not even the Court’s tolerance interval seems to 
be particularly important from the perspective of judges (however, Parliament and 
Government can exert at least a little bit of influence as long as they move within the 
Court’s tolerance interval in Basic Structure matters). The fact that the Supreme Court’s 
second decision, namely the PUCL case, remained at SC and did not constitute any 
movement towards G or P, points towards the extraordinary power of the judges and 
provides several lessons. ‘Among the most important of these is the primacy of policy 
preferences; that is, judicial specialists generally agree that justices, first and foremost, 
wish to see their policy preferences etched into law’ (Epstein and Knight 1998, 10).  
 Following Fischer (2007). 9
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For regular judicialisation patterns, we see ‘how legislators are gradually placed 
under the tutelage of the constitutional court or, more precisely, the pedagogical 
authority of constitutional case law’ (Stone Sweet 2000, 149). For Basic Structure cases, 
there is no need for much tutelage and the Court simply is as assertive as it wants to be. 
Finally, the current institutional distribution of power sanctions an almost absolute 
judicialisation of law making that goes beyond the normal levels of judicial 
policymaking and the regular reception of judicial decisions by legislators. Within the 
sphere of electoral laws, the Indian Supreme Court has managed to govern the exercise 
of legislative power directly and without mediation. 
The Supreme Court confirmed that a citizen’s right to elect his representative 
could not be limited by statutory provisions except as permitted by the Constitution — 
and of course, it is the judges who say what the constitution is or rather what the Basic 
Structure is. Over time, the heresthetical manoeuvrings of the 1970s that practically 
deferred to the other branches and only spoke about the Basic Structure as an idea, 
unfolded and empowered the Court in a unique way. In summary, the Court no longer 
has to be strategic in such constellations but can implement its own policy preferences 
without taking into account the preferences of Parliament and Government. In a way, 
instead of strategic decision-making, the Supreme Court can decide sincerely and 
without regard to the opinion of other branches. Of course, this should not be misread as 
absolutist judicial power: a successful Supreme Court must take into account, 
strategically, public opinion, elite opinion (especially the media) and the benefits that 
accrue from the added legitimacy of the Election Commission and other support 
constituencies (such as the Bar Association). The court is not autarkical and not all 
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powerful, but in some cases, the Basic Structure doctrine means that the Indian Supreme 
Court is powerful enough to turn the prime minister, cabinet and Parliament into 
institutions of irrelevance.  
 There is another story attached this chapter’s conclusion that involves the 
strategic cunning of the Supreme Court in relation to public opinion. Just like the public 
interest litigation for transparency of assets and criminal records, there was a public 
interest litigation seeking judicial intervention on delimitation and constituency size  10
(because of demographic developments, a vote in the North today counts much less than 
a vote in the South, but this is obviously a political Pandora’s box, with not much to 
gain and everything to lose for most political parties. Since 1971, politicians have stuck 
to the decision to avoid the complexity of constituency boundaries and put a 
constitutional freeze on delimitation through constitutional amendments, embracing 
gaps in voting shares and then extending the status quo of constituency boundaries until 
2031 (via the 87th Amendment Act, 2003). The Supreme Court knew of course that such 
a topic engendered at least as much opposition as support — across the Indian public, 
amongst elites, and within the Court’s support constituencies — and, as a result, simply 
ignored the case and the issue in general, and did not even seem to be tempted to waste 
its political capital on a classic win-lose, divided constituencies, topic.  
 In 2007, a BJP MP, Vijay Jolly, who ran an NGO called the Delhi Study Group, filed a PIL on 10
delimitation in the Supreme Court entitled Delhi Study Group v Union of India, but the case has been 
ignored. The Supreme Court refused to entertain the argument that proportionate appropriation of seats 
could be part of the basic structure, J&K National Panther’s Party v. Union of India (2011) 1 SCC 228. 
Given the model of judicial decision-making embraced in this thesis, such decisions are not based on 
textual or logical arguments: it would be possible to construct a plausible argument either way. When the 
Supreme Court supports transparency in relation to criminal records and assets the judicial decision is 
supported by numerous support constituencies as well as public opinion. If the Supreme Court interfered 
with constituency boundaries, such support from other actors would be fragmented at best.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
India's Rights Revolution: Expansion of 
Judicial Policy Making Spaces
Abstract   While this thesis focuses on the changing political 
opportunity environment through elections, we have also 
recognised path dependency patterns within which judges 
themselves can participate, bringing about circumstances that 
empower them even further. Public interest litigation is at first 
an institutional innovation that invites new actors into the 
courtroom but then built new support constituencies through 
social and economic rights after the Emergency. This Chapter 
documents the evolution of this field of jurisprudence as another 
example of ‘when judges change the rules of the game’ and the 
other branches are too weak to check and balance judicial power. 
As a result, Chapter Seven brings into focus judicial institutional 
innovations that have revolutionised access to the Court as well 
as the remedies and other tools with which the Supreme Court 
intervenes in governance. While the expansion of judicial 
policymaking into many spheres of public life has been explored 
by different scholars at different times, this chapter seeks to shift 
the debate towards quantitative data and the impact of PIL on 
court organisation. On this basis, Chapter Seven argues against 
Epp’s view that there has only been a weak rights revolution in 
India and explores further heresthetical manoeuvres in favour of 
judicial power expansion: the power not to decide and de facto 
docket control. 
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[7.1] Evaluating and Explaining Public Interest Litigation
Two narratives run side by side: To begin with, it seems obvious to any observer of 
Indian economic and social development that the pace of law and social change is 
chronically lagging behind constitutional utopias; at the same time, there are numerous 
examples where Indian litigants and courts have skilfully utilised rights to contribute to 
meaningful social change. India’s legal system, like other legal systems, has to be 
conceptualised as a structurally conservative institution. As a general rule, litigants who 
are resource strong and repeat players enjoy strategic advantages, and it is difficult to 
think of law as ‘empowering’ even if we assume that courts side with the 
disempowered:  
That courts can sometimes be induced to propound rule-changes that legislatures 
would not make points to the limitations as well as the possibilities of court-
produced change. With their relative insulation from retaliation by antagonistic 
interests, courts may more easily propound new rules which depart from prevailing 
power relations. But such rules require even greater inputs of other resources to 
secure effective implementation, and courts have less capacity than other rule-
makers to create institutional facilities and re-allocate resources to secure 
implementation of new rules. Litigation then is unlikely to shape decisively the 
distribution of power in society. (Galanter 1974, 149-50)  
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What is more, there ‘is wide agreement that access to justice in India requires reforms 
that would enable ordinary people to invoke the remedies and protections of the 
law’ (Galanter and Krishnan 2004, 789-90). In the process of trying to meet 
constitutional aspirations, representations of legal entitlements remain at the centre of 
the political imagination. To assess the relevance of India’s ‘rights revolution’ for 
questions of judicial power (Epp 1998; Ignatieff 2000), it is necessary to trace an 
evolving constitutional jurisprudence that has asserted greater powers of judicial review 
and to chart its influence on contemporary legal and political practices. It is clear that 
the intellectual origins of the Indian rights revolution have had a contentious history, 
leading back to the formal articulation of various demands for rights during the 
independence movement since 1895 as well as the language of rights of the Karachi 
Resolution of 1931 (Reddy and Dhavan 1994). The concern of this Chapter, however, is 
less with the history or the discernible patterns of juristic thought and more with 
investigating the working of rights after positivisation provided the opportunity for their 
institutional effectiveness.  Figure 7.1 illustrates the institutional flows that have re-set 1
the agenda of the Supreme Court through access and through litigation support 
structures. Through the modern process of constitutionalisation, rights have integrated 
themselves into the fabric of positive law, engendering a radical shift in our 
understanding of how the character of law as the sphere of subjective rights — rather 
than rules — transforms into fundamental norms that infiltrate and shape the 
architectonic principles of legal order (Alexy 2002; Habermas 1996, 247-248).  2
 The other PIL debate, which is also not directly relevant for this thesis, is the question of whether PIL 1
has been captured by urban middle classes and elites. This is indirectly relevant in terms of understanding 
the SC agenda and which cases the judges accept and decide in line with government preferences.
 Follows Fischer (2007). 2
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FIGURE 7.1 Rights Revolutions from Above and from Below
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Note: The trope of ‘the haves coming out ahead’ on the one side, and the organizational and structural 
disadvantages of the ‘have nots’ on the other, derives from Galanter (1974). Since the Emergency, constant efforts 
in the realms of resource capacities (e.g. legal aid, cause lawyering) and litigation reorganisation (through public 
interest litigation) have opened up new access routes to the Supreme Court for new actors, resulting in both, the 
creation of different rules of the game as well as a radical transformation of judicial agendas.
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Epp argues that rights revolutions are driven from below, by changes in the litigation 
support structure, and finds that significant shifts occurred during the Emergency. 
Middle classes and elites became politicised, and money and opposition resources 
(organisational skills) that used to flow into elections now flow into litigation. Indian 
scholars, such as Baxi  and Sathe, present a different argument in which an activist 
judiciary drives — from above — the empowerment of those at the bottom. Chapter 
Seven can deal with both explanations, and Figure 7.1 demonstrates that the outcome 
remains the same, whether changes in judicial agendas come from below or from above. 
The key purpose of Chapter Seven is to update Epp’s data, and thus to argue against his 
conclusion that India experienced only a weak rights revolution. It is important to point 
out that the theoretical framework provided by Epp, namely the importance of well-
organised litigation support structures for powerful judiciaries, remains intact. The only 
conceptual shortcoming in his model is the absence of social and economic rights 
(Figure 7.2), and thus he fails to see India’s real rights revolution, such as the expansion 
of the Article 21 cases illustrated in Chapter Three.  
Secondly, Epp’s data is limited to published decisions and, furthermore, to small 
sample sizes from cases printed by reporters.  The focus on reported cases has a faute de 3
mieux quality. It will not capture all legal activity and it is not a watertight empirical 
image of the working of the Supreme Court, but it is the best image we have. Working 
only    with  reported  cases  even  has  advantages:   cases   reported    are,    in    reality,  
 Epp’s research took place before the digitisation of Indian case law, while this thesis benefits from much 3
larger sample sizes and electronic search tools.  
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representative actions, whose results will be used to resolve a number of other actions. 
A study of reported cases has a great representative value: it is, firstly, indicative of the 
spread of litigation. Secondly, a study of reported decisions captures the amplificatory 
effects of apex court judicial activity. That is to say, Epp’s data (and our data in most of 
the other Chapters)  deals  with  the sort  of judicial activity that  provokes  responses  in  
FIGURE 7.2 Epp’s Rights Revolution Data: Distribution of Tax & Property Cases, Civil 
Liberties Cases and Constitutional Cases (% of Cases Reported), 1960-1990
Source: Compiled by author from Epp (1998).
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Judicial activism at its foundational moment generated a great deal of social 
euphoria. There was considerable excitement at the emergence of judicial catharsis 
in the period 1977 to 1979 where leading Supreme Court Justices apologised, in 
word and deed, to the people of India for judicial abdication during the 1975-7 
Emergency period. A new people-oriented profile of judicial power and process 
began to emerge. In this sense, constitutional interpretation almost assumed the 
dimensions of a new social movement that had as its principal mission the task of 
taking peoples’ suffering seriously as almost the very essence of constitutional 
adjudication. (Baxi 2000, 157)  
For the early days of PIL, the Indian Supreme Court’s approach has been aptly labelled 
‘social action litigation’ (Baxi 1985), a straightforward empowerment and access to just 
mechanism for marginalised sections of Indian society, ensuring their participation in 
judicial proceedings and allowing them to shape judicial agendas (see Figure 7.1, 
bottom up pattern). This is to say, third parties — lawyers, activists, NGOs and rights 
advocacy groups — could bring the grievances of other individuals or groups to the 
attention of the judges.  
Yet the scope of empowerment through PIL was determined by the litigation 
support structure available (e.g. legal aid, litigation support groups, civil liberties 
organisations). In this respect, Indira Gandhi’s imposition of emergency rule (1975-77) 
acted as a catalyst for the emergence of social movements and civil liberties 
organisations.  
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[7.2] 	Changing the Rules of the Game: Access, Activism, Remedies —  
	 Judicial Coups d’Etat? 
  
The courts, driven by what many scholars have termed a sense of shame post-
Emergency, started viewing themselves as guardians of the Constitution in a very literal 
sense. They began opening up and expanding the scope of rights guaranteed in the 
Constitution but also started coming up with what judges and scholars admit were 
creative remedies to fit with fundamental rights, which they considered important for 
social and economic justice. In addition, they also tinkered with interpretations enabling 
them to look into the backyard of the executive and the legislature in purely political or 
economic arenas. This is not to say that the courts were always on the side of justice for 
the deprived. Studies and critiques by judges themselves were quick to put on record 
instances where the disempowered were not given a chance to defend themselves, two 
very commonly cited examples of this being the rights of slum dwellers and the rights 
of the tribes affected by the Narmada dam.  5
In order to permit fuller access to Courts, PIL has been marked by a departure from 
procedural rules extending to the form and manner of filing a writ petition, 
appointment of commissions for carrying out investigation, and giving a report to 
Court, and the appointment of lawyers as amicus curiae to assist the Court. 
(Muralidhar and Desai 2000, 161) 
  (Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation 1985 SCR Supl (2) 51 and the Narmada Bachao 5
Andolan case (2000) 10 SCC 664).
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One of the first instances of a substantial act of judicial creation was the idea of 
continuing mandamus, thus inventing a new remedy and a new tool of judicial 
governance. In the 1979 case of a prisoner approaching the court on behalf of another 
prisoner who was being tortured, reported as  Sunil Batra v Delhi Admin (1980 SCR (2) 
557, Justice Krishna Iyer outlined the basic reason for PIL even when remedies were 
present in other statutes for criminal acts, such as the torture of prisoners in custody. 
But the dynamic role of judicial remedies, after Batra’s case, imparts to the habeas 
corpus writ a versatile vitality and operational utility that makes the healing presence 
of the law live up to its reputation as bastion of liberty even within the secrecy of the 
hidden cell. (par. 3)  
Around the same time, another prison case, dealing this time with the conditions of 
under trial prisoners, came before the Court in the Hussainara Khatoon vs Home 
Secretary, State of Bihar 1979 SCR (3) 532.  The Supreme Court mentioned the 6
pressing need for legal aid and the requirement to create a system that would give the 
poor access to justice. In Hussainara Khatoon, the Court asked for updates on the status 
of the prisoners and further developed the idea of continuing mandamus. Justice 
 This case is of particular importance for lawyers, and often labelled the first public interest litigation 6
case because of the topic (undertrials marginalised in prisons without) but also the impressive cause 
lawyering (Cunningham 1987). An interesting side note is the fact that the case is decided against a Janata 
government in Bihar while the Janata Party is still in power in Delhi. Mostly, public interest litigation 
cases during the 1980s constitute mainly regime support. The Janata government, however, was genuinely 
committed to a strong and independent Supreme Court, ’restored the rule of law and basic democratic 
freedoms through significant constitutional amendments, was “riding a human rights wave,” and the 
Janata Party, in power from 1977 to 1979, was politically weak’ (Ruparelia 2013, 24). Combining Epp’s 
view — the experience or authoritarian rule and Janata as backlash — and Ginsburg, weak politicians 
entrench judicial review as “insurance” — we can see that these models work well for specific cases. 
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Bhagwati also quoted American case law again in the SP Gupta case, 1982 (2) SCR 
365, when he said notions of standing had to be liberally construed to enable effective 
access to justice. The scope of judicial law making related not just to access but also to 
remedies, he said: 
It is a fascinating exercise for the Court to deal with public interest litigation because 
it is a new jurisprudence which the court is evolving, a jurisprudence which 
demands judicial statesmanship and high creative ability. The frontiers of public law 
are expanding far and wide and new concepts and doctrines which will change the 
complexion of the law and which were so far as embedded in the womb of the 
future, are beginning to be born. (par. 24) 
In Nilima Priyadarshini v State of Bihar 1987 Supp SCC732, a woman had been 
detained against her will. The Court took note of a letter to take action in this case, 
although a later investigation found the letter had not been written by her. Nevertheless, 
the court took cognisance of the letter and passed orders against wrongful 
imprisonment. This also shows that a cumbersome and outdated penal code might make 
the PIL route easier for litigants to pursue. 
In the 1997 Vineet Narain (1998 1 SCC 226) case, the court went into the question 
of how to ensure executive action and again had to come up with a creative solution. As 
C.J. Verma, who wrote the opinion, put it at the start of his order: 
The primary question was: Whether it is within the domain of judicial review and it 
could be an effective instrument for activating the investigative process which is 
under the control of executive? The focus was on the question, whether any judicial 
204
CHAPTER 7   ·   Rights Revolution
remedy is available in such a situation? However, as the case progressed, it required 
innovation of a procedure within the constitutional scheme of judicial review to 
permit intervention by the count to find a solution to the problem. This case has to 
develop a procedure within the discipline of law for the conduct of such a 
proceeding in similar situation. […] the procedure devised was to appoint the 
petitioners' counsel as the amicus curiae and to make such orders from time to time 
as were consistent with public interest. (par. 1) 
The Court in this case ensured that the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC),  which 
had been a paper tiger, was given teeth and was charged with monitoring and assessing 
the CBI.  The Court thus took matters into its own hands, issuing directions to the 7
extent that the other arms of government would not be informed even of the actions 
taken by the CBI. By now, continuing mandamus was taken as a settled method of 
keeping track of the enforcement of its orders. Such remedies and applications of almost 
dormant oversight mechanisms have helped the Court find solutions to problems by 
merely enforcing existing structures. 
All in all, PIL became a parallel governance system by lawyers and judges. The 
means of enforcement of these judgments has been public naming and shaming of 
governmental agencies and departments that do not follow court orders and, in many 
cases, the senior civil servant in charge of that department. The other mechanism is to 
hold these parties in contempt of court, inviting whatever legal consequences contempt 
might have. This means the courts do not merely rely on the normative and persuasive 
power of judicialisation but also can wield a stick to ensure enforcement.  
 The CVC was set up by the Government in February 1964 as a result of the recommendations of the 7
Committee on Prevention of Corruption, ‘to advise and guide Central Government agencies in the field of 
vigilance’; <cvc.gov.in/cvc_back.htm>; last accessed October 10, 2015). 
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[7.3] Justiciability: Horizontal and Vertical Judicialisation 
Public interest litigation thus expands judicialisation vertically, ensuring bottom-up 
access to the Supreme Court, as well as horizontally, as every issue becomes justiciable. 
Of particular interest in this respect, further challenging Epp, is a fresh quantitative 
approach to studying India’s rights revolution. Firstly, if we work with reported cases 
like Epp — but on the basis of the SCC electronic database — we observe a steady rise 
in the number of PIL cases reported (Figures 7.4 and 7.5), and, in contrast to Epp’s data, 
even an acceleration in PIL activity during the last ten years (Figure 7.5). 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judicial populism) or are win-win ones (judicial declarations on the need for better 
education, better food and cleaner air, which are hardly controversial).  8
Apart from the various types types of evidence in favour of a strong rights 
revolution and judicialised discourses that inspire all sorts of actors to bring their 
grievances and ideas to the attention of the judiciary, the most remarkable aspect in 
relation to letter petitions is that they constitute another judge-made revolution and have 
even led to the creation of a specific PIL cell within the Supreme Court. Letter petitions 
or episolatory jurisdiction in the court begun quite early, with letter petitions being 
accepted in the Hussainanara Khatoon case and the Sunil Batra case in 1979. Justice 
Krishna Iyer, mentioning the phenomenon in 1979 in the second Sunil Batra case while 
introducing the case facts, said: 
This, writ petition originated, epistolary fashion in a letter by a prisoner, Batra, to a 
Judge of this' Court (one of us), complaining of a brutal assault by a Head Warden 
on another prisoner, Prem Chand. Forms were forsaken since freedom was at stake 
and the letter was posted on the Bench to be metamorphosed into a habeas 
proceeding and was judicially navigated with electric creativity, thanks to the 
humanist scholarship of Dr. Y. S. Chitale as amicus Curiae and the erudite passion 
for affirmative court action of Shri Soli Sorabjee, the learned Solicitor General. 
Where the prison process is dehumanized, forensic help, undeflected by the negative 
crudities of the adversary system, makes us dare where we might have daunted. The 
finest hour of justice comes when court and counsel constructively collaborate to 
fashion a relief in the individual case and fathom deeper to cure the institutional 
pathology which breeds wrongs and defies rights. 
 On the other hand, there are also those cases in which the court cannot avoid to lose some judicial 8
political capital because some groups are bound to lose, for example, the height of the Narmada dam 
(somebody loses) or decriminalisation of LGBT communities leaves the court in the middle of divided 
opinion.
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Even cases of remarkable national and international importance can have their origin in 
a simple letter, such as in the Narmada case: 
In November, 1990 one Dr. B.D. Sharma wrote a letter to this Court for setting up of 
National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes including proper 
rehabilitation of oustees of Sardar Sarovar Dam. This letter was entertained and 
treated as a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution being Writ Petition No. 
1201 of 1990. (par. 32) 
The Court also took cognisance of a telegram sent to the house of a judge (Justice 
Kuldip Singh in the case of  Paramjit Kaur v State of Punjab (1996) 7 SCC 20, in a case 
that initially started out as a writ for habeas corpus with regard to a missing person but 
turned into an investigation of mass cremations in Punjab).  9
Questions in relations to organising the administration of PILs have been left 
untouched by the legislature. The Supreme Court has set out only administrative 
guidelines with regard to the types of and process for letters to be accepted as petitions. 
This was done in a December 1988 full court decision (on the Supreme Court’s 
administrative side), when guidelines were set out on the types of letters the court would 
accept as well as the procedure for bringing them to court. This was on the watch of 
chief Justice Bhagwati and nine other judges who signed the administrative order. The 
Registry was to accept PILs in 10 categories, which included bonded labour, neglected 
 The Court did not get involved in controversial questions of national security. Court files thus routinely 9
migrate back to the bottom of the pile — only with the distance of time were six officers were convicted 
in 2006 for the murder of the missing person and investigations were ordered by the Court. 
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children, minimum wage issues and jail issues unless they could be effectively dealt 
with by the concerned high court concerned. This also included allegations against jail 
authorities as well unless the allegations were serious or concerned with torture or 
custodial death. The letters were to be first screened by the PIL cell (created by the 
judges for this purpose), and only those that fell into the categories above would be 
dealt with by the court. Moreover, only the registrar, as opposed to any junior officer, 
was supposed to order which petitions were to be lodged.  
Another judicial coup d’état was the judicial self empowerment to bring cases to 
the court on suo motto basis. Suo motu cognisance of cases was another aspect of PIL 
that was introduced early on. The court used this to enquire into cases and also to 
involve institutions in cases before them even if they had not been made parties. In 
Vincent Panikurlangara v Union of India (1987) 2 SCC 165, the Supreme Court held 
that when statutory bodies were joined or called upon to  participate suo motu by the 
Supreme Court, they were bound to do so because of the public importance of PIL 
cases. It has taken suo motu cognisance in a variety of cases, but there does not seem to 
be any rule or underlying pattern for which cases they decide to take suo motu 
cognisance of and which cases they do not. 
As per the statutes, the Supreme Court can only take suo motu cognisance in 
matters of contempt of court, but the court has used the concept to look at issues it is 
made aware of. In one such case, a bench initiated suo motu proceedings when noting 
the large-scale destruction of property in agitations in Re: Destruction of Public and 
Private Properties v. State of A.P.  (2009) 5 SCC 212. In another case, Re Death of 25 
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chained inmates v Union of India (2002) 3 SCC 31, it was as a result of the publishing 
of newspaper articles:  
It is plenary power exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law to meet the 
demand of justice. Article 136 is a special jurisdiction. It is residuary power. It is 
extraordinary in its amplitude. The limits of Supreme Court when it chases injustice, 
is the sky itself. (PSR Sadanantham vs. Arunachalam (1980) 3 SCC 141, par. 403)  
In conclusion then, the story of PIL reminds us of the heresthetical manoeuvres we 
encountered in relation to the basic structure doctrine. It all began with cases which the 
government supported, such as the justiciability of the directive principles or the 
forceful implementation of the Bonded Labour Abolition Act, 1976. Judicial activism in 
the 1980s thus often provided regime support, and hardly any assertion was made 
against the core preferences of the Union government. Moreover, every time the 
Supreme Court supports a government cause, the new procedural rules become 
embedded more deeply and the rules of the game change. Establishing an inquisitorial-
style judicial intervention mechanism and de facto docket control, the Supreme Court 
today can pick and choose its PIL cases and successfully claims the power not to decide. 
By the 1990s, political parties no longer had the strength to build a majority to address 
PIL reforms, which would have provided a useful check on the power of the Court. As a 
next step, the judicial power expansion explored in Chapter Seven is examined in 
relation to the content of judicial policymaking in Chapter Eight and with special 
reference to political economy. The social revolution mandate of the Constitution 
provides a sturdy ideological backbone, not just in terms of the tools that the Supreme 
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Court can invent and use, but in terms of the substantive dimensions of judicial 
activism. For instance, the social revolution mandate is an essential element of one of 
the most important public interest litigation decisions, S.P. Gupta case, with Justice 
Bhagwati’s long and famous exposition on the question of locus standi and 
liberalisation of standing, setting the tone of judicial activism in India.  10
It is necessary for every Judge to remember constantly and continually that our 
Constitutional is not a non-aligned national charter. It is a document of social 
revolution which casts an obligation on every instrumentality including the 
judiciary, which is a separate but equal branch of the State, to transform the status 
quo ante into a new human order in which justice, social, economic and political will 
inform all institutions of national life and there will be equality of status and 
opportunity for all. The judiciary has therefore a socio-economic destination and a 
creative function. It has to use the words of Granville Austin, to become an arm of 
the socio-economic revolution and perform an active role calculated to bring social 
justice within the reach of the common man. It cannot remain content to act merely 
as an umpire but it must be functionally involved in the goal of socio-economic 
justice. The British concept of ‘justicing’, which to quote Justice Krishna Iyer 
(Mainstream, November 22, 1980), ‘is still hugged by the heirs of our colonial legal 
culture and shared by many on the Bench’ is that ‘the business of a Judge is to hold 
his tongue until the last possible moment and to try to be as wise as he is paid to 
look’. ( S.P Gupta vs. Union of India 1981 Supp SCC 87, par. 27) 
 Follows Fischer (2007).10
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Which Road to Social Revolution? 
Judges and the Political Economy
Abstract  This chapter explores the scope of economic policymaking 
by India’s Supreme Court, as well as new judicial functions in the 
context of India’s liberal economic reforms of the 1990s. While 
liberal economic policies and elite discourses emphasise the benefits 
of competition and free markets, the corresponding constitutional 
preferences remain embedded in legal provisions and traditions that 
favour a state controlled economy and heavy social engineering in 
the name of economic, political and social equality. The conflict 
between liberalisation, on the one hand, and established socialist 
constitutional practices, on the other, means that India’s Supreme 
Court judges take centre stage in the domain of the political 
economy, having the power to either stall or accelerate any reform 
processes by means of judicial review. This chapter illustrates how 
political parties and all their coalition constellations fall short of the 
numerical supermajorities necessary to amend the Constitution in 
line with a changing political economy. Moreover, the chapter’s 
analysis of disinvestment policies highlights the full extent of Indian 
coalition governments’ weaknesses as fragmentation and indecision 
spread to the realm of statutory law-making: even cabinet decision-
making remains blocked until the Supreme Court ‘extends its 
friendly hand’ (Whittington 2005) so that pro-disinvestment BJP 
ministers must eventually rely on the intervention of an allied court 
to implement their policy preferences against the opposition from 
coalition partners as well as from within their party. The chapter 
concludes by studying the wider impact of constant court 
interventions, namely the articulation of politics (who gets what, 
when and how) and policy preferences as judicialised rights 
discourses of constitutions across all spheres of governance.
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[1.1] Constitutional Ideologies, Elite Politics and Missing Supermajorities
As liberalisation and the global marketplace have become firmly established in the 
rhetoric and practice of elite politics (Varshney 1998), the political momentum for 
economic change has kept falling short of the numerical majorities to amend the 
Constitution. Consequently, there is a remarkable gap between economic policies and 
constitutional commitments, with the Indian constitutional status quo emerging as its 
own legal regime for economic governance. In contrast, fundamental transformations of 
the political economy usually go hand-in-hand with constitutional reform politics in 
other countries. For example, the fourth amendment to China’s constitution introduced 
protections for “inviolable” private property in 2004; throughout the 1990s, Eastern 
European countries entrenched property rights in new constitutions; and South Africa’s 
new constitution radically broke with the socialist policy preferences of the African 
National Congress, such as land reform and nationalisation, triggering an Africa-wide 
wave of constitutional reforms readjusting property rights (Wily and Mbaya 2001). The 
constitutionalisation of balanced budgets and debt ceilings in European countries 
(Adams et al. 2014) further demonstrates the presence of constitutional reform politics 
in other nations which, like India, are established constitutional democracies.  1
Given the absence of similar constitutional reform politics, India’s Supreme Court 
judges play a major role in the field of economic liberalisation, having the power to 
 The Appendix illustrates the absence of constitutional amendments that correspond to India’s liberal 1
economic reforms.
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either stall or accelerate the reform process by means of judicial review. Unrestrained by 
the political obstacles of electoral politics, the court has sketched a dialectical reform of 
the constitutional political economy, exercising judicial restraint as the means of 
production are freed from state control and endorsing judicial activism as the judges 
advocate the interweaving of the distribution and consumption of wealth with the goals 
of social revolution. Based on an analysis of judicial policymaking as well as 
constitutional reform debates, this chapter maintains that the Supreme Court, armed 
with the constitutional ideology of the social revolution, acts as a powerful veto player 
and agenda setter as India’s policies are shifting from ‘empirical gradualist’ (Morris-
Jones 1959, 415) socialism to empirical gradualist liberalisation and globalisation. 
Technical blueprints for engineering social and economic change from above have 
been common, and previous chapters have demonstrated the interdependence of 
political economy and constitutional legal developments, in particular in relation to 
land. India’s Constituent Assembly had colossal developmental and even greater 
redistributive ambitions at the end of the 1940s.  
Nehru’s state was a purposive state. It was unashamedly socialist even though while 
moving the Objectives Resolution before the Constituent Assembly, he was aware 
that the word ‘socialist’ was missing. But, socialism was not just a stated objective, 
it was the very essence of the task that India had embarked herself upon. Nehru’s 
socialism manifested itself in the very structure of the Constitution. Socialism was 
not a dream of the masses; but the responsibility of the state. (Dhavan 1992, 47—48) 
There was broad agreement that, unless the problems of poverty and inequality within 
society were addressed and solved ‘all our chapter constitutions will become useless 
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and purposeless’.  Throughout the first three decades of independence, political actors 2
then inserted their own socialist policy preferences within the constitutional text, 
culminating in the abolition of constitutional protection for the right to property; 
reciprocally, the Constitution further embedded ideologies of socialism and social 
revolution into the warp and weft of Indian politics. From the beginning, the 
Constitution was first and foremost a social document,  ‘[t]he majority of its provisions 
are directly aimed at furthering the goals of the social revolution’ (Austin 1966, 50); to 
date, constitutional text and constitutional practices continue to embody the ideal of 
inculcating economic, political and social equality in the politics of the subcontinent. 
In addition, the Constituent Assembly’s socialist visions of a new political 
economy also reflected the experience of imperialism, which the key policymakers had 
come to view much more in terms of the imperatives of capitalist production than as an 
ideology of civilisational or racial domination. ‘It would therefore be foolish to 
conceive of Indian independence merely as a political condition [...]. Political 
independence  would  not  remove  India’s  vulnerability  to  economic 
imperialism’ (Khilnani 1998, 71—72). In short, and at the most basic level, the 
Constituent Assembly carved ‘democratic socialism’ (Dhavan 1992, 48) into the 
fundamental structures of the ‘constitutional political economy’ (Elster 1994) in order to 
give effect to the social revolution mandate and to respond to the apprehension of the 
vulnerability of India’s economic interests in an open international economy. 
In a nutshell, and in contrast to today, the constitutional political economy at 
independence was attuned to the emerging model of economic development — and 
 Jawaharlal Nehru, CAD, Volume II, 317 (January 22, 1947); Rothermund (1966).2
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whenever there was a need for further fine-tuning or for overriding judicial decisions, an 
easy amendment procedure kept a sovereign parliament in control as policymakers 
blended a mixed economy with centralised planning (see Appendix as well as Figure 5.3 
for Congress’ absolute amendment power). The state-directed regulatory schemes 
sheltered as well as controlled the private sector, and India’s government-owned public 
sector unequivocally dominated key industries. Notwithstanding the intermittent shifts 
in emphasis, the vital structures of these policy fundamentals were not subjected to 
significant changes until the early 1990s. Four decades of planning, however, have not 
delivered the promised social revolution.  
Poverty in the country-side and the city continues to destroy the lives of hundreds of 
millions. And, as the example of the East Asian economies has dazzled the world, 
the dusty failures of the Indian state to devise anything like an effective policy of 
trade — fundamental to the raison d’état of any modern state — appear increasingly 
inexcusable. Gandhians and socialists, environmentalists and free-market liberals all 
agree that something has gone wrong. (Khilnani 1998, 62)  
It is difficult, though, to evaluate what has gone wrong and what or who is to blame. 
Economists inevitably differ in their judgments, each of them drawing on convoluted, 
often counterfactual, technical details, differing in their emphasis on domestic or 
international contexts. India’s project of development is further complicated by the 
country’s robust democratic politics, in which ideological designs as well as practical 
economic policies often do not withstand the pressures and claims of voters. Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, for instance, found himself with a strong parliamentary majority, 
yet unable to sustain his efforts to “modernise” the Indian economy during the second 
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half of the 1980s (Jenkins 1999). Nevertheless, he had put liberalisation on the political 
agenda before increasing domestic deficits and a severe foreign-exchange crisis brought 
India’s economy to the brink of bankruptcy and collapse soon after the end of the Cold 
War. In response to this crisis, the country embarked upon a reform process that gave a 
fresh and strong emphasis to liberalisation, deregulation and globalisation. Today, there 
is little doubt about India’s status as a potent emerging market and by the mid-1990s, 
the Economist had already much admired the reforms as ‘nothing less than a repudiation 
of India’s distinctive approach to development — a repudiation, that is, of Nehru’s 
vision of socialist self-reliance’ (Corbridge and Harriss 2000, 157). 
 At the same time, the preamble of the Constitution still venerates the Indian 
polity as a ‘sovereign socialist secular democratic republic’. 
WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a 
SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to 
all its citizens: 
JUSTICE, social, economic and political; 
LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; 
EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; 
and to promote among them all 
FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the integrity of the Nation; 
IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, 
do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS 
CONSTITUTION.  3
  Preamble; words in italics were inserted by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976.3
220
CHAPTER 8  ·   Judges and the Political Economy
Similarly, the Ninth Schedule, added by the Constitution (1st Amendment) Act, 1951, 
which provides a safe haven from judicial review for the land reform legislation by 
India’s States, irrespective of inconsistency with fundamental rights, remains in effect, 
and so do the constitutional amendments that have transformed the fundamental right to 
‘acquire, hold and dispose property’  into a much weaker, only statutory, right to 4
property.  In 1983, five years after the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, Justice Chinnappa 5
Reddy summed up the relationship between the social revolution and the right to 
property, holding that ‘[t]he fundamental right to property has been abolished because 
of its incompatibility with the goals of justice, social, economic and political and 
equality of status and of opportunity and with the establishment of a socialist 
democratic republic, as contemplated by the Constitution’.  The judges have not 6
changed their mind so far,  and it is often forgotten that India is embracing the 7
principles of a market economy without any formal constitutional guarantees of the 
right to property and without constitutional protection from arbitrary expropriation. 
While the transformation of property regimes has been seen as a key constitutional 
challenge in post-socialist Eastern Europe (Stark and Bruszt 1998) as well as China (Oi 
and Walder 1999), India’s economic reforms, in contrast, unfold in the context of 
 Article 19(1)(f) in the ‘original’ unamended constitutional text.4
 Article 300-A: ‘No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law’, inserted by the 5
Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978; Article 300-A not only lacks the status of a fundamental right 
but also rules out constitutional judicial review with respect to questions of just and equitable 
compensation.
 State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale AIR 1983 SC 803 (par. 2).6
 See, for instance, Dharam Dutt v. Union of India (2004) 1 SCC 712: ‘the right to property had ceased to 7
be a fundamental right and the newly engrafted Article 300A of the Constitution requires only authority of 
law for depriving any person or his property’ (par. 68).
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insecure and ill-defined property rights, thus, simply ignoring the most fundamental 
benchmark of liberal constitutionalism (Fitzpatrick 2006). Needless to say, the absence 
of formal constitutional guarantees of the right to property has neither stopped the flow 
of foreign direct investment nor the growth of the economy — in fact, the ease of the 
process of acquisition of land by the state often lays the ground for the speedy 
development of industrial areas and infrastructure. For instance, Bangalore’s world 
famous IT corridor and software technology parks could not have been built without the 
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966, which allowed for the acquisition 
of agricultural lands without paying much compensation or having concern for the 
needs and rights of the affected rural communities.  It is a tragic irony that the abolition 8
of property rights during the heyday of the socialist state and in the name of social 
justice has left many marginalised people unprotected — subjected first to the needs of 
a self-serving and self-justifying socialist state and, today also, to the demands of 
private economic power. What is more, the question of property rights is a stark 
reminder of the complexity of the social revolution and the ideological nature of 
constitutional adjudication (Kennedy 1997). Some authors equate constitutional law 
with repression or view the Supreme Court as a forum that tends to reinforce the 
prevailing hegemony (e.g. Bhushan 2004). Others see India’s constitutional system as 
 Since 1966, the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act has enabled the state to acquire nearly 8
57,000 acres of land all over Karnataka. A report on the impact of this Act and a summary of some 
ongoing cases in various courts of Bangalore has been published by the Alternative Law Forum in 
Bangalore; see Of Master Plans and Illegalities in an Era of Transition, available at: 
<www.altlawforum.org>. In general, without constitutional guarantees of the right to property, the courts 
seem unable to protect individual plaintiffs from unjustified expropriation or low compensation 
payments; see, for instance, Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. (1996) 2 SCC 549; New Reviera Coop. 
Housing Society v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (1996) 1 SCC 731; Butu Prasad Kumbhar v. Steel 
Authority of India (1995) Supp (2) SCC 225; Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat 1995 (1) SCC 
596.
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inherently beneficial and continue to hold the Indian Supreme Court in high esteem: ‘on 
a comparative basis, it may be true to say that no apex court in any democratic country 
has shown as much dynamism, humanism, creativity, and empathy with the cause of the 
poor and the downtrodden as the Supreme Court of India has done’ (Jain 2000, 99).  
The perseverance of the constitutional ideology of the social revolution, thus, 
remains the paramount constitutional paradigm. Expectations that liberal economic 
reforms might challenge the “socialist consensus” have so far remained unfulfilled and 
the social revolution laid out by the Constitution continues as market-oriented economic 
policies are introduced and consolidated.  
[8.2] Disinvestment: Judicial Policy Support for Weak Political Elites 
The widening gap between constitutional semantics and the new economic policies 
undermines the coherence of the constitutional structure; interestingly, though, there 
seem to be no efforts being made to synchronise constitutional reforms and new 
economic policies — on the contrary, face-to-face with markets and competition, the 
constitutional reform suggestions of political parties simply aim at continuity and 
satisfying the popular call for further extensions of social, economic rights — further 
stressing the social revolution’s imperativeness. This section illustrates that the political 
forces favouring basic changes in India’s economic policies have not been able to 
translate the momentum for economic reforms into a constitutional discourse, meaning 
the political consensus necessary for constitutional amendments has not been achieved. 
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Consequently, as the supermajorities required for amending the Constitution’s political 
economy seem to be out of reach of coalition governments and their fragile political 
alliances, one cannot remain blind to the policymaking potential of the judges. A 
powerful, active judiciary, armed with a constitutional text that is thoroughly committed 
to social revolution, hangs over economic reformers like a sword of Damocles — or in 
the case of disinvestment, the judges extend a friendly hand and provide policy support 
for reformers.  
 In 1996 the Common Minimum Programme budget speech announced the 
establishment of the disinvestment commission. A Department of Disinvestment was 
created for the purpose on 10 December 1999, and on 6 September 2001, it became the 
Ministry of Disinvestment. Its mandate included disinvestment as well as restructuring, 
and it aimed to bring about greater transparency in central public sector enterprises and 
improvements to corporate governance. But the idea of disinvestment met with a high 
degree of resistance, as ministers did not want to give up control of the public sector 
units under their charge. Although disinvestment was a process that began in 1991-92, 
by 2000 only two PSUs were loss-making enterprises at the time of their sale (according 
to the government website on disinvestment). The minister in charge of disinvestment 
was Arun Shourie. He soon started giving public interviews about his frustration with 
the process as various members within and outside the government wanted to delay or 
stop the process of disinvestment. 
Though the Government has already agreed in principle to disinvest all non-strategic 
PSUs, there is still strong opposition. For instance, all 48 PSUs under the Heavy 
Industries Ministry are non-strategic and should, ideally, be privatised. But Heavy 
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Industries Minister Manohar Joshi is against disinvestment of five PSUs (see The 
Last Emperor). There are other ministers, not as vocal as Joshi, but equally opposed 
to privatisation of PSUs under their control. (India Today, August 27, 2001) 
In 1996, the Ministry of Industry constituted a commission, the Public Sector 
Disinvestment Commission, for a period of three years under G.V. Ramakrishna. The 
term was extended at the end of this period for another three months. Thereafter, a Dr R. 
H. Patil headed the commission or two years from 2000 to 2001. Together the 
commissions submitted 20 reports of over 95 cases. Under the terms of reference, the 
Commission had to advise the government on disinvestment of CPSEs, or what the 
website calls ‘strategic sales’. The government classified PSUs according to strategic 
and non-strategic areas and arms ammunition and defence, atomic energy except for 
agriculture medicine and non-strategic industries, power and railway transport. All other 
industries were non-strategic and the government sought to reduce its stake in these 
areas from 51% to 26%, and even below that level. The commission resigned in 2004 
when the PA government was formed. 
The ministry’s website documents that the Ministry of Disinvestment:  
[H]ad communicated to the Commission on 23 January 2002 that all Non-Strategic 
PSEs including subsidiaries but excluding IOC, ONGC and GAIL stand referred to 
the Commission for it to prioritise, examine and make recommendations in the light 
of the existing Government policies as articulated on 16 March 1999 and the Budget 
speeches of Finance Minister from time to time.  9
 <www.divest.nic.in/discommission.asp>; last accessed, September 15, 2015.9
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It was against this background that the case of disinvestment in the two oil companies 
came before the Supreme Court. This resulted in what the Bombay Stock Exchange 
website describes as:  
2004-05-2008-09: The issue of PSU disinvestment remained a contentious issue 
through this period. As a result, the disinvestment agenda stagnated during this 
period. In the 5 years from 2003-04 to 2008-09, the total receipts from 
disinvestments were only Rs. 8515.93 crore.  
2009-10-2013-14: A stable government and improved stock market conditions 
initially led to a renewed thrust on disinvestments. The Government started the 
process by selling minority stakes in listed and unlisted (profit-making) PSUs. This 
period saw disinvestments in companies such as NHPC Ltd., Oil India Ltd., NTPC 
Ltd.  10
Bharat Petroleum and Hindustan Petroleum were only two of five companies that came 
under the lens of disinvestment. This was traditionally a very lucrative and powerful 
ministry and the loss of these public companies meant that the value of the ministry’s 
portfolio would diminish. A public interest litigation case was brought to the court in 
2000. 
The philosophy behind disinvestment was to sell companies when they were in 
their prime to enable the government to achieve a maximum gain from the sale. It was 
part of a concentrated move begun in the early 1990s under the Congress-led 
government — thus there actually is support across party lines — to move away from 
government owned companies. 
 <www.bsepsu.com/historical-disinvestment.asp>; last accessed, September 15, 2015.10
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The Public Interest Litigation was brought to the Supreme Court by the Centre for 
Public Interest Litigation, and the order was passed on 16 September 2003 by a two-
judge bench comprising S. Rajendra Babu and G.P. Mathur. The question was whether 
majority shares in HPCL and BPCL could be sold to private parties:  
[W]without Parliamentary approval or sanction as being contrary to and violative of 
the provisions of the ESSO (Acquisition of Undertaking in India) Act, 1974, the 
Burma Shell (Acquisition of Undertaking in India) Act, 1976 and Caltex (Acquisition 
of Shares of Caltex Oil Refining India Limited and all the Undertakings in India for 
Caltex India Limited) Act, 1977.  
The court held that the wording of the Act required that the statutes had to be amended 
suitably before the disinvestment could continue. They added that this was the reason 
the Maruti Udyog disinvestment action had not been challenged and that it was on a 
different footing compared to the present case, even though Maruti Udyog was also 
acquired under an Act. They reiterated that there was no challenge to the disinvestment 
policy of the government. The court confined itself to ruling only on companies 
governed by acts and ensuring the judgment did not stand in the way of the 
disinvestment policy in general.  
The judgment in itself does not adequately reflect the high drama that surrounded 
it, especially the conflict within the Cabinet. The Minister for Petroleum, Ram Naik, 
was against disinvestment: 
The battle between the Petroleum and Disinvestment Ministries over privatisation of 
two oil companies will now take place another day but both are geared for war. The 
Ministries have marshalled their arguments and are all set to take up the cudgels for 
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and against disinvestment of the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) 
and the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) as soon as the Attorney-
General gives his advice on the legal issues. Informed sources here say that it was 
the Petroleum Minister, Ram Naik's intervention that led to the deferring of the 
decision by the Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment on Friday night. He apparently 
pointed out that it would not be correct to go ahead with any decision on this issue 
till the Attorney-General's views were known since a commitment had been made to 
Parliament. The sources say that the Disinvestment Minister, Arun Shourie, on the 
other hand, was keen on taking a view on the HPCL privatisation, especially since it 
had been delayed by three months since the last CCD meeting on September 7. Mr. 
Naik’s arguments, however, held sway as the Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, 
felt the need to maintain propriety in terms of commitments made to Parliament. 
Ultimately, after some discussion, it is believed that the Prime Minister, Atal Behari 
Vajpayee, concurred with these views and a decision was taken to defer all 
discussion on HPCL and BPCL.  11
 Ultimately, the lack of consensus within the BJP, within the coalition and even within 
the Cabinet meant that the two companies could not be sold. This was ultimately a 
pyrrhic victory for the petitioners of this PIL and those opposed to disinvestment as a 
bigger company, Indian OIL Corporation, which had been designated one of the 
government’s Navratna companies (an accolade for central public sector enterprises that 
performed particularly well) was then sold to meet disinvestment targets. Although the 
Supreme Court decision did create a pause, the judges had not really opposed the policy 
of disinvestment, and their decision circumvented any future opposition to 
disinvestment by clearly stating that the move was not disallowed by any provision of 
the Constitution.  
 <www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2002/12/29/stories/2002122904391000.htm>; last accessed, September 11
15, 2015.
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[8.3] 	 Social and Economic Rights: Judicial Policy Support and Agenda 
	 	 SeFing for Politics from Below 
Disenchantment with India’s mixed economy and economic planning has spread to the 
Supreme Court too, with the result that the judges have often thrown their weight 
behind economic reforms. Yet judicial policy preferences may still come to haunt the 
liberalisation process. In this respect, the main arguments advanced here concern the 
distinction drawn by Ashutosh Varshney (1999) between elite and mass politics in the 
process of economic liberalisation: ‘Elite concerns — investment tax breaks, stock 
market regulations, custom duties on imported cars — do not necessarily filter down to 
mass politics’ (Varshney 1999, 223). They also do not impinge very much on the social 
revolution as not many people are affected by them in a direct or obvious manner. On 
the other hand, if India’s economic reforms — privatisation of the public sector, 
restructuration of labour laws, agricultural reforms and the reduction of fiscal deficits to 
low levels (Varshney 1999, 225) — shift further towards the terrain of mass politics, the 
judges will have to make much harder choices and find it more difficult to reconcile 
liberalisation and the social revolution. Thus, the first central contestation of this 
Chapter is that the Supreme Court, a key actor within the institutional matrix of 
economic reforms, functions as a powerful — yet often ignored — policymaker 
whenever liberal reforms conflict with the goals of the social revolution. In the words of 
Justice Banerjee: 
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There cannot possibly be any doubt that the socialistic concept of the society as laid 
down in Part III and IV of the Constitution ought to be implemented in the true spirit 
of the Constitution. Decisions are there of this Court galore wherein this Court on 
more occasions than one stated that democratic socialism aims to end poverty, 
ignorance, disease and inequality of opportunity.  12
As a matter of fact this Court has been candid enough on more occasions than one 
and rather, frequently to note that socialism ought not to be treated as a mere concept 
or an ideal, but the same ought to be practised in every sphere of life and be treated 
by the law courts as a constitutional mandate since the law courts exists for the 
society and required to act as a guardian-angel of the society. As a matter of fact the 
socialistic concept of society is very well laid in Part III and Part IV of the 
Constitution and the Constitution being supreme, it is a bounden duty of the law 
courts to give shape and offer reality to such a concept. [...] The primary impact of 
socialism as a matter of fact is to offer and provide security of life so that the 
citizens of the country may have two square meals a day, and maintenance of a 
minimum standard of life, it is expected, would lead to the abridgment of the gap 
between the have-s and have not-s. The feudal exploitation and draconian concept of 
law ought not to outweigh the basis structure of the Constitution, or its socialistic 
status. Ours is a socialist State as the Preamble depicts and the aim of socialism, 
therefore, ought to be to distribute the common richness and the wealth of the 
country in such a way so as to sub-serve the need and the requirement of the 
common man. [...] Raw societal realities, not fine-spun legal niceties, not 
competitive market economics but complex protective principles, shape the law 
when the weaker, working class sector needs succour for livelihood through 
labour.   13
 G.B. Pant University of Agriculture & Technology v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2000 SC 2695 (par. 3); 12
the case relates to a labour dispute, decided in favour of the regularisation of contract workers as full 
employees.
 Secretary, H.S.E.B. v. Suresh AIR 1999 SC 1160 (par. 1-3 and par. 7); this case too concerns 13
regularisation of contract workers as full employees.
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The practical significance of these judgements should not be overestimated, as the 
organised sector of India’s labour market, i.e. the government administration at the 
central, state and local level, as well as public and registered private firms, employ only 
about 8.5 per cent of the country’s labour force of about 350 million people (Zagha 
1999, 161). Yet, the ideological content of the Supreme Court’s decisions, as spelled out 
by Justice Banerjee, are a cornerstone of India’s political economy, since the broad 
consensus on a socialist framework has been central and instrumental to the emergence 
of the state’s capacity to act as a third actor: ‘The state as a third actor began its 
autonomous career in independent India as a creature of Nehruvian socialism’ (Rudolph 
and Rudolph 1987, 62). As a result of the 42nd Amendment, which introduced the word 
socialism in the Preamble of the Constitution, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the laws on the nationalisation of private property, introduced a 
fundamental right to ‘equal pay for equal work’, struck down the Central Civil Services 
(Pension) Rules, 1972, as they had failed to achieve the establishment of a welfare 
society, regularised casual workers with parity in pay with regular workers and seeks to 
reduce inequalities in income. As well as this, the Supreme Court has exercised judicial 
restraint as Parliament has passed dozens of fresh amendment acts and more than tripled 
the number of acts placed under the Ninth Schedule. 
The perseverance of the social revolution’s constitutional ideology, thus, is the 
second important concern of the arguments presented here, as the constitutional text 
continues to sanction a command polity model, imagining the state as ‘sovereign — 
differentiated, autonomous, and authoritative’ (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 14). 
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Step by step, the Supreme Court has thus emerged as a crucial and powerful agenda 
setter, defining specific indicators of development as non-negotiable cornerstones of 
economic policies. For instance, the court established the right to education in the 
Mohini Jain case, reiterating this position in the Unnikrishnan case (the vast majority of 
right to education cases dealt with higher education but resulted in a lot of attention on 
primary education in the country in the long run).  
The evolution of the right to education began with the case of Mohini Jain v State of 
Karnataka, which ostensibly dealt with the payment of extra sums of money known as 
capitation fees to colleges to admit students. But the court observed that fees put 
education out of reach for many in the country. It came to this conclusion because it said 
the capitation fees showed a clear class bias, where the rich could access education 
when the poor could not. The order prefaces its directions against fees with the 
following comment: 
The preamble promises to secure justice ‘social, economic and political’ for the 
citizen. A peculiar feature of the Constitution is that it combines social and economic 
rights along with political and justiciable legal rights. The preamble embodies the 
goal which the State has to achieve in order to implement social justice and to help 
make the masses free. The securing of social justice has been specifically enjoined 
as an object of the State under Article 38 of the Constitution. Can the objective 
which has been so prominently pronounced in the preamble and in Article 38 be 
achieved without providing education to the large majority of citizens who are 
illiterate?  14
 Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka 1992 AIR 1858.14
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This judgement was reconsidered in the case of Unni Krishnan v State of Andhra 
Pradesh 1993 1 SCC 6, where the majority of three judges held that education was a 
fundamental right but toned down the effect of the earlier judgment by stating that 
though education up to the age of 14 was a fundamental right, thereafter free education 
would be available based on the economic capacity of the state. But the TMA 
Pai case AIR 2003 SC 355 a few years later overruled most of the Unnikrishnan case. 
— adding to the confusion. 
The results of the earlier cases were huge financial losses, the inability to fund the 
running of educational institutions and empty seats, and both private institutions and 
government institutions were finding it difficult to function.  
The Justice B.N. Kirpal’s majority judgment sought to remedy the Unnikrishnan 
decision in the 11-judge TMA Pai case (2002). As can be seen, the judgements of the 
Kirpal era (including the Narmada case outlined in the earlier chapter) the Supreme 
Court sought to balance economic necessity with social justice requirements, but not 
always very successfully. This judgment introduced quotas — seats that would be 
reserved for poor students even in unaided institutions but where the institutions could 
decide how to administer this, aided institutions would have to reserve seats and 
government-run institutions would have to accommodate the maximum number of 
students for free though all of them could follow the merit system in their institutions 
within the quotas.   15
Crucial for our analysis is the agenda setting role of the Indian Supreme Court. 
The Unni Krishnan case and the focus it gave to third-party organisations and activists 
 This is what Dhavan termed half-baked capitalism as the money to support the ruling was not allocated.15
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as well as individuals trying to obtain admission in schools in urban areas resulted in an 
amendment to the Constitution and the insertion of a new Art. 21A guaranteeing the 
right to primary education for children from the ages of 6 to 14 as a fundamental right 
(86th Amendment Act, 2002; Sripati and Thiruvengadam, 20014). As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the Supreme Court has emerged as the key player in the realm of 
constitutional change: Step one, the judicial innovation judicialises education policies as 
rights discourse; step two, the Supreme Court recognises a fundamental right to 
education via Art. 21 and thus de facto and de jure brings about constitutional change; 
step three, the other branches implement the agenda outlined by the Supreme Court, 
firstly through constitutional amendment, secondly through the Right of Children to 
Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009. In a nutshell, judicial power here has shifted 
completely from the realm “making other actors do something against their will” 
towards the realm of influence, shaping the preferences of other actors through non-
coercive judicialisation of political discourses.  
[8.4] The Stickiness of Judicialisation 
This chapter demonstrated how the ideological fundamentals of the constitutional 
ideology have remained untouched as liberalisation has changed India’s political 
economy. Public interest litigation revolutionised access to justice in India, and the 
democratisation of the judicial process has led to an extraordinary extension of social, 
political and economic rights to marginalised sections of Indian society — while much 
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of the rest of the world implemented the World Bank’s Washington consensus. In other 
words, as economic planning and socialist modes of production have been reformed or 
abandoned in line with competitive market policies, the Supreme Court judges have 
pursued the social revolution in the context of distributive justice and a judicialised 
rights discourse. Consequently, the central contestation of this chapter emphasises the 
role of judicialisation in channelling the structural changes of liberalisation and 
globalisation. India has escaped the global discourse of statelessness as the norms and 
values and the ideologies and principles enshrined in the Indian Constitution argue the 
case for a higher level of stateness in order to control and transform the political effects 
of new economic policies as well as transnational production-consumption networks. 
For better or worse, the Supreme Court judges and India’s constitutional discourse 
refuse to go along with global ideological hegemonies. Today, the ‘untrammelled 
hegemony of Anglo-American ideological premise’ (Evans 1997, 64) is one of the most 
salient forces shaping the specific character of the current global economy, including the 
extent to which globalisation is viewed as entailing the eclipsing of state control. India’s 
resistance to the unimaginative visions of statelessness underline the institutional 
centrality of the state and the importance of diverging ideologies. The Constitution, the 
constitutional court and the constitutional discourse, as well as constitutional reform 
debates, are crucial determinants of how India has tried to find its own version of a 
liberal economy embedded in a social revolution. ‘[T]he Indian Constitution is a 
National Charter pregnant with social revolution, not a legal parchment barren of 
militant value to usher in a democratic, secular, socialist society which belongs equally 
to the masses including the harijan-girijan millions hungering for a humane deal after 
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feudal-colonial history’s long night’.  As India’s liberalisation movement has 16
fundamentally altered its economic and development strategies, elements of state 
autonomy might have ‘leaked away, upwards, sidewards, and downwards’ (Strange 
1995), yet, they never just evaporated. As seen through the eyes of India’s Supreme 
Court judges, an eclipse of the state is not in sight as the constitutional commitments to 
the social revolution have not been abandoned and the new political economy is being 
sustained with the promise of state-administered social and economic justice. 
The full extent of judicialisation — the prevalence of rights discourses and framing 
of political debates through constitutional text— has been brought to the forefront by 
the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC), which 
submitted its Final Report in spring 2002. The fierce opposition to the Commission and 
the political posturing at the time of its establishment undermined the exercise of 
reviewing India’s constitutional experience after 50 years. Nevertheless, the Final 
Report, as was submitted to the government, spells out central policy preferences in the 
field of constitutional reform. As well as this, the NCRWC’s suggestions are 
surprisingly similar to the general debates in India’s law journals. As a result, the final 
report mirrors many of the dominant ideological themes of the established constitutional 
rights discourse, with a strong emphasis being placed on social and economic rights.  17
 Justice Krishna Iyer, Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India AIR 1981 16
SC 298 (par. 11).
 The absence of any suggestions to constitutionalise certain aspects of economic reforms or to re-17
introduce a fundamental right to property supports the contestations advanced in this chapter. Even the 
former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, a key initiator and staunch defender of the Review 
Commission, did not talk about the need for inserting liberal economic policies in the constitutional text 
but rather warned of ‘an open-door policy’ and affirmed the relevance of protecting small and cottage 
industries to increase employment as well as greater state investments in the agricultural sector. Vajpayee 
also gave the Commission a specific task: ‘The country is also faced with a pressing challenge to quickly 
remove regional and social imbalances by reorienting the development process to benefit the poorest and 
the weakest.’
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 Otherwise, it is further promoting the enhancement of welfare rights: ‘A new 
article, say article 21-C, may be added to make it obligatory on the state to bring 
suitable legislation for ensuring the right to rural wage employment for a minimum of 
eighty days in a year’.  The role of the judiciary in the integration of directive 18
principles of state policy and fundamental rights has been commended by the NCRWC, 
which calls this process ‘constitutionalising’ social and economic rights. Yet, in the eyes 
of the Commission, this process has not been adequate for fulfilling the goals of the 
founding fathers.  These points have been repeatedly stressed in the report, showing the 
inescapable nature of the social, economic and rights-oriented concerns of the 
Commission and the view that only a high level of stateness can achieve such ends. In 
this context, the right to food, the right to livelihood and right to work are a higher 
priority than mere economic growth as measured by a rise in national income. In search 
of the right parameters of development and having eschewed models from developed 
nations, the commission has tried to carve out India’s place through an inventive 
argument, which states that these justiciable rights cannot be spoken of without 
providing and ensuring employment — which goal thus becomes the ground for both 
social and economic policies.  
 The role of judicialisation in this picture is important to point out, as in all these 
scenarios, state control or regulation or sensitisation are key concepts stressing the need 
for further laws, orders and administrative bodies to deal with and solve the socio-
economic crisis. Not only does the Commission suggest increasing the ambit of the 
State, it also recommends public good duties to be enjoined in private organisations, 
 NCRWC (1) 91, par. 3.13.2. 18
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thus enforcing a more strident socialism in the voice of the Constitution. Under the 
heading ‘Social obligations of the private sector’, the report states that since ‘investment 
in the private sector is largely from and by public bodies (Government bodies and 
Banks which handled Public Finds) the private sector too has social responsibilities to 
perform’ (ibid. 82). The NCRWC’s recommendation that under Article 51 A of the 
Constitution, it should be the duty of industrial organisations to provide education to the 
children of their employees is one case in point. Even more interesting is the 
Commission’s recommendation with respect to disinvestments:  
The Commission recommends that it should be mandatorily stipulated in the 
Memoranda of Understanding of privatisation or dis-investment of public sector 
undertakings that the policy of reservation in favour of SCs, STs and OBCs shall be 
continued even after privatisation or disinvestment in the same form as it exists in 
the government, and this should be incorporated in the respective statutes of 
reservation. As a measure of social integration, there should be a half per cent 
reservation for children who have one parent SC/ST and the other parent in non-SC/
ST, and this reservation should be termed as reservation for the Casteless. (ibid. 117) 
Concepts that have till now been confined to the realm of the government and public 
institutions have been judicialised as rights and constitutional entitlements. 
  
Decolonisation of our jurisprudence, heavily soaked in Anglo-American legal 
literature, is a desideratum if the wretched millions of the Indian earth are to enjoy 
distributive justice and share in the work, wealth and happiness of Bharat. 
Regrettable but true, the socialist structure of our constitutional order — a basic 
feature, as ruled by the Supreme Court in the past — is being subverted by a coup 
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engineered by Fund-Bank pressure and M.N.C. infiltration into Indian economic 
space, making swadeshi (Gandhi), self-reliance (Nehru) and democratic economic 
sovereignty (Constitution) mere abracadabra. The judicature, with power to strike 
down contra-constitutional manoeuvres, has specifically held in Nakara Case plus 
that socialist factors are basic features and inviolable. We thus face a juris-crisis and 
the Court must act. Which way? It is anybody’s guess. Will it be the Waterloo of the 
Preamble, Parts III, IV and IVA, as interpreted by the Apex Court? (Iyer 1997, 172) 
It may be difficult to uphold judicial restraint as liberalisation shifts towards mass 
politics and the court has to decide in matters relating to labour laws or subsidies. An 
interesting case to assess the direction of judicial preferences is Dalmia Cement v. 
Union of India, which upheld the Jute Packaging Material (Compulsory Use in Packing 
Commodities) Act, 1987, although the judges had to admit that the requirement by law 
to use jute bags as packaging had extremely negative effects on the industries 
concerned. However, the judges put the welfare of agriculture first: 
 Article 38 of the Constitution enjoins the state to strive to promote the welfare of 
the people by securing and protecting, as effectively as it may, the social order in 
which justice — social, economic and political — informs all the institutions of the 
national life striving to minimise inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate 
inequalities in the status, facilities and opportunities of individuals and groups of 
people residing in different areas or engaged in different vocations. As stated earlier, 
agriculture is the mainstay of the rural economy and agriculture, therefore, is an 
industry. For the tiller of the soil, his livelihood depends on the production and 
return of the agricultural produce and sustained agro-economic growth. The climatic 
conditions throughout India are not uniform. They vary from tropical to moderate 
conditions. Tillers of the soil being an unorganised sector, their voice is scarcely 
239
CHAPTER 8  ·   Judges and the Political Economy
heard and is not even remotely voiced in these cases. Their fundamental right to 
cultivation is as a part of their right to a livelihood. It is a bastion of economic and 
social justice envisaged in the preamble and in Article 38 of the Constitution. As 
stated earlier, the rights, liberties and privileges assured for every citizen are linked 
with corresponding concepts of duty, public order and morality. Therefore, the jural 
postulates form the foundation for the functioning of a just society. The fundamental 
rights ensured in Part III are, therefore, made subject to restrictions, that is, public 
purpose in Part IV Directives, public interest or public order in the interest of the 
public. In enlivening the fundamental rights and the public purpose in the directives, 
Parliament is the best judge for deciding what is good for the community, by whose 
suffrage it comes into existence and the majority political party assumes governance 
of the country. The directive principles form the fundamentals of their manifestos. 
Any digression is unconstitutional. The Constitution enjoins upon the executive, 
legislature and judiciary to balance the competing and conflicting claims involved in 
a dispute so as to harmonise the competing claims to establish an egalitarian social 
order. It is a settled law that the fundamental rights and the directive principles are 
the two wheels of the chariot: no one of the two is less important than the other. 
Break one and the other will lose its efficacy. Together, they constitute the 
conscience of the Constitution for bringing about social revolution under the rule of 
law. [(1996) 10 SCC 104, par. 21] 
From this perspective, let us consider the constitutionality of the provisions of the 
Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons and the preamble of the act indicate that 
it intends to provide a livelihood to nearly four million rural agricultural families 
and 2.5 lakh industrial workers. The ancient agri-based jute industry occupied a 
significant position in the national economy, in particular in the economy of the 
north-eastern region of the country. It is an agri-based and labour-intensive industry. 
It is also an export-oriented one, and its raw material is based entirely on indigenous 
jute produced by the agricultural families. Parliament avowedly intends to protect 
the interests of the persons involved in jute production: the jute industry, therefore, 
requires protection. (ibid., par. 50) 
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 The Supreme Court seems to follow a twofold strategy: the social revolution is 
defended as the judges identify new groups as beneficiaries of state actions and create 
new patterns of distribution as well as rights that can be claimed against the state (e.g. 
the Supreme Court has also entrenched a right to work via Art. 21). Similar 
developments can be observed with respect to the right to food, which the judges 
deduce from the context of the right to life, Art. 21. To sum up, the judges seem to be 
content to apply a wider definition of socialism that is at ease with the market economy 
as long as the state is capable of controlling the material resources produced and as long 
as wealth is distributed to best serve the social revolution. 
The chapter’s analysis of the impact of judicialisation, in combination with a stalled 
amendment process, illustrates the ordering and re-ordering of constitutional priorities 
as India transforms its economy. To sum up, the evidence that we can extract from cases 
and judicialised rights discourses points to a vision of a high level of stateness, even 
after liberalisation. Today’s constitutional framework does not really provide for an 
ideological shift from 60 years ago. The state is viewed as responsible for the same 
functions — yet, it is accepted that the Indian state needs a new set of tools to fulfil its 
tasks. What is at stake is the question of state autonomy, the maintenance of “command 
politics”. India then is a good example of the relevance of ideological channelling of 
politics through judicialisation. The Supreme Court judges recognise that liberalisation 
increases both — the potential returns from effectual state action and the costs of state 
ineffectiveness. India’s Constitution and the judicialised policy discourses establish the 
degree to which the political effects of economic change are mediated by superimposed 
interpretative frameworks; through judicialisation, the constitution becomes 
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consequential not just for individual cases and not just for the insights it offers, but 
because of its potential impact on economic policy. 
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CHAPTER NINE
The Music of the Veena: 
An Autochthonous Court
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As the Constituent Assembly of India met for the first time, on Monday, the 9th of 
December 1946, Sachchidananda Sinha, greeted the Honourable Members of the 
Assembly with his prayer that the Constitution may be ‘reared for “Immortality,” if the 
work of man may justly aspire to such a title, and it may be a structure of adamantine 
strength, which will outlast and overcome all present and future destructive forces.’  1
Three years later, it seemed that rather the Government of India Act, 1935, had been 
reared for “immortality” and as a structure of "adamantine strength" outlasted the 
intervention of the Constituent Assembly (Rothermund 2006, 245). The Nehruvian 
constitutional settlement in 1950 could thus be called an “export” of a majoritarian 
Westminster model given that about 250 of the 395 articles of the 1950 Constitution are 
literally or substantially identical with the Government of India Act, 1935 as passed by 
the British parliament (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, 72). Therefore, it is easy to 
understand the dissatisfaction of those who had yearned for autochthony: ‘We wanted 
the music of the veena or the sitar, but here we have the music of an English band. (K. 
Hanumanthaiyya, CAD, 17 November 1949.  However, though foreign in origin, the 2
indigenization of India’s constitution has continuously taken place at the operational 
level and in the context of the day to day administration of justice; in particular, the 
working of the Indian Supreme Court — and the ways Indians have worked the Court 
through a “user theory of law” (Nader, 1984, 26) — have brought about a constitutional 
form sui generis as well as a unique body of constitutional jurisprudence deriving from 
 CAD, 9 December 1946; Sachchidananda Sinha, Provisional Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, in 1
his Inaugural Address.
 CAD, 17 November 1949. 2
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a distinct institutional organisation that has been shaped by distinctively Indian 
contexts: mega-sized jurisdiction and corresponding workload and hyper-diversity, 
poverty and the problem of legal empowerment. When it came to solving these puzzles 
Indian judges have never been shy. From the early decisions of the Federal Court to the 
contemporary judicialisation of transparency campaigns, this thesis has analysed many 
bold judicial decisions that have shaped modern India and there can be no doubt that 
countless Supreme Court cases have directly affected the lives of millions of Indians. 
Taking together size of the jurisdiction, the unbounded approach to justiciability, and a 
political system that has created a perfect environment for judicialisation, it seems safe 
to say that India’s Supreme Court is the most powerful court in the world. 
It is not only Indian judges and Indian politicians who see the Court as a potent 
and powerful actor; judicial power has transformed the entirety of India’s governance 
structures to such an extent that civil society often looks to judges first. When Jean 
Drèze and the People’s Union for Civil Liberties wanted to address food security and 
malnutrition, they neither made an effort to speak to politicians or to approach 
parliamentary committees — instead they judicialised their preferences as a “right” to 
food and poured their time and resources into the filing of a public interest litigation at 
the Supreme Court.  Like many other reformers and social movements they concluded 3
that winning victories in courts is the best way to advance the cause of social change; 
and to understand the full scope of judicialisation we only need to remind ourselves of 
how quickly judicial bargaining power then turned employment guarantees from a key 
litigation demand  into landmark social security legislation and the passing of the 
 PUCL vs Union of India (Writ Petition [Civil] No. 196 of 2001. The role of litigation support structures 3
has been discussed mainly in Chapters Six and Seven.
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National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005. Above all, this thesis has tried to 
explore the political origins of such judicial empowerment — in case of the right to 
food, new pressures from below change judicial agendas through changing litigation 
support structures. This means that — with the Right of Children to Free and 
Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (Chapter) — the two most important acts of Indian 
welfare legislation of the 21st century derive from the Court. 
In case of the Narmada dam, judicialisation derived from the paralysis and 
political gridlock within the various branches of government as Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh tried to delegate his decision-making powers to the Indian Supreme 
Court so that he could never be blamed for deciding the height of the dam in favour of 
one section of his coalition government at the expense of the other (Wood 2007). The 
Prime Minister’s refusal to invest his own political capital into the resolution of political 
disputes within the UPA coalition, eventually led to a Supreme Court order reminding 
him that — as Prime Minister — he can either follow or refuse to follow the 
recommendations Review Committee of the Narmada Control Authority and that in case 
of a tie within that committee, the Prime Minister would be empowered to make a final 
and binding decision. Long gone are the days of Prime Minister’s letters to Chief 
Ministers and few other examples illustrate the transformation of India’s constitutional 
structure as well as this Supreme Court order to the Prime Minister; The Hindu’s 
headline — ‘Supreme Court empowers Manmohan to resolve Narmada dam 
dispute’ (April 18, 2006) — thus summarises the shift from parliamentary to judicial 
supremacy in a few words.  
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Throughout this thesis we have seen how judicial power expansion also flowed from 
events and developments outside of the realm of judicial decision-making, namely the 
transformation of the Indian party system. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, 
summed up all our data and observations in relation to fractionalisation, political 
competition, volatility and power diffusion when he commented on the NDA’s defeat in 
2004: ‘we do not know why we lost, those who were victorious do not know why they 
won’ (Times of India, November 24, 2004). Such hyper-competitiveness of Indian 
elections underlay and will continue to drive politicians’ support for powerful judges; 
we have explored numerous examples of cases in which political actors tried to achieve 
through litigation what could not be achieved through the ballot box. Maybe the most 
remarkable narrative in this respect was the Supreme Court’s intervention in the BJP’s 
cabinet infighting about disinvestment and how mere judicial signalling then allowed 
almost all political actors to realign in line with privatisation plans. 
The extent of judicialisation and judicial power is beginning to overwhelm even 
the Indian Supreme Court; Justice Agrawal observed during oral Supreme Court 
proceedings: 
We are fed up with this government. There is no accountability and nobody bothers 
about laws or guidelines. Nobody in the government works and the whole 
government has become non-functional. That is why PILs are filed. When we pass 
orders, those in power complain about judicial activism. When they are out of power 
they are happy and they come here [to the Court] for remedy. (The Hindu, August 6, 
2008).  
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With these backgrounds in mind, we had embraced Shapiro’s ‘political 
jurisprudence” (1964; 1983; Shapiro and Stone Sweet 2002) as a valid starting point for 
situating phenomenological accounts of the radical empowerment of India’s Supreme 
Court within a longitudinal framework of strategic metaphors. 
The core of political jurisprudence is a vision of courts as political agencies and 
judges as political actors. Any given court is thus seen as a part of the institutional 
structure of American government basically similar to such other agencies as the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, the House Rules Committee, the Bureau of the 
Budget, the city council of Omaha, the Forestry Service, and the Strategic Air 
Command. Judges take their places with the commissioners, congressmen, 
bureaucrats, city councilmen, and technicians who make the political decisions of 
government. In short, the attempt is to intellectually integrate the judicial system 
into the matrix of government and politics in which it actually operates and to 
examine courts and judges as participants in the political process rather than 
presenting law, with a capital L, as an independent area of substantive knowledge. 
Quite fundamentally, political jurisprudence subordinates the study of law, in the 
sense of a concrete and independent system of prescriptive statements, to the study 
of men, in this instance, those men who fulfil their political functions by the 
creation, application, and interpretation of law. (Shapiro 1964, 296-7) 
Combining our strategic account of judicial decisions with Chief Justice Hughes’ classic 
comment that ‘the constitution is what the judges say it is’ (1907, quoted in Roddey 
Holder 1997, 5) we have found the following pattern: Judges have increasingly asserted 
their own authority in the governance of the India whenever legislative politics, 
operating on the basis of majority rule, failed in finding efficient solutions. As soon as 
the executive or legislature become incapable of action, they will lose control of their 
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political authority and the Court — as an agency capable of focused, autonomous action 
— will act where the government and legislative is too divided to react. In such 
circumstances, policymaking and lawmaking will tend to be judicialised and migrate 
towards the sphere of the Indian Supreme Court as the only body that is capable of 
decisive action and ensuring political stability (Mitra 1999). It has been shown that 
judicial decision-making and judicialisation patterns are ultimately and inevitably 
shaped and altered by structural forces, be they economic, social, or — in India’s case 
— mostly political. The thesis departs from conventional explanations of judicial power 
in India, arguing that neither judicial behaviour nor normative political philosophies can 
account for the stunning rise of judicial power in India. Following Ran Hirschl the rise 
and fall of judicial power is explained through the search for political origins as the 
continuous presence of elections — the sine qua non of Indian democracy — has 
continuously increased complexity and uncertainty, and thus the demand for judicial 
review as “insurance.”  
 It is in this context, that this thesis has added the Indian Supreme Court to a general 
portrait of judges as “single-minded seekers of legal policy” (George and Epstein 1990, 
325). Just as comparative studies of courts around the globe have documented a hefty 
rise in ‘‘the power of judges’’ after the second World War, we observed the luxurious 
ascendancy of the Indian Supreme Court throughout the last three decades, as the 
endogenous rights revolution of the 1980s, the judicial coups d’états of the 1990s and 
the great innovation of basic structure constitutionalism have expanded the concept of 
judicial review in ways “unparalleled in the annals of world judiciary” (Baxi 1999, 
174). 
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It is not easy to dare to add an epilogue, thus traversing the boundaries of doctoral thesis 
writing to some extent. At the same time, there are earthquakes of such magnitude that 
to ignore them would be misleading.  
Summer 2001, I was happy co-authoring — with Professor Subrata K. Mitra — 
my first peer-reviewed journal article on the judicialisation of India’s personal law 
system. We were relying on High Court cases that awarded large maintenance payments 
to divorced Muslim women, thus, doing the very opposite of what the public thought 
the Rajiv Gandhi government had enacted into law following the Shah Bano 
controversy. We had heard from Professor Werner Menski that the Indian scholar Danial 
Latifi had filed a public interest litigation to clarify this aspect of judicial policy-making 
on an all-India basis, yet, as with so many other controversial public interest litigation 
cases, the Supreme Court decided not to decide for more than ten years. Shortly after we 
had submitted the final version of our article, the Indian Supreme Court suddenly 
decided Danial Latifi vs Union of India 2001 (7) SCC 740 on September 28, 2001. It 
was no coincidence (numerous Indian scholars have written about this) that the 
Supreme Court of India made this decision two weeks after 9/11, and it is quite likely 
that the judgment had been written a long time ago and the Court was simply waiting 
for the right moment ; in this case, the issue would not get much media attention, and 
especially Muslim communities would be pre-occupied and unable to carefully digest 
the case that came after Shah Bano.  
The fact that we had anticipated and spoken about such developments before they 
happened strengthened my resolve to engage with judicialisation studies and to focus on 
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the Indian Supreme Court. For a long time, all trends seemed to be flowing together 
beautifully, and in particular the UPA II was a “judicial-power-dream” come true; I felt 
confident that 2009 was a suitable cut-off date.  
The BJP victory 2014 did not shock me much. Firstly, it just added another layer 
of unpredictability over Indian elections and a politician’s risk of losing his seat seems 
greater than ever. Secondly, it will take a long time to understand whether 2014 will 
have a systemic impact and newspapers seem to underestimate the increased importance 
of vote transfers from pre-electoral allies and the continued centrality of coalition 
politics. Thirdly, Chapter Five’s analysis of amendment politics immediately clarifies 
that the BJP’s victory, though very impressive, does not even bring the party close to 
amendment power. However, the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 did 
come as a shock as I would not have expected Parliament to open the next battlefront in 
relation to judicial appointments. I put aside my doubts and stuck to the cut-off year 
2009, thus ignoring that the judicial coup d’état of the 1990s — when the Supreme 
Court deposed the Prime Minister from his established seat in the judicial appointments 
process — now had had a new coda. Since October 16, 2015, things look again 
differently, as the Supreme Court of India, for the first time in history, has simply struck 
down the entire Ninety-Ninth Amendment Act and the related statutory law by invoking 
the basic structure doctrine. While there is a lot to say about judicial appointments and 
accountability, if Modi’s victory really ushers into a new phase of a two-party system, 
then the Supreme Court was wise to postpone the debate about how judges should be 
appointed. Leaving aside all those questions, what has happened on October 16th had 
almost no political ramifications: politicians shrugged their shoulders and I have yet to 
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find a single attack on the basic structure doctrine. This is true judicial power, and also a 
little bit of heresthetics — like Kesavananda the judgment stretches out across more 
than a thousand pages and the “transaction costs” of reading such a long judgment are 
probably too high for many politicians.  
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Amendments to the Constitution of India, 1950-2009: 
Issues and Relation to Supreme Court
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CBI  Central Bureau of Investigation  
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BomLR  Bombay Law Reporter  
BJP  Bharatiya Janata Party  
CAD  Constituent Assembly Debates  
275
 
 
CJ  Chief Justice  
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Del  Delhi  
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